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Program Discusses Warsaw Pact PCC Meeting

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["Point of View" program moderated by Yevgeniy Osipovskiy, not further identified, with special correspondents Viktor Levin and (Sergey Shavykin) in Budapest]

[Text] [Osipovskiy] Hello, comrades. The program is presented by Yevgeniy Osipovskiy. It is going to be devoted entirely to matters to do with European security and world security as a whole, following the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee [PCC] conference held in Budapest this week. The ministers of foreign affairs and defense of six countries—Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Czechoslovakia, and the USSR—unanimously adopted and signed a protocol on the lapse of the military agreement concluded in the Warsaw Pact framework and the disbandment of its military bodies and structures by 1 April 1991.

It is being noted in connection with the conference results that this decision was adopted in light of the in-depth changes taking place in Europe and by way of implementing a decision of the Political Consultative Committee conference held in Moscow on 7 June last year, which declared that the military structures of the military and political alliances, including the Warsaw Pact, were coming to the end of their useful life at this new stage of European development. In June of last year, a joint conclusion was also reached that the evolving abandonment of a model of security based on blocs was becoming irreversible. It was stated that as new structures of European security came into being, transformation of the alliance would also become possible and necessary. A very important practical step has now been taken in this direction. Taking part in the program today are our special correspondents Viktor Levin and (Sergey Shavykin), who covered the Budapest conference in person. Viktor Nikolayevich, could you sum up in general terms the decision adopted in the Hungarian capital?

[Levin] Do not think I am dodging your question, but it seems to be desirable initially to tell listeners about the views of Bessmertnykh and Yazov, our minister of foreign affairs and minister of defense respectively, expressed by them hot on the heels of the conference. Their statements contain the word today, referring to 25 February. Let us listen together to what Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh had to say.

[Begin Bessmertnykh recording] This is the latest stage in the work commenced by the previous session of the Political Consultative Committee in Moscow last June. The Moscow PCC session decided in principle that the governments of Warsaw Pact member-states would jointly consider the question of winding down the military functions of the Warsaw Pact in light of all the processes of change taking place in the world, including those in states' strategic and defense doctrines. Our session today was preceded by fairly active work on the part of representatives of all states' governments. We considered the documents which had been prepared, and in particular the protocol which sets the conditions and main provisions for winding down the military structure of the Warsaw Pact. This was indeed the main objective of the present session and conference.

I would also like to say that simultaneously and in parallel with this session, Dmitriy Timofeyevich met his counterparts and I my own counterparts, the ministers of foreign affairs of the Warsaw Pact countries. We also managed to discuss a number of very important bilateral matters connected with the most varied aspects of our cooperation. In order for our comrades to be aware of this and for people at home to know what the gist of it is, I would like to stress that we think that at the present stage we should be more energetic in going on to secure our interests with regard to other countries on a bilateral basis, on a basis of bilateral agreements and treaties.

Such treaties are now being drawn up with almost all states. They deal, in particular, with matters having to do with ensuring the security of ourselves and our partners. We are now generally speaking energetically, coming to an understanding that what is important for the Soviet Union is above all the Soviet Union's security. The security of the rest of the world is also important to us of course, but our paramount consideration must be our own security. [end recording]

[Levin] This is Defense Minister Yazov's point of view.

[Begin Yazov recording] I would like to say in continuation of what Aleksandr Aleksandrovich was saying that the Warsaw Pact was created as s counterweight, so to speak, to the treaty which was created by the NATO bloc. According to contemporary views on peace this system of blocs does not ensure peace, it creates conditions for further confrontation. We are striving for peace, however, and someone had to take the first step. So we have taken the first step. We have signed an agreement on the dissolution of the military side, so to speak, of the Warsaw Pact. The Political Consultative Committee will still exist for some time yet, but the fact itself that there will be no military side to the Warsaw Pact, this says an awful lot in the first place about great confidence.

How else could it be? We have agreed on the unification of Germany, we have agreed on the withdrawal of troops from Europe. What sense is there in continuing to have, to have formally, I will say frankly, the Warsaw Pact, which will not be fulfilling its functions? Peace must now be ensured by other ways, by other methods. I think that that is the most important thing.

I completely agree with Aleksandr Aleksandrovich. He said that now the most important thing nevertheless is to think about one's own people, about defending it, about

defending our state borders. Although today we do not have any enemies who are preparing to attack, nevertheless there must be defenses, and the state's defense capability must be strengthened. Irrespective of our having signed this agreement, at meetings with certain defense ministers we talked about the necessity of further cooperation in the military sphere on a bilateral basis. There are many reasons for this. [end recording]

[Levin] I would like to augment what has been said with a number of specific facts, in the first instance, which reflect the deep changes in Europe which the ministers spoke about.

[Osipovskiy] There are indeed quite a lot of such facts. Of particular importance is the Paris Charter for the new Europe signed by the top leaders of the states participating in the Pan-European process. An important treaty was signed in Paris last November about conventional armed forces in Europe which will irrevocably bring military confrontation to an end and create the foundations for a new system of European security. A joint declaration of the 22 states has been adopted and is now in operation; they stated that they are no longer enemies and will construct relations of partnership and friendship with each other. One can say with complete confidence that the process of a collective creation of the new Europe has begun.

One of the fundamental innovative decisions of the Paris meeting was the setting up of a center for the prevention of conflicts which is called upon to play a very important role in strengthening trust and security.

[Levin] Since these facts have been brought up, I cannot help but mention the rather frequent alarmist articles, in some organs of the Soviet press. It is not just journalists, but also some people occupying eminent posts who are intensively trying to inspire the thought that because of crude miscalculations in our foreign policy—that is what they think—the USSR is once again in the position of a besieged fortress.

Do you remember the speech by General Makashov at the Russian Party Conference? In his words, after we pulled out of the countries of Eastern Europe without a fight, the security of the USSR was, he said, undermined. The prospect is now coming into view—this is once again in the words of such people—of the appearance of NATO formations on the frontiers of the USSR from the Baltic to the Black Sea.

At the same time there is very much speculation—I cannot call this anything else - being spread in connection with the unification of Germany. One of the leaders of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Communist Party stated that all Soviet people regarded this unification with a feeling of deep alarm.

Unfortunately, some of our party leaders are directly trying to speak on behalf of all the people. I have seen dozens of letters from war veterans, however, and I think that in this instance their opinions are particularly valuable—who does not share these fears? How can one speak seriously about the German military threat if in accordance with the accord reached at the talks between Gorbachev and Kohl, Germany has undertaken within four years to reduce the number of its armed forces to 370,000 men? This undertaking was laid down in international legal documents just like the undertaking by Germany not to have nuclear, chemical, and bacteriological weapons.

In truth, I get the impression that the attack on the new political course determined by the new thinking—let me remind you that this new thinking was formulated by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev—pursues the aims of taking us back, of pushing us back into the previous ideological and political framework, of substituting the word for the concept of pan-human values—by means of dogmatically interpreted class interests, and evidently pursues the aims of reviving the Stalinist model of socialism. It was in this model that the determining factors were those same, I repeat, dogmatically interpreted class interests and the tireless search for enemies of the people which stemmed from it.

Let us return to the question of the significance of the Budapest conference of the Political Consultative Committee. In my view, it has two dimensions—the immediate and the historical. The dominant feeling in the former is the feeling of collapse. There used to be the military organization of the Warsaw Pact and it no longer exists, they say. Our allies have dispersed in various directions.

[Osipovskiy] You must agree, however, Viktor Nikolayevich, that it is difficult to get away from that feeling. We lived for so many years in the Warsaw Pact Organization, for so many years repeated that this was the shield of peace and socialism, without it—without the Warsaw Pact—there would be no peace in Europe. Now, suddenly...

[Levin, interrupting] Yes, the stereotypes of bloc thinking, just like other stereotypes, keep a strong hold. Moreover, the Warsaw Pact really did play an important role. Excuse me if I once again digress from replying to the question of the significance of the decision adopted in Budapest, but I had a conversation with Polish Foreign Minister Skubiszewski here in the Hungarian capital about the role of the Warsaw Pact. Let us listen to a recording of it.

[Begin Skubiszewski recording in Polish with superimposed Russian translation] I would like to emphasize, Skubiszewski notes, that the situation today is completely different from 1955 when the treaty on creating this organization was signed in Warsaw. There is no such

threat from, for example, Germany today. Furthermore, compared with 1955 the situation has changed in the member-states of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and in Bulgaria and Romania. These states are now conducting a policy calculated on restoring European unity. As far as Poland is concerned, I would like to say decisively that Poland remains wide open to the East.

One should draw conclusions from the changes which are taking place. President Mikhail Gorbachev in his message to the heads of the Warsaw Pact member-states pointed out the role of bilateral relations, and this is a very considerable instrument in our new relations. I had a conversation this morning with Minister Bessmertnykh on the necessity for signing a new bilateral treaty. The draft of the treaty is already prepared and we shall present this draft soon. [end recording]

[Levin] That is what the Polish foreign minister says, and he is a major, internationally-recognized specialist in his area. To return to the question of the significance of the decision to abolish the military structures of the Warsaw Pact Organization. I give my word that I shall not digress further. I referred to the immediate dimension. It always bears a strong emotional coloring. If one thinks about it more deeply, however, I am sure that the decision which was made will influence the whole course of future events in Europe and, in the first instance, it is sure to affect NATO.

Considerable changes are taking place in the North Atlantic bloc. There, too, unilateral measures are being taken to limit armed forces. The disbandment of the military organization of the Warsaw Pact in essence means that there is no longer any reason to maintain such a structure in NATO. This must have an effect. In reply to a direct question on this theme, Aleksandr Churkin, head of the Information Directorate of the USSR Foreign Ministry, said this in Budapest:

[Begin Churkin recording] It now seems to us that to travel along a path determined by the existence of blocs is a manifestation of a certain old way of thinking. Therefore, to think in NATO categories, is not, it seems to us, the most fruitful way for constructing a new Europe. In general, the attempts to create some sort of structures even though they may be outside NATO—but some sort of enclosed structures, say security structures—is surely not the optimal path and the most correct one on the path toward creating a European home.

We consider that NATO, of course, could and should respond to the steps which we are now undertaking by disbanding the military organization of the Warsaw Pact, the North Atlantic bloc should disband its military organization, for example. On the other hand we do not think that this is a problem which we should particularly emphasize. We respect the various views which are being expressed in the West about the role of the North Atlantic bloc, also taking account of the fact that the well-known document was signed in Paris about the relations between NATO and the Warsaw Pact which states that these are organizations which are no longer mutually hostile. It is by taking all of these conditions into account that we are constructing our views of NATO and of the questions of the membership of this organization. [end recording]

[Levin] By the way, remember what Defense Minister Yazov said: We have set the example. I am sure that NATO, let me say it again, cannot pretend that nothing has happened.

[Osipovskiy] I would like to dwell in more detail on the position of the NATO countries. Indeed, there are changes taking place in the North Atlantic alliance, but not such fundamental ones as in the Warsaw Pact. Literally all the defense ministers of Western countries welcomed the decision adopted in Budapest. At the same time, however, they spoke in favor of continuing to ensure a reliable defense of NATO. Manfred Woerner, secretary general of NATO, noted that this organization did not intend to disband itself and would continue its activity; it did not need the image of an enemy for this.

According to Woerner, relations of partnership would be constructed with the USSR. This is a most significant remark. Perhaps if there is no enemy and the cold war stage has disappeared into the past, then the necessity for the existence of NATO diminishes, too. What, then, is the motivation of its representatives? Three basic reasons can be distinguished: the necessity for political cooperation between the 16 NATO member-countries; the maintenance of links between the United States and Western Europe; and the existence of many risks. One of these risks is said to be: Even if the threat from the Warsaw Pact has disappeared, there remains the dange of instability in the USSR, in Eastern Europe, and in the Persian Gulf region. In these conditions NATO comes out for maintaining a strong defense but at lower levels of armament.

I now have a question to ask of (Sergey Shavykin). What is your opinion of the way that events will further develop in the Warsaw Pact?

[(Shavykin)] I do not think anyone will be able to give a straightforward answer to this question today. Evidently, the main problem now facing the Warsaw Pact is the problem of preserving the organization, the political organization of the Warsaw Pact. Is there any reason to preserve this organization or is this organization no longer necessary? I asked this question of Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Jiri Dienstbier. My conversation, however, took place in the corridor, practically on the run.

[Begin Dienstbier recording in Czech with superimposed Russian translation] It is now very difficult to give a reply to this question. It is most likely that a routine meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the

Warsaw Pact will take place in Prague at the end of June or the start of July at which this question will be discussed.

In connection with this I would like to stress that only the military structure of the Warsaw Pact was abolished in Budapest. The mechanism for political cooperation continues to operate although, apparently, in a few months time decisive steps will be taken toward seeking new forms of cooperation on principles which are different from the previous ones.

[(Shavykin)] Meanwhile, six states remain in the structure of the Warsaw Pact, and they are united by some common principles. What are these principles? I asked this question of Hungarian Foreign Minister Geza Jeszensky at the news conference at the end of the session of the foreign and defense minsters.

[Begin Jeszensky in Hungarian with superimposed Russian translation] The princples uniting the six countries are no different from those on which relations are built in all the rest of Europe: good-neighborliness and mutual security; the ten basic principles of Helsinki and the Paris Charter for a New Europe; non-violence, and general democratic principles. [end recording]

[(Shavykin)] As can be seen from the reply of Hungarian Foreign Minister Geza Jeszensky at the news conference, the principles which unite the six states of Eastern Europe in the Warsaw Pact are indeed being preserved; and in this case the principles of the eastern part of the continent, or of its western or its central part, are the same. It is on these principles that the common European home will evidently be built, in which each neighbor will see only a friend in his partner and neighbor.

By the way, during the conversations in the corridors and meetings in Budapest, and in the statement published in the Hungarian press before the session of the Political Consultative Committee in Budapest, one gained the impression that the countries which have been united in the organization—both political and military, but now only political—of the Warsaw Pact are by no means breaking off relations with each other. Those relations will certainly be developing—they will develop on a bilateral basis.

Take, for instance, the interview I had with the press secretary of the defense ministry before the meeting began. He emphasized that the Hungarian Republic has already signed bilateral agreements on mutual trust in the military sphere with Romania and Czechoslovakia. Treaties with Austria and with Yugoslavia are being prepared. Talks with the Soviet Union are being successfully conducted through diplomatic and military channels. The Hungarian Republic hopes very much that by the middle of this year, it will succeed in signing a treaty on mutual trust in the military sphere with the Soviet Union. In other words, relations in the eastern part of the continent will be largely based upon bilateral agreements. The question remains whether the sum of the bilateral treaties will amount eventually to the creation of some new regional organization in the eastern part of the continent. I do not know. I cannot answer that question. The journalists are guessing, and so—to be honest—are the foreign ministers, as was evident even at the news conference. No doubt it is too soon to say. I think that most likely, in time—I can venture this prediction—some new regional organization will take shape in the eastern part of the continent. It is another matter, again, on what principles relations between these countries will be built. I do not think it will be any sort of political alliance. I do not think it will be a close military alliance. It will certainly be an economic alliance, however, since all the countries of Eastern Europe—I do not now know whether this is good or bad, but it is a reality, it is a fact—all these countries, the economies of all these countries are very strongly interconnected and very strongly interdependent.

By the way, immediately after the session of the PCC in Budapest, a session of the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance was to be held at the level of heads of government. That session, as our listeners of course know, was cancelled. There were many reasons for this. Frankly, I think the main reason was that the principles on which cooperation—purely economic cooperation—between our countries will be built just have not yet been determined. The fact that our countries will simply be predisposed, and forced, to cooperate in the economic sphere will also largely determine, I think, the future of our political contacts, which certainly will not be interrupted, but will develop on different principles than before.

[Osipovskiy] In conclusion, I want to return to the problems of security. Europe is now setting an example of how to work together to ensure trust-strengthening measures and the deepening of dialogue in the sphere of arms control and disarmament. There is no doubt, however, that one example is not enough. It looks very much as if what is happening in Europe is only the first step. The world as a whole is now undergoing qualitative changes—a universal process of transition from Cold War to global cooperation. New structures of security are going to emerge in other parts of the world, too—above all in Asia—possibly through an extension of the Helsinki process to that continent. It may be that we shall witness the emergence of new regional structures of security which wil enrich human civilization.

A special problem now is that of postwar security in the Gulf, in the Near East. That is another issue whose solution cannot be delayed. Undoubtedly this, too, will enrich international experience in this matter. In this regard I would like to say something more about the role of the UN. In my view the UN General Assembly has often been used more as a platform for propaganda than as a forum at which to draw up plans of joint action. Is

that organization capable, at the present crucial turning-point, of ensuring that it plays its part, or do we need to make radical changes to its orientation and structure?

Many are now inclined to the view that it should now become a sort of world government. The logic of this is quite clear: to try in our interdependent world to unite the efforts of all states in order to provide global and regional stability. Here a special role will be assigned to the UN Security Council, which must be given the widest powers and its own armed forces. It is an alluring idea. It seems to be something for the remoter future, however. Moreover, I for example am more impressed by the role of the UN as a center for coordinating the actions of the states, who, after all, retain their own functions. This makes it more possible to settle situations of conflict and clashes of various kinds by peaceful means. In this respect the structure of a new system of security is seen as a three-in-one construction: the states, regional systems, and general security under the aegis of the UN. Such are the considerations that arise when one analyses an important step such as the decision of the extraordinary conference of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee to rescind its military agreements and abolish its military organs and structures.

I thank our special correspondents in Budapest, Viktor Levin and (Sergey Shavykin) for taking part in the program. We now end "Point of View", which was presented by Yevgeniy Osipovskiy. Goodbye, comrades, and all the best.

TASS Reports U.S. Statements on Postwar Gulf

PM0703111991 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 6 Mar 91 First Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Persian Gulf: Postwar Routine"]

[Text] 5 March—U.S. President G. Bush stated in the White House Monday [4 March] that "great progress" had been achieved at the first meeting between the multinational forces' command and Iraq's military representatives. He positively appraised Iraq's release of the first 10 prisoners of war and the provision of information about the location of mine fields in Kuwait. The President stressed that the United States would seek the release of all the multinational forces' prisoners of war and of the Kuwaiti citizens seized by Iraq. "Complete and unconditional fulfillment by Iraq of all the relevant resolutions of the UN Security Council and the implementation of all the demands of Resolution 686 will enable progress to be made toward a permanent and stable cease-fire," G. Bush noted.

The White House announced that the United States intends to release 300 Iraqi prisoners of war. According to White House Press Secretary M. Fitzwater, the multinational forces have taken about 70,000 Iraqi servicemen prisoner. In his words, some of them "are declaring that they do not wish to return," and the United States "will try to find ways of taking account of their wishes." Commenting on reports of mass protests against Saddam Husayn's regime, M. Fitzwater stressed that they testify to the growing opposition to his rule. He also noted that the question of trying Saddam Husayn for war crimes must be decided by Kuwait and other countries in the region. However, he announced that the United States "is gathering evidence for a possible military tribunal." M. Fitzwater announced that if such a trial takes place, the United States will take part in it.

Before his tour of the Near East countries, U.S. Secretary of State J. Baker met on Monday with Italian Foreign Minister G. de Michelis and Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs J. Clark, who are also about to leave for talks in the region. "We are facing very difficult problems after the crisis," J. Baker said in conversation with journalists after his meeting with the Italian foreign minister. "This is precisely why it is important that we maintain firm unity for the solution of these problems." "The main aim of our actions after the crisis and the end of the conflict is to work to maintain the same level of cohesion and unity in the coalition as we had during the crisis and the conflict," G. de Michelis said in his turn. And the Canadian foreign minister stated that the aim of the tours was a common one—"to try and ensure that what we have experienced in the last seven months has helped to lay the foundations for a lasting and fair peace in the region."

On the same day Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs J. Clark received UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar in New York. The Canadian minister informed him of Ottawa's readiness to participate actively in the preparation and conduct of peacekeeping operations in the region.

U.S. Secretary of Commerce R. Mosbacher announced on Monday the setting up of an information center whose task will be to help U.S. companies wishing to take part in the restoration of Kuwait. The Persian Gulf "is open for enterprise," the secretary stated, stressing that private firms, rather than the U.S. Government, will be involved in the reconstruction of the shattered Kuwaiti economy. The U.S. secretary of commerce announced that about 300 contracts, worth a total of about $500 million, to carry out the most urgent restoration work in Kuwait had already been concluded. Some 70 percent of these contacts have been concluded with U.S. firms.

The end of the war in the Persian Gulf and the return of "normal life" to Iraq's cities was announced Monday by Baghdad Radio. This was the first mention by Iraqi mass media of the end of military operations in the region.

Ignatenko on Gorbachev-Major Talks, Persian Gulf

PM0703114991 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 7 Mar 91 Union Edition p 1

[Report by G. Alimov: "V. Ignatenko: Good Relations Are Developing Between the Two Countries' Leaders"]

[Text] On 5 March V. Ignatenko, the USSR president's assistant, held a routine briefing for Soviet and foreign journalists. Describing the results of M.S. Gorbachev's meeting with British Prime Minister J. Major, he said that it "was an amicable and frank meeting."

In the opinion of the USSR president's assistant, "good relations are developing and, perhaps, have already developed" between our president and the British prime minister. V. Ignatenko believes that J. Major derived great satisfaction from the conversations, from their cordiality and usefulness. He cited the British prime minister's words during a working luncheon in the Kremlin. J. Major wished success in the continuation, as he put it, of the great cause of perestroyka.

The high-ranking visitor from Britain was the first Western leader to have an opportunity to hear from President M.S. Gorbachev about Moscow's ideas on a postwar settlement in the Persian Gulf area. However, the briefer did not specify what the proposals were. In all probability, they will be discussed at the Supreme Soviet session.

Asked how M.S. Gorbachev reacted to the fact that J. Major had received representatives of the three Baltic republics in Moscow before meeting with him, V. Ignatenko replied:

"The prime minister of such a respected country is free to act as he sees fit. He can not only meet with representatives of the Baltic republics, but can also discuss with

them any matters he wishes. This is normal. So the reaction from our side is normal too."

The USSR president's assistant announced that U.S. Secretary of State J. Baker is expected to arrive in Moscow mid-March. He will arrive here immediately after his Near East trip. He is expected to meet with M.S. Gorbachev and USSR Foreign Minister A.A. Bessmertnykh. According to V. Ignatenko, the plan is to discuss a wide range of questions, including a whole range of issues connected with a settlement in the Persian Gulf area. Questions of bilateral relations will also be discussed.

Will the Soviet Union retain its positions in the Near East after the war in the Persian Gulf? According to V. Ignatenko, our positions there "remain stable and strong." The future of the region belongs to the peoples living and working there. And it must be decided primarily by them. Our attitude toward the region's problems is well known, the president's assistant said. We want to see peace and order there, and we want the norms of civilized relations to triumph there. It is important for all interested countries, including Israel, to participate in the settlement of the region's problems. V. Ignatenko stressed that the convening of an international conference on the Near East would make it possible to solve many questions. The Soviet side obviously expects the U.S. secretary of state to bring some ideas and proposals to Moscow.

Talking about the USSR president's work schedule, the briefer also announced that on 7 March M.S. Gorbachev will attend the ceremonial meeting to mark 8 March [International Women's Day], and on 11 March, the USSR president will have a meeting with Turkish President T. Ozal, who will be paying an official visit to Moscow. One of the most noteworthy events in the very near future is FRG Foreign Minister H.-D. Genscher's arrival in the USSR 18 March.

Churkin Discusses Superpower Status, FRG

LD0703200791 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 1530 GMT 7 Mar 91

[Interview with Vitaliy Churkin, chief of the Information Directorate of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, by Valentin Dvinin; from the "Meridian" program]

[Text] [Dvinin] Vitaliy Ivanovich, the question that I want to put to you concerns utterances circulating abroad that the Soviet Union has now lost its superpower status, and that the United States, especially in the light of the results of the Gulf war, has become the individual [yedinolichnom] leader in the world, the individual superpower. What can you say on this?

[Churkin] I think that the Soviet Union remains a very weighty figure on the world chessboard. It is not by chance that our position during the aforementioned Persian Gulf crisis throughout the entire six months was followed with such intense attention throughout the world. The fact that the Soviet Union was able to stand in the same row with the political coalition that spoke out against the aggression while at the same time preserving open communication channels with all interested sides, including Iraq, added authority to our foreign policy and diplomacy. Today the majority of serious politicians in the West, and for that matter in the whole world, understand that without the Soviet Union it is impossible to resolve the most complex international problems. And on this, it is not by chance that on completing his tour around countries of the Near East, U.S. Secretary of State Baker will travel to Moscow, where this problem—currently prominent in world politics—will be the subject of serious discussion. In the United States they understand that it will be practically impossible to solve the Near East problem without the Soviet Union.

I think that at the moment our weight in the international arena is defined by two factors: first, the trend of our foreign policy in the strategic sense, toward resolving those tasks in which the world is most interested at this time—arms cuts and eliminating regional conflicts; and second, the professionalism, the inventiveness, if you like, of Soviet diplomacy. I think that I can confirm that our foreign policy department remains a state structure which continues to function quite effectively. Of course much depends on the base on which Soviet foreign policy can lean; on whether we will succeed in successfully completing and continuing perestroyka; and on whether we will succeed in preserving the union. The last aspect is perhaps somewhat unexpected for us. In the world, in the overwhelming majority of cases, they are interested in seeing that the Soviet Union remains a great power, playing an important role in the international arena.

[Dvinin] Well, I think that the letters from viewers will show if you managed to convince them. I have another question, also a fairly delicate one: Recently, just a few months after the unification of Germany, calls began to resound there for the FRG to be made a permanent member of the UN Security Council—that is, one of the five places occupied at present by the victorious powers of World War II. As far as I know, Roland Dumas, French minister of foreign affairs, said categorically that his country will not permit a revision of the UN Charter. What is the position of our Foreign Affairs Ministry on this question?

[Churkin] At this stage we refrain from categorical appraisals, the more so since in any event this is such a problem that it will require a great deal of time to resolve. You see, it is not only Germany that is expressing an interest in becoming a permanent member of the Security Council. Japan, Nigeria, Brazil, and certain other countries are also coming out with the same claims. Changing the UN Charter, which would be required, is an extremely complicated process. The convening of a general conference is essential, and then

ratification by all UN member states of adopted decisions. Apart from that—and probably these matters will have to be attended to first and foremost—as a start, it is essential to do something about those articles in the UN Charter which talk about hostile states. Germany is meant here, first and foremost. It is obvious that this clause in the Charter is somewhat obsolete, so that for the time being, in the foreseeable future, we will resolve in practical terms these less complex questions connected with the UN Charter.

[Dvinin] Thank you.

Further on Talks at Spanish Foreign Ministry

LD0603204991 Moscow TASS in English 1945 GMT 6 Mar 91

[By TASS diplomatic correspondent]

[Text] Moscow March 6 TASS—Valery Nikolayenko, head of the Soviet Foreign Ministry's Directorate for Latin American Countries, held regular rounds of bilateral consultations on Latin American issues with representatives of the Spanish Foreign Ministry (February 26-27) and the U.S. Department of State (March 1).

The state of and prospects for the development of major political and economic processes in Latin America as well as the character and objectives of cooperation with Latin American countries were discussed during the consultations held at the Spanish Foreign Ministry, a spokesman for the Soviet Foreign Ministry's Directorate for Latin American Countries told TASS today in response to questions about the outcome of the consultations.

Matters aimed at promoting the process of political settlement and national reconciliation in Central America figured importantly during the consultations, the spokesman emphasised.

A wide coincidence of the Soviet Union's and Spain's positions on the above mentioned matters was noted. The two sides declared in particular for the adoption of all necessary measures in the interests of resolving the crisis situation in El Salvador as soon as possible, for the need for the sides involved in the conflict to show a well-considered and responsible approach and strictly observe the accords reached at the Geneva and Caracas meetings.

There was also an exchange of information on preparations in the Soviet Union and Spain for the celebration of the 500th anniversary of the discovery of America. It was recognised advisable to continue cooperation in this matter, the Soviet spokesman said.

The two sides emphasised the need and importance of the continuation and intensification of contacts on Latin American problems.

As for a meeting with Bernard Aronson, U.S. assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs, it focused on Central American problems, the Soviet spokesman said.

The two sides reaffirmed their support for the dialogue which the El Salvadorean Government and the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front are having under the auspices of the United Nations secretary-general on a political settlement and declared in favour of giving a boost to this process and creating favourable conditions for its further development. The Soviet and U.S. sides set out their considerations about measures which could give a new impetus to the negotiating process, the spokesman said.

In connection with the question, touched upon by Aronson, about the recent discovery of Soviet-made weapons on Honduran territory—weapons which Honduran rebels ostensibly received from Sandinistas—the Soviet side reaffirmed the Soviet Union's principled stand on that score, the Soviet spokesman stressed.

The Soviet position is that, under the terms of Soviet military cooperation with Nicaragua, weapons that were supplied there at one time, may not be transfered to a third party without the Soviet Union's consent, the spokesman explained.

Since the end of 1988 the USSR has not been supplying its weapons to Nicaragua at all. Soviet weapons have never been and are not supplied to other countries in the region, the Soviet spokesman stated.

Other topical problems of Latin America were also considered during the meeting with Aronson, the two sides highly appreciated the established practice of regular political consultations of Latin American problems, a high level of trust and mutual understanding achieved during the consultations, and pointed out a great importance of further development of Soviet-U.S. cooperation in Central America, including the El Salvadorean peace process, the Soviet spokesman said.

UN Rights Panel Session Proceedings Reported

PM0803101591 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 7 Mar 91 Second Edition p 4

[Special correspondent V. Bolshakov article: "Colors on the Map: Meetings at the Palais des Nations in Geneva"]

[Excerpts] Geneva—There is demonstration after demonstration in front of the Palais des Nations building in Geneva these days. On a patch of thawed ground between flagpoles stands a tent where hunger strikers are campaigning for Tibetan independence from China. For several days in a row, Kurds holding red banners have picketed. Placards and eyewitnesses from all over the world tell of those who have disappeared without trace in countries in Latin America and of those who have been tortured in jail.

At the Human Rights Center in Paris I was given a map on which countries with the poorest human rights record are colored red. Our country is no longer marked on the map in red, by the way. The USSR is shown in more soothing tones because the situation in our country is considered "near to normal."

The UN Commission on Human Rights was set up precisely to monitor how these rights are being observed in the world and how far the countries which have ratified the main international pacts and conventions on protecting human rights are true to their spirit and letter. And therefore a large part of the commission's work is dedicated to questions of human rights violations and the discussion of reports on countries with the poorest record. [passage omitted]

The UN commission not only monitors the observance of human rights but also formulates policies on them. The sensation of the 47th Session [of the UN Commission on Human Rights] was the speech by Ukrainian Supreme Soviet Chairman L.M. Kravchuk, who reported on how work to safeguard human rights in that republic is progressing and on the Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic]'s new proposals on protecting mankind's ecological rights. What does this term mean? Prof. V.I. Vasilenko, head of the Ukrainian SSR delegation, told our correspondent: "For some years now we have been putting forward the idea of the need to elaborate and enshrine in law the inalienability of man's ecological rights. At this session we will be adopting a resolution which instructs the commission's special rapporteur to study the problem of the interconnection between human rights and the environment. What do we have in mind? First and foremost the right to live in a healthy environment. The right to ecologically clean food and everyday goods of a similar quality. There is the right to ecologically safe working conditions and the right to obtain and disseminate reliable ecological information—on the state of the environment, on food, and so forth. And finally, the right of each individual to take part in the adoption of those decisions which affect the environment. Specifically this means the siting of hazardous enterprises in this or that region, the use of ecologically harmless technologies, and so forth."

The Ukraine has also raised at this session the question of states' responsibility for the violation of human rights, especially with regard to agreements on the observance of those rights which have been ratified by national parliaments.

Enrique Bernales, the Peruvian diplomat who is chairman of the 47th session, received me after the discussion of the draft resolution on the human right to ownership of property. The draft is coauthored by the United States, some other countries, and the Soviet Union, which is significant in itself. I asked Senor Bernales what is particularly noteworthy about the current session.

It is very important, he noted, that a number of resolutions expanding the concept of "human rights" have already been adopted. For example, the resolution on the right to development. The session has also shown that the confrontation which marked the cold war years has gone and, let us hope, gone forever. It is being confidently replaced by constructive cooperation between states.

[Bolshakov] What is the session saying about the human rights situation in the USSR?

[Bernales] There have been speeches which mentioned the situation in the Baltic republics. I do not know whether this will develop into a separate draft resolution on this question or into some kind of statement. I think, however, that the delegations cannot fail to notice that the USSR representative's speech was quite self-critical about the past and the events which have occurred in those republics. We are also taking into account the positive changes in the observance of human rights in the USSR and the measures to democratize the country and improve the Soviet Constitution. [Bernales ends]

Nevertheless, a "Baltic resolution" sponsored by Sweden and seven other states with the active involvement of the United States was prepared backstage at the session. As I was told by the Soviet delegation, the Common Market countries are formally desisting from that at the moment although they do support the draft. "Our delegation," Prof. Yu.S. Kolosov said, "believes that such a resolution will not be beneficial either to cooperation in Europe or our internal affairs."

Fortunately this document was not put to the vote and has remained in the wings.

The lights burn late into the night at the Geneva Palais des Nations. The agenda of the 47th Session of the UN Commission on Human Rights is very strenuous. And there is much to be done before the session ends 8 March.

International Medical Consortium Formed in USSR

LD0603121691 Moscow TASS in English 1151 GMT 6 Mar 91

[By TASS correspondent Eleonora Sutotskaya]

[Text] Moscow March 6 TASS—The International medical consortium set up in the Soviet Union will be a flexible system producing medicines and medical technology.

The consortium unites key research centres, plants with novel technologies, hospitals and clinics.

The consortium was set up within the framework of the forum of scientists and specialists for Soviet-American dialogue non-government organisation. [sentence as received]

Its presentation ceremony was held in Moscow today.

The consortium will specialise in cardio-vascular, anti-tumour and sedative medicines, including those based on herbs, medical and diagnostic equipment, train specialists, design hardware and finance research and development.

"The lack of medicines in the Soviet healthcare system is catastrophic. This year only a third of demand was satisfied. The situation with medical and diagnostic equipment is equally bad," consortium president Nikolai Karkshchenko told TASS.

"Giant centralised ventures have no future in this industry. An alternative system is necessary—for instance, broad commercial cooperation between scientific centres and plans to promote creativity and initiative. This is the best way in market conditions," he said.

"There are lots of engineering ideas in the Soviet Union, but Soviet technologies do not always allow their implementation," Karkishchenko said.

"The consortium plans to develop international cooperation. Among its foreign partners—the American medical consortium, Bayer and Hehst German firms, several U.S. And European universities. It is now discussing cooperation with firms in China, South Korea, Greece and Finland," he said.

United States & Canada

IZVESTIYA on Bush Speech to Congress

PM0803094791 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 8 Mar 91 Union Edition p 1

[Correspondent V. Nadein report: "Sights Set on Domestic Problems: Speech by President Bush in U.S. Congress"]

[Text] Washington—President Bush is building on his success by using his unparalleled popularity as commander in chief of a victorious army to secure the rapid solution of a number of urgent domestic policy problems. This is the conclusion of observers commenting straight after the U.S. leader's speech at a joint sitting of the houses of Congress.

This speech, delivered Wednesday evening, was accompanied by such tumultuous applause, such whistling (the ultimate expression of American enthusiasm), and such frenzied waving of the national flag that it was more like the ecstasy of deranged sports fans than a meeting of venerable statesmen. But that is precisely the kind of atmosphere that the Republican President is counting on to push a package of major domestic laws through a predominantly Democrat congress.

On the eve of Secretary of State Baker's departure for a number of countries in the region where until recently war was being waged, the President listed the four key problems which together shape the main thrust of America's diplomatic efforts in the Near East.

Recognizing the fact that America's most vital interests depend on peace and stability in this region so fraught with conflicts, the President talked about the U.S. readiness to contribute to ensuring security in the region, not, however, through a permanent presence of ground forces in the Arabian peninsula but through participation in joint maneuvers between land and air forces and through maintaining an active U.S. naval presence in the region.

This was the first main point of the program. Bush's second point was the nonproliferation of weapons, first and foremost weapons of mass destruction, in the region.

In this context the President stressed particularly forcefully that Iraq "must not have access to the instruments of war." The speech did not make clear what mechanism is capable, in the U.S. opinion, of guaranteeing that Iraq will not retain or obtain the ability to produce and acquire weapons.

However, Bush's expressed confidence that come what may, "Saddam Husayn and the people around him" will pay in full for the suffering they have inflicted on the population of neighboring Kuwait and the people of other countries, above all the people of Iraq, may provide a partial answer.

Taken together with the expressed hope that the day is near when the international community will accept the "friendly Iraqi people" into its ranks, this sounds like a rather gloomy prediction for the brutal and wild dictator of that country.

By all accounts, the provisions of point three of the President's program are now being studied especially closely in Israel. Even though that country did not take part in the combat actions against Iraq and was merely the victim of missile attacks, the U.S. President stressed that "for the first time Israel and many Arab countries stood against the same aggressor."

In view of that, Bush proclaimed that "the time has come to end the Israeli-Arab conflict."

Without mentioning Israel, although clearly having in mind the Israeli explanation of the reasons for retaining the occupied Arab territories, Bush said that "geography does not guarantee security, but security cannot be based exclusively on military force." He also called for a return to UN Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 on this score.

The phrase that the "tactics of terror lead nowhere" sounded even more pointed when used by the President, and is clearly aimed at the continuing intifadah in the Israeli-occupied territories.

Point four of the program relates to the economic development of the region. Bush described its wealth of natural resources and talented population as the guarantee of rapid restoration. In this regard he pinned special hopes on the "redirection" of the vast oil-based wealth away from military aims and the acquisition of weapons in various distant countries to the tasks of peaceful construction.

There can be no doubt that there will be no objections to the President's program for international cooperation, especially in the Persian Gulf region—and not only because the President's postwar popularity surpasses all previous examples. However, even this colossal political advantage may not work when it comes to domestic problems.

Everyone breaks out into rapturous applause these days when the names of R. Cheney, the defense secretary, C. Powell, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and—particularly—General N. Schwarzkopf, commander of the U.S. armed forces in the Gulf, are mentioned. That happened many times Wednesday evening.

When it comes to the financial and economic figures in the present administration, however, no one breaks out into applause. The forecasts of economic recovery are having to contend with the woeful figures in the account books, but the shoots of the next boom are still weak and vulnerable. Therefore the President's statement that at the end of the victorious war Americans already have every reason for getting down to business, investing, and buying sounds more like a rallying cry than a statement of fact.

The war in the Gulf was a difficult test for a world community which has still not created strong traditions and unshakable rules for the post-cold war period. In the U.S. President's opinion, the community "passed this test." This shows in particular that Soviet-U.S. relations have every chance of developing with the same propitious acceleration that they acquired before this war.

Commentary Views Bush Mideast Plan Aspects

LD0703192191 Moscow World Service in English 1210 GMT 7 Mar 91

[Yuriy Solton commentary]

[Text] Following his official announcement about the need of the war with Iraq at a joint session of both houses of the American Congress, President George Bush has spelled out a plan for a post-war settlement in the Middle East. Now our commentator Yuriy Solton, with these comments:

I do not know what the official Soviet reaction will be. The plan calls for scrutiny. There is no doubt that it will be discussed at the end of next week when the secretary of state, James Baker, arrives in Moscow after his Middle East trip. My first impression is that the White House is thinking in earnest about how to stabilize the situation and eliminate the main causes of tension in the region.

As far as I can judge by first reports, the United States seems to show some signs of departure from the one-sided orientation on Israel as its only ally. Symptomatically, President Bush urged the Arab nations and Israel to come to terms through mutual compromises. Mr. Bush voiced support for the UN Security Council resolutions demanding that Israel would pull out from the Arab lands it occupies and recognizing the right of each state in the region, Israel included, to safe existence. However, it's unclear how far the United States plans to go to solve the problem in concrete terms.

The eight Arab anti-Iraqi coalition allies at a conference in Damascus have declared that convening an international peace conference under UN auspices is the most acceptable means for a settlement, including a fair solution to the Palestinian issue. Such a view is shared in Moscow, Paris and some other capitals. However, Tel Aviv says categorical no. Washington has up till now tacitly welcomed such intransigence. Can anything be changed now? At this stage we can only guess.

President Bush spoke in favor of control over deliveries of mass destruction weapons to the region. Such an intention deserves approval. By and large the flow of weaponry to the Middle East from the United Sttes and other countries, the Soviet Union included, precipitated the Gulf war. But how can Washington's sane intention be reconciled with action? The administration already plans to sell to Egypt aircraft with rockets and bombs for a sum of $1.6 billion. Saudi Arabia will ostensibly be allowed to keep part of the arms airlifted to its territory for the war against Iraq. And Israel will get from the United States $650 million to offset the swelled spendings on arms.

There is yet another point in Mr Bush's plan I object to. I mean the assumption by the United States of police functions in the region. The President voiced readiness to make an American contribution to guaranteed security by involving the USA in joint exercises of ground and air forces and by maintaining the combat- ready naval U.S. presence in the region. It seems to me that in principle, a military meddling in the affairs of the region as a whole is inadmissible. And, speaking concretely, after the destruction of the Iraqi military machine, the Arab countries are able to settle conflicts themselves and find opportunities to avoid the repetition of armed clashes.

TASS Sees Baker's Moscow Talks as 'Difficult'

LD0703144491 Moscow TASS in English 1314 GMT 7 Mar 91

[By TASS commentator Pavel Vasiliyev]

[Text] Moscow March 7 TASS—Now that the results of the Gulf conflict are being summed up, one of the key issues comes to the fore: How will Gulf events influence Soviet-American relations?

The reply to this question will depend not only on what has happened but also on how realistically the two powers will behave themselves.

They have shown the maturity of ideas and actions for the time being. The two powers have passed several critical points when one or two wrong steps could have entailed a dangerous relapse of mistrust and confrontation, which could have been followed by an escalation of political miscalculations.

Despite the common line to oppose the Iraqi aggression, the USSR and the United States formed, over the six months of the crisis, their own approaches on the basis of their own interests, which did not fully concur.

However, Soviet-American cooperation helped find common ground for correct actions. The Soviet-American joint statements in Helsinki and Washington show the broad sphere of concurring interests and approaches of the two countries.

Nevertheless, the start of the land offensive by multinational forces, when Moscow was convinced of a chance to avoid this phase of the conflict, put Soviet-American cooperation to a serious test.

Later, the two sides made efforts not to aggravate this test. The cease-fire and the resumption by the U.N. Security Council of the problem's discussion helped overcome tactical differences between Washington and Moscow.

But, have the two countries overcome all political and psychological differences?

Judging by direct or indirect attempts to put into doubt the policy for cooperation between the USSR and the United States, it is difficult to give a completely positive reply to this question.

Considerable political and diplomatic efforts will be needed to strengthen the present level of Soviet-American relations.

There are some differences not only on Middle East issues. Arms limitation issues should be also settled at the negotiating table, otherwise these issues may lead to unfavourable political consequences.

The United States should clarify its intentions against the background of the difficult political evolution in the USSR.

These three questions will evidently be the main items on+ the agenda of U.S. Secretary of State Baker's talks in Moscow next week.

The talks will probably be difficult, but it looks like that there are chances for progress and better understanding between the two countries on each of these points.

Current Status of SDI Program Viewed

PM0703152191 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 5 Mar 91 First Edition p 3

[G. Khromov article: "The Main Affair of the 20th Century: How Things Are Proceeding With the Implementation of the American SDI Program"]

[Text] Eight years have passed since the announcement in the United States of the so-called strategic defense initiative (SDI) program, which the public immediately nicknamed the Star Wars program. In the words of the then President R. Reagan, SDI was to defend the entire United States territory from a missile strike. At the same time, world public opinion also held it to be a means of safeguarding a first nuclear strike, as a country possessing global ABM defenses could rely on remaining unpunished in the event of such a strike. Furthermore, it was considered that the SDI program's implementation would bring the United States immense technical advantages.

To date the SDI program has already gobbled up more than $20 billion. This is considerably more than the cost of the atomic bomb project, and almost as much as the project to put a man on the moon. And what are the results?

The program's originally declared aim has already been officially recognized as overambitious even for such a rich and technologically advanced country as the United States, and its newly declared aim—to defend very important facilities—confirms the appraisal given earlier of the possible aggressive orientation of the program, whose implementation might undermine the foundations of the agreement on a 50 percent reduction in strategic offensive weapons, which is near to conclusion.

In the opinion of many specialists there has also been no serious technical progress. P. Zimmerman writes in the Pentagon publication DEFENSE NEWS (21 January 1991): "In the course of research in the field of strategic defense there have not been any new scientific discoveries, and not one of the concepts talked about back in 1983 has been significantly developed at all." Work in such areas as the development of a nuclear-pumped laser, charged particle beam generators, electrodynamic mass accelerators, and excimer lasers, which were considered to be essential at the beginning of the program, have been practically completely halted due to their scientific untenability or practical infeasibility.

At present the SDI program's developers still have a version of the system ("Brilliant Pebbles"), based on kinetic kill principles, "on the boil." But, many specialists consider that this, too, is leading nowhere. This version envisages using many thousands of satellites put into orbit around the earth, each of which is equipped with its own motors, sensory systems, guidance systems, and kill systems. The technical and economic viability of such a system has not been confirmed. Many specialists claim that it is impossible to imagine a system which can be tested in no other conditions than in combat. And where will they find these conditions?

The present SDI project's authors themselves are thinking up Star Wars scenarios which look consistent, if only in the eyes of a simpleton. In particular, they are trying in every way to play up the nonnuclear interception of missiles and nuclear warheads, as this is the only case in which the radar, optical, thermal, and other tracking system sensors do not become "blinded"; and without these it is impossible to engage the system's kill systems. And here the projects' authors hush up the fact that the other side is not going to act in accordance with this scenario.

In order to extract any funds at all from Congress, SDI's backers resort to speculative statements. For example, according to them the Soviet Union is creating its own ABM defense system at an intensified pace, and in a number of areas—laser technology for one—has already superseded the United States. It has been claimed in the American publication SOVIET MILITARY POWER over a number of years that the world's first laser complex (such facilities are part of the SDI program's projects) which is capable of taking out American satellites, has been built and is operational at the Soviet testing range in the area of Saryshagan. But the very first visit to this testing range by representatives of the American public and American specialists in 1990, ended in the confusion of the authors of the said publication. The lasers in Saryshagan turned out not only to be incapable of taking out satellites, but cannot even be seen as prototypes of such types of arms.

In this connection I would like to point out that the move toward openness in the military sphere, including in work connected with ABM defenses, should secure the strengthening of trust between the countries. This is why at the talks on nuclear and space weapons, our country speaks in favor of securing predictability in the sides' activities regarding ABM defenses. Overall our intentions are clear—we are for the preservation of the 1972 ABM Treaty.

However strange it may seem, the most responsible figures in the U.S. Administration are even using the events in the Persian Gulf to "push" the SDI program. See how effective the Patriot antimissile system is, they say, and how simple it is to destroy Iraqi Scud missiles with their help. You might ask: What has this got to do with the SDI program? Systems of the Patriot type relate to so-called tactical ABM defense, and include antimissile missiles with nonnuclear warheads and a real capability to effectively resolve the problem of defending military facilities and cities against operational-tactical missiles which are also not equipped with nuclear warheads (such systems are not banned by the 1972 ABM Treaty). The Patriot system is of no significance for the balance of strategic nuclear forces, and to the present day has never been regarded as an element of strategic defense. As congressmen joke, the organization for the implementation of the SDI program "is simply trying to find itself a job to do," as, you see, it has to justify its existence somehow.

But, in respect of SDI's main element—its space-based systems—the Congress adopts a far from amusing attitude: During recent years it has regularly banned the administration from carrying out full-scale experiments in space to hone particular components of this program, seeking to prevent infringements of the ABM Treaty. Congress expressed its attitude toward the program in a yet more serious manner when it ratified the latest military budget.

Compared to the preceding year, appropriations for the year 1991 have been reduced for the first time during the program's lifetime. Moreover, Congress has reduced the appropriations by 25 percent at a stroke—to $2.9 billion, and today the question of a further reduction in appropriations for fiscal 1992 is already being discussed. The legislators are clearly proceeding on the basis that it is not expedient to continue work on SDI with the aims and tasks originally set for it—it is at least necessary to fundamentally amend the program. In addition, some congressmen propose separating actual work on tactical ABM defense systems, handing this work over to the Army, from the specifically theoretical projects which are strictly speaking part of the SDI program; and this will, no doubt, be yet another obstacle to SDI's future.

It is obvious that in no small measure this attitude of the American Congress is determined by the whole gamut of the present-day realities of international relations, the strengthening of Soviet-American links, primarily in the field of disarmament, and the irreversible movement toward a world without nuclear wars.

'Studio 9' Discusses USSR-U.S. Relations

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["Studio 9" program moderated by Professor Valentin Sergeyevich Zorin, political observer of Soviet Television and Radio, with Jack Matlock, U.S. ambassador to the USSR; Boris Dmitriyevich Pyadyshev, chief editor of the journal MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN; and Andrey Serafimovich Grachev, deputy chief of the CPSU Central Committee International Department]

[Text] [Zorin] Hello, comrades. Participating in our talk today in "Studio 9" of the Ostankino television center is Mr. Matlock, U.S. ambassador to the USSR; Boris Dmitriyevich Pyadyshev, chief editor of the journal MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN, doctor of historical sciences, who has the rank of ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary; and Andrey Serafimovich Grachev, well-known Soviet political scientist and deputy chief of the CPSU Central Committee International Department.

Well, I think that the participation of the U.S. ambassador in our program gives you an opportunity to guess the topic of our discussion today. Indeed, we want to talk about the present state of Soviet-U.S. relations. I must say that the "Studio 9" mail has recently had a preponderance of letters devoted to this topic. The regular viewers of our program are people with a deep interest in international affairs who are not satisfied solely with routine information. We try to be attentive to their opinions; therefore, the tone of our mail suggests a need to talk today about Soviet-U.S. relations.

Many of the letters' authors asked the question quite specifically: Is it possible that a certain cooling in Soviet-U.S. relations has become noticeable recently? It is curious that the number of letters of this sort increased noticeably after the Soviet-U.S. summit, scheduled for the middle of this month in Moscow, was postponed. I get the impression that not all of our television viewers are satisfied with the official reasons that were given by both sides as the reason for postponing the meeting.

You may recall that one of these reasons was the need for President Bush to remain in Washington during military activities in the Persian Gulf. The second reason mentioned was that the strategic offensive arms treaty, which was supposed to be signed during the summit meeting, was not completely finalized.

I tell you quite frankly that to some extent I share some of the doubts of our television viewers. If the first reason appears to be more or less plausible, the second one, about the treaty's not being ready—it says that some technical details of the treaty have not been finalized—does not convince me, because if the desire on both sides

was great the technical details could probably be ironed out by the necessary date. In the past we managed to resolve far more complex problems, and arguments of this sort did not seem to be convincing.

Well, it is also hard to ignore some other facts that give cause to ponder the state of Soviet-U.S. relations today. For example, the conventional arms treaty that was signed in Paris, has not yet been submitted for ratification. This attracts attention. Economic relations are not showing much progress. The U.S. Congress has adopted a resolution on the Baltics that recalls less favorable times in Soviet-U.S. relations.

It is noticeable that both in Washington and in Moscow, I emphasize in Moscow, all sorts of criticism has recently been leveled at various aspects of Soviet-U.S. relations. Words such as sanctions and unjustified concessions have been bandied about. I want to emphasize again that this is happening both in Washington and we also run into such statements in Moscow. I think that we now have every reason to ask the question as to whether or not we can talk about some cooling in Soviet-U.S. relations, or, as engineer Denisov, our television viewer from Tomsk, writes: Could we be threatened by what happened with detente in the seventies?

So, let us begin our discussion with you, Boris Dmitriyevich. How would you respond to this question?

[Pyadyshev] Valentin Sergeyevich, I suppose that when you ask us this question you do not expect that we will begin nodding our heads in unison and say: Come now, no, of course not, the sources of development of Soviet-U.S. relations have by no means dried up, our relations have good prospects, and they will continue to develop in the future.

But, nevertheless, let us take a look at what Soviet-U.S. relations are like in reality in their present form. This is a fairly stratified and complex structure. First we have bilateral relations themselves, in the traditional sense. But the burden of the two superpowers has hung like a heavy weight over them throughout the post-war decades. This burden could not fail to have an influence on the nature and essence of the bilateral relations themselves. Often the influence was negative.

There is also another third layer, a layer borne of many years of confrontation, the cold war between the Soviet Union and the United States, between the two systems which were headed by our powers. This layer had the most negative influence on our bilateral relations. Only now is the point approaching at which we are beginning to strive for and achieve some practical results in disassembling the top layer and making some corrections in the third layer, and only now in the past two or three years have we begun practical and productive work aimed, strictly speaking, at developing bilateral relations.

As far as the essence, the most fundamental issues are concerned, and of course these are economic issues, here I must regretfully say that we are at a very, very low level. I do not have figures for all of last year, but for the first half of last year our turnover of goods with the United States amounted to about 1.8 billion dollars-rubles, we can round this out to $2 billion, and to about $4 billion for the year. This seems like an impressive figure, but what we see is that of these $2 billion in turnovers for the half year our exports account for just 200 million rubles, whereas the entire remainder of this gigantic sum goes to imports of U.S. goods into the Soviet Union. Last year our two countries increased their goods turnover by about 50 percent. Once again these seem to be encouraging figures, but of this 50 percent increase, 60 percent went towards increasing imports of U.S. goods while we unfortunately decreased our exports to the United States by 10 percent.

In a word, concluding my thoughts on this topic I would like to say, that presently we are at a crossroads. Very energetic factors are at work in favor of really moving our Soviet-U.S. relations onto a firm, stable, and reliable basis. At the same time, unfortunately, trends and factors that work in the opposite direction are also fairly strong.

[Zorin] Mr. Ambassador, your point of view on this question.

[Matlock] Well, first of all I would not call the current situation a slump in relations, of course, we are not talking about the situation, say, in the seventies. I think this is simply not only an exaggeration but possibly reflects a lack of understanding of the basic facts. It remains a fact that we are cooperating on very important questions. We are cooperating in the Security Council over the question of Iraq's aggression against Kuwait. This is a very important question. For the first time in history, that is in post-World War II history, we have managed to cooperate with the Soviet Union on the important question of security. This cooperation allowed the United Nations to act as it was initially planned. This is very important.

Now as far as bilateral relations are concerned. Of course there will be a meeting of our presidents. They have already become a regular thing. I think we should not look for additional reasons for why the meeting should be later rather than sooner. Presently our military forces, our Armed Forces are engaged in combat and it is simply impossible for our President to be outside of the United States for four or five days. This is a fairly critical time for us and he is the commander-in-chief of our Armed Forces. I think this is clear.

As far as the strategic arms treaty is concerned, it is in fact not quite ready. We are very close, and it is true that the questions that have not been solved yet are technical questions. But in a treaty of this kind even technical questions are very important questions. Moreover, this is a very long treaty and the work of lawyers on its text is a fairly extensive job. So of course it is not a tragedy that they will meet somewhat later.

It must be admitted that on our side a certain amount of caution has appeared in our relations, although generally I consider our relations healthy. But there is some caution, particularly as a result of the events in the Baltics and particularly as a result of a certain vagueness about whether or not the Soviet Union has changed its course. Caution does in fact exist, but we are not talking about a return to the past, to confrontation or a cold war. No, we are only talking about the future, about what our cooperation may be like.

Of course if the previous Soviet policy course continues we hope for very broad cooperation. If the course changes, this will mean that cooperation will be more restricted. But this does not mean that there will be confrontation, that there will be sanctions, that there will be a renewal of the cold war. I think this is completely excluded.

[Zorin] It is very gratifying to hear such an optimistic opinion from the United States Ambassador. But what Ambassador Matlock has said suggests the following question, to you Andrey Serafimovich. The ambassador has mentioned the events in the Baltics in particular, and it crossed my mind that—just take a look—while Soviet-U.S. relations were rolling along a smooth road, along a highway, they developed fairly rapidly and in an upward direction. But as soon as certain difficulties and crises appeared, be it what is happening in the Persian Gulf or the events in the Baltics, certain interruptions began. Be it as you say Mr. Ambassador, but nevertheless, there have been some interruptions. Things are not as rapid or smooth as they were before.

Now in connection with this, Andrey Serafimovich, I would like to ask you this question: Can a conclusion be drawn from what is happening, about a certain lack of reliability, some kind of fragility in those positive processes that had occurred in Soviet-U.S. relations?

[Grachev] You know, Valentin Sergeyevich, returning to the first question—although generally the second one continues it—I would say that in the situation of the past few weeks I am bothered less by the decreasing speed or what you called a slow down or some kind of interruption. In relation to what scale, first of all? Who established the scale. When could the scale and this speed, according to which our relations must travel, be established? Moreover we agree with the fact that generally we have entered into an unprecedented phase in their development. Therefore there can be no timetable here.

I am probably more worried about something else—the speed with which unexpectedly those things that you mentioned, the demons of past stereotypes, began to suddenly come to the surface. Various ghosts of the cold war, even if in an exchange of some kind of propaganda salvos, of stereotypes, old...

[Zorin interrupts] From both sides.

[Grachev] I said in an exchange.

[Zorin] Yes.

[Grachev continues] ...old fears and prejudices which indicate that we have indeed possibly allowed ourselves to become too euphoric during the previous stage until we stepped on to the test track— after all, I agree that eventually the reliability of any vehicle is tested on the potholes— and the potholes started. As a matter of fact, they began some time ago for us and they are not linked solely with the Baltics. I am afraid that the further development of perestroyka processes in the Soviet Union will of course, unfortunately, not be without conflicts.

It is becoming evident that the question now is whether or not our relations with the United States will become hostage to how events in the Soviet Union develop. It seems to me that the matter is not a case of returning to a past situation, to hiding in the customary old shell, and to saying that as far as our internal affairs are concerned we do not intend to discuss them with anybody. I think that this would be unfair. We ourselves have said, and with sufficient basis to do so, that perestroyka and its consequences reach beyond the framework and the borders of the Soviet Union. It has historic and possibly global consequences, and that is why I think that we should submit both our actions and deeds and their consequences to the judgment of this community and at least to bear these consequences in mind in our behavior.

At the same time I think that it is important that our overseas partners, and particularly the United States, do not turn out to have their own versions of our perestroyka. Any discrepancy from this draft or this process would be seen as a digression from some kind of agreed upon formula or agreement.

I agree with you, Mr. Ambassador, when you say that our relations will not revert to previous times. I too hope that this is so and that the cold war has been buried for good. The way I see it, I think that it is also very important that the attitude towards our country and towards perestroyka—let us say, let us call this a kind attitude—not be viewed as a gratuity, as aid, and moreover not as charity, because in actual fact we are talking about mutually beneficial relations. They are mutually beneficial because they could not be otherwise, in every sphere, whether this concerns disarmament talks, economic relations, or ultimately whether this concerns processes of openness that I hope will link the Soviet Union with the outside world ever more closely.

[Zorin] It appears to me, Mr. Ambassador, that you wanted to say something in connection with what Mr. Grachev said?

[Matlock] Well, yes, there are different questions and one must not think that all of these questions are equal in significance or origin. Now, of course, as far as economic ties are concerned, they must and will exist on the basis of mutual benefit. This is obvious. Nevertheless, when Boris Dmitriyevich said—and he was right—that our economic ties are not developing very rapidly, we should

understand that, of course, if there is no basis for, say, profitable investments, if it is a question of investment; or if there is a deficit of currency, if it is a question of trade; or a deficit of goods that compete in the world markets, this limits the opportunities and no state policy can change this.

Of course, the Soviet Union must decide, and only the Soviet Union can decide what changes will occur in the economy of the Soviet Union. However, of course, these decisions nevertheless influence the decisions of others. Now a successful economic policy creates opportunities for development, investment, and trade. An unsuccessful economic policy, of course does not provide these opportunities.

Now as far as the question of internal affairs is concerned, and the question of recent fairly strong criticism, particularly in the press, it should be realized that for us the Baltic question is not an internal issue, because we have never given legal recognition to the annexation of the Baltic countries in the Soviet Union. For us this is an international issue. When people see these attempts to use violence to solve a political question, naturally this revives these ghosts of the past. This is correct. However, one should understand why. This is not interference.

[Zorin] Mr. Matlock, you know that what you have just said makes me recall that I am a historian. In addition, as a historian I studied the history of the United States. Therefore, I would like to cite for you two statements made by a man we all admire. I have Abraham Lincoln in mind.

Now, it is interesting, in connection with what you have said about the Baltics, what you think about these statements made during the U.S. Civil War period. One of the statements is as follows: Not a single state can withdraw legally from the composition of the United States solely at its own volition. The second: Having become part of the United States the Republic of Texas has forever lost its right to any claims of independence. This was also Lincoln.

Now, do you not see any, well, a kind of forgetfulness among some Americans who now, when commenting on events in our country, for some reason forget events of not such a distant past in the United States itself, and about such statements by President Lincoln?

[Matlock] We do not forget. You know that every one of our states, knowing our Constitution, voluntarily and through a plebiscite of the population of that state, joined the Union. There is no right of secession in our Constitution. The Soviet Constitution is different. There is a right of secession in it, especially because these Baltic countries states never freely decided on a union. So how can one say that they must be forced to observe a constitution which they never accepted? Our states adopted the Constitution. This is the difference.

[Zorin] I do not want to engage in polemics right now, I just want to recall that the annexation of the State of New Mexico, say, was achieved through a fairly bloody war and not through a plebiscite, referendums, or voluntary choice. However, that is history.

[Grachev] I would like to add a couple of words, but not to continue a diplomatic controversy that has been going on for years and the outcome of which at this table is probably predictable. I would simply like to mention a new point which I think is important, important for us and also for those who are observing our situation from the outside.

Indeed there have been times when the United States, and particularly Congress, could have had the impression or may have considered that when reviewing various aspects concerning the internal situation in the Soviet Union—I am speaking about the internal situation in the Soviet Union, although I am including the Baltics in this—when this concerned human rights and many other aspects, they could have imagined that they were reminding the Soviet public about some problems to which it is paying insufficient attention, or which are being hidden, or which the Soviet people do not have an opportunity to discuss. It seems to me that fortunately the situation has now changed.

I can assure you that the pain of conflicts, particularly from bloodshed, whether this occurs in the Baltics or other regions of our country, is naturally felt not only by all Soviet people, but I know that it is the topic of very keen political discussions and a topic of discussion in our country's leadership and parliament. Roughly the way you put it, the only possible way out of this situation, as I see it, is by observing the law, by adhering to the constitution, and particularly that very article of the constitution that envisages the possibility of secession from the Soviet Union by any of its republics in accordance, once again, with existing legislation and its procedures.

[Matlock] Any normalization must be nonviolent and carried out only by political methods—that is the most important thing for our relations.

[Zorin] Mr. Ambassador, I would like to return to a thought that you already have expressed. You stressed the extraordinary significance of the fact that for the first time in postwar history, in connection with Iraq's aggression against Kuwait, the Soviet Union and the United States did not immediately find themselves on opposite sides of the barricades in this situation but spoke out together in the United Nations against this aggression. Of course, this is an extraordinarily important fact, I agree, and it is extremely important, I think, that this is a fact that will be of significance for a long time to come. It is a fact with a long-term effect.

Now, I think it would be wrong for us to circumvent the situation that has taken shape today. There is a very definite divergence in connection with the latest events in the war, a divergence between the positions of the Soviet Union and the United States. I suppose, and many here suppose, that President Gorbachev's plan, the

proposals that were made a few days ago, gave an opportunity to avoid war, to avoid bloodshed. There is a danger even now that there will be more casualties than we have already.

Hence, there is one position held by the Soviet Union and a differing position held by Washington. In connection with this I would like to ask you: How will this definite difference in positions that has emerged affect the future course of Soviet-U.S. relations? Could it spoil these relations?

[Matlock] Well, first of all it should be said that this cooperation between the Soviet Union and the United States is very important, not only for our countries, but for the entire world. I consider that cooperation will continue; this is the obvious desire of our President; and I think that this is also the desire of your president. I would say that, yesterday, when there was voting in the Security Council, the Soviet Union and the United States once again voted for the complete fulfillment of all 12 Security Council resolutions.

So basically, in my opinion, our positions still coincide on important issues. Of course, there were divergent assessments last week. We are not concealing this, of course, and it simply appeared to us that it would be most undesirable not to demand complete fulfillment of all United Nations resolutions, all Security Council resolutions. It was not clear whether Saddam Husayn was ready—even today it is not quite clear whether Saddam Husayn is ready—to implement all these resolutions.

At the same time, of course, there was a continuation of atrocities in Kuwait. The Iraqis began to set oil wells on fire in Kuwait itself. They continued to terrorize the population of Kuwait, and is seemed to us that we simply had no alternative.

Well, in any case, I think our differences of opinion on these...our views on the assessment of the situation are only a transitional thing, I hope.

[Zorin] Andrey Serafimovich, would you like to say something?

[Grachev] Yes, absolutely. I agree with the ambassador. I think he is right when he draws attention to the fact that, even in the last, most difficult days, besides differences in the Soviet and U.S. positions, a fairly broad and important common ground of concordant positions remained. Generally, this common ground, the fact that it could be preserved in many questions of principle, now permits us to see a denouemont on the horizon of this terrible conflict.

Unfortunately, in my opinion, this denouement is turning out to be extremely bloody and possibly bloodier than it should have been. It is difficult now to give an answer to the question: Could the complete and unconditional withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait be ensured only on the basis of the use of military action and continuation of the military operation or, as we considered, politics had a good chance to intervene to achieve these aims, possibly in a smoother way?

But, in any case, the outcome is already visible and I think it even gives us an opportunity to talk about some conclusions and lessons from the recent situation. I would name several. Those that, in my opinion, are related not only to future and current Soviet-American ties, but possibly also to the entire climate of the international situation on which, of course, these relations have an enormous influence.

Now, I think that it is most important, even in recent days, in conditions when Iraq appears to be a victim of a major military operation on the part of the multinational forces, not to forget that the initial reason for the entire conflict and this whole storm of violence which raged in the Middle East, in the Persian Gulf region, was nevertheless a reckless and adventurist aggressive act of the Iraqi leadership. This should not be forgotten, because, in the long run, practically all the misfortunes which befell the Kuwaitis and their own people were brought about by this policy.

Secondly, I think it is important that the international community was equal in this situation to the tasks which faced it, and managed, by uniting and preserving this unity, to rebuff aggression and to defend not only the independence of a small and defenseless state, but the principles of independence and sovereignty as well. And, I think this is a lesson for any other potential aggressor and a guarantee that this kind of aggression will not, let us hope, be repeated either in the Middle East or on any other continent.

Lastly, although I think this is important and of paramount significance to our topic, is the fact that Soviet-U.S. relations passed an important test here. It seems to me that the fact that they were not identical on all issues is also an important lesson of this situation. They could not and should not be identical. It is a good thing that this crisis rid many of us, and possibly many in the United States, of both illusions and fears that they would suddenly become unusually close or indistinguishable. They will not be. Behind the positions, behind each leader's position, will be his own interests and his own understanding of national interests and national security. The fact that the leaders of our two states could coordinate them, to preserve this coordination and mutual understanding and, in some aspects, subordinate these interests of theirs to the interests of the international community, is in my opinion, an extremely important lesson.

[Zorin] Mr. Ambassador, in connection with what we are talking about, the following question arises: Prior to the beginning of ground action, the positions were somewhat divergent, to put it mildly. Now, the military stage of the conflict is apparently approaching its conclusion. The light can be seen at the end of the tunnel. A very difficult

political stage will follow, which must sum things up. I can imagine that, during this next stage, our positions will not necessarily coincide. There may be disagreements and I even assume some substantial ones. That is why I am once again returning to this question: The tests of the first stage have been passed—the test of Soviet-U.S. relations—what next?

[Matlock] Well, first of all, I think the most important thing for both of us was the rebuff given to aggression. This is a very important matter for the entire world community. Without this, I could not be optimistic about the future. Of course, our assessments will not always coincide. I think this is obvious. But nevertheless, if we are united in our irreconcilability towards aggression from any quarter, then, in my opinion, this will facilitate cooperation. That is why we insisted on the complete fulfillment of all Security Council resolutions.

Of course, we know that, when the Soviet Union itself was attacked by aggressors, there was no indulgence of the aggressor. I even remember that, during World War II, there was a slogan, that the fascist beast must be destroyed in his own lair. Well, we are not going that far, but nevertheless it seems to me that the Soviet people can understand that aggression must not succeed. That is most important of all. Of course, the whole tragedy in Kuwait and Iraq is exclusively the fault of the Iraqi leadership, which committed this aggression and which forced its own people to suffer these horrors. That is clear.

But, you know, a complete defeat of fascism was needed in order to create post-war peace in Europe. Of course, we regretted all the casualties, but nobody reproached the allies, the Soviet Union and the United States and other allies, for destroying Hitler's military might. Now, I am not saying that such intentions exist in this case, but this should be understood. Therefore, I think that this is understandable and we should think about the future, we should think about how to prevent the emergence of new aggressors, new invaders. We should think about stronger international law. We should possibly think about a more active role for the United Nations. But, I think that our cooperation is inevitable, and I very much hope that both the Soviet and the U.S. leadership will understand the inevitability of this cooperation, because I cannot see any basis for fundamental differences over this issue.

[Grachev] I think it is a very important idea that now, at the conclusion of military action, and it is winding up now, it is time to think about peace. If we return to historic parallels and the peace which must be established, then I think that one of the lessons, particularly the lessons of World War II, is that this peace cannot be and should not be an imposed peace, and that peaceful people, the civilian population, should not have to pay for the crimes of their leaders, particularly those of adventurist regimes.

Now, when we are entering, I hope, a stage of searching for and building a new postwar peace in this region, I think we must remember that this peace can be steady and stable only if it is based on a consideration of the interests and on the participation of the people of the region themselves, who, together with the international community, must build the basis and foundations for this stable peace, which it will no longer be possible to shake by any new aggression.

[Zorin, turning to Matlock] Now, I would like to ask you another question from a somewhat different field; to ask you in particular, insofar as you have been occupying the most important post of U.S. Ambassador in the Soviet Union for a long time now, and have apparently been doing this pretty well, otherwise President Bush would not have extended the mandate given to you by President Reagan. Therefore, it would be interesting for me to hear your opinion on the question: If we consider long-term, I stress long-term, and lasting strategic interests, rather than fluid, short-term, and momentary interests, what is preferable for the United States, to deal with a united Soviet Union or, as the U.S. press has often noted recently, to wager on relations with several sovereign states which currently still form a single country?

[Matlock] Well, it should be said at the outset that we are not trying to foster dismemberment of the Soviet Union or its destabilization. We want good relations with the Soviet Union. We would like to build, even expand, cooperation, and we consider that a democratic Soviet Union resting on the harmony of all peoples of this union could be a good partner. This of course does not mean that we do not want good relations and good ties with the republics as well. But, one does not exclude the other. Of course, each republic and sometimes even every oblast has its own specifics and interests, particularly in the cultural sphere, the trade sphere...

[Zorin interrupts] Excuse me, you have just tested this with your tour of the Far East?

[Matlock] Yes, yes. And, of course, we would like to establish contacts, and our states too would like to establish closer contacts. There are very good contacts between our State of Georgia and [Soviet] Georgia, for example. There are other contacts, say, between the State of Illinois and Russia, and so forth. We are prepared to open trade centers, and so forth.

Now, I consider that good relations, good ties with the republics does not exclude good ties with the center.

[Zorin] Well, time is running very fast and therefore, since the end of our program is approaching, I would like to pose one question to each of our participants in this discussion.

Today, we dwelt on both positive processes in Soviet-U.S. relations—that is how our television viewers probably perceived some of the nuances of opinion...[changes thought] But, I think that it is extremely important today

for us to answer the question: Is the process of improvement in Soviet-U.S. relations reversible? Could everything go full circle, as they say? Aviators have an expression, point of no return, the point beyond which an aircraft cannot return to the airfield from which it took off. I want to ask you this question: What do you think, has this point of no return been passed in Soviet-U.S. relations. Let us begin with you, Boris Dmitriyevich.

[Pyadyshev] I would very much like to give a positive response to this question, that yes, this point of return or no return has been passed. But, for it to be passed in reality, a lot of work, a lot of work faces both sides. Both conceptual work as well as very, very practical work. Up to now, we have been talking about where the reasons for our current complications originate, where the way out lies. The way out lies in living according to one set of rules. If two teams come onto the field and one team plays American football, while the other team plays European football, it probably will not work. It is essential that both teams play according to one set of rules.

These rules already exist. They are Helsinki, the Vienna Document, the Paris Charter for Europe, in which the United States and the Soviet Union participate. Ultimately they are the fundamental documents which have been signed between our countries, beginning with the Geneva meeting of our two Presidents. So there is a whole code of absolutely firm and clear rules according to which our countries must live, both in big things and small. This is a concept, so to speak.

A great deal of intense work remains at the lower level, at the practical level. For example, at the last summit in Washington, which Mr. Ambassador, naturally attended, no more and no less than 11 agreements were signed. When we were returning from Washington with a group of our comrades, we discussed what could be done for the practical realization of these agreements. And, even then, many difficulties emerged. For example, the question of student exchanges. Where could 1,000 U.S. students be housed in Moscow? The issue of how to transfer 1,000 Soviet students to the United States if Aeroflot charges for the tickets in dollars? Or where could we find a pleasant detached house in Moscow to house an American Cultural Information Center?

In an agreement signed in Washington at last year's summit Aeroflot promised us to sharply improve matters in handling passengers. Where is this sharp improvement? The Ministry of the Maritime Fleet made a similar promise. Where are the results? I am addressing this in particular to the Soviet participants in the agreements, but the same thing could probably be addressed to the corresponding U.S. departments, companies, and the country. In a word, a great deal of practical work lies ahead in order to place large and reliable blocks in this lower foundation of Soviet-U.S. cooperation.

[Zorin] Mr. Ambassador.

[Matlock] Well I consider that this point has been passed. If we are talking about a return to the cold war, there will be no return to the cold war. Of course this does not guarantee that everything will be smooth, that there will be no problems, or that cooperation will go as we would both desire. We must work on these problems, but I think the point has been passed.

[Zorin] Andrey Serafimovich.

[Grachev] I would like to be an optimist like Mr. Matlock. I think there is a basis for this position, although I wanted to talk about this from a slightly different point of view. I hope that the frontier of irreversibility has already been reached in our mutual relations, and primarily because this frontier has been reached in the development of the Soviet Union. It seems to me that Soviet society has already passed that point of no return, which indeed turns it into a society capable of speaking with the rest of the world, particularly with the United States, in the single language of common human values.

And that is why those rules which Boris Dmitriyevich mentioned here, according to which everyone in the world community must play together, they have not only been compiled and signed by us all, but, it seems to me, we are making a common contribution into what is set down in them, into the concept of security, the concept of democracy, and the concept of human rights.

Now if we understand one another, then it seems to me that this is the best guarantee that any, even some future difficult crisis, be it similar to the one in the Baltics, the Persian Gulf, or some other area—of course I have no wish to see them multiply—does not upset the balance of the main thing, that is, the dynamics of Soviet-U.S. relations that have already acquired a certain scope and which, it seems to me, are capable of ensuring what is most important—progress.

[Zorin] Well, I would probably join the optimists, although what Boris Dmitriyevich spoke of has a very real basis in fact and there are apparently no grounds to become euphoric. There will be difficulties, and, Mr. Ambassador, let us be direct, not everybody in your country is sympathetic to this course in Soviet-U.S. relations, so let us admit...

[Matlock interrupts] And not everybody here.

[Zorin] Yes. I agree, and here unfortunately there are certain circles that love to talk about unjustified concessions, and so forth, forgetting that the question that is being decided is whether mankind is to live or not. This is far too serious a matter to engage in an accumulation of propaganda points on these grounds.

But it seems to me that the grounds for optimism can be found in the fact that the turn in Soviet-U.S. relations was underlaid with the ill wishes of even the most prominent leaders. Yet there was an objective basis. There was a realization of the impossibility of nuclear war, of the fact that it would be suicide for mankind. It required nearly half a century after Hiroshima and

Nagasaki for statesmen to understand this, not theoretically but practically. But this has been understood. It is an objective fact. It cannot be evaded.

Many other objective things have also changed. For example the confrontation on ideological grounds has ended, a confrontation which practically separated us from you since 1917. To a great extent this is now becoming a thing of the past. These were reasons, but besides reasons there are also consequences. For example there has been a psychological breakthrough. There has been a breakdown of various stereotypes in the masses, among Americans, among the citizens of our country, and throughout the world, and to return everything to the past by some sort of malicious efforts seems to me to be almost impossible although, agreeing with what Boris Dmitriyevich spoke about, I think that zigzags are nevertheless possible and I am afraid there will be some. What do you think, Mr. Ambassador?

[Matlock] Yes of course, as I said, possibly and even probably there will be difficulties. Of course there will be work for us diplomats. We will...

[Zorin interrupts] We will not go without bread.

[Matlock] Yes. As I was saying, I completely agree that objective factors simply will not permit a policy of threats of mutual destruction. This is a completely unreasonable policy, and it seems to me that our leaders are all reasonable people. Of course there will be difficulties, because our interests do not quite coincide. But these differences, I would say, will not justify a confrontational policy, and so I think there will be no return to a cold war.

[Zorin] Well, I think that during our discussion we have tried to reply to those of our television viewers who asked the question of whether or not there has been a cooling in Soviet-American relations. This is not a static situation, it is a dynamic process, and therefore I hope that we, Mr. Ambassador, will have another opportunity in the future to return to the discussion of this question, taking new events into consideration.

Now I would like to thank you for taking part in our discussion, and to thank our television viewers for their attention. And so, until we meet again here in our Studio 9. Thank you.

China

Envoy Submits Statement on Nuclear Arms Treaty

OW0703220291 Moscow International Service in Mandarin 2200 GMT 6 Mar 91

[Text] Yu Hongliang, the Chinese ambassador to the Soviet Union, has submitted a statement to the Soviet Government for safekeeping, declaring that China joined a treaty signed on 11 February 1971 banning the installation of nuclear and other mass destructive weapons on seabeds and underground.

Northeast Asia

DPRK Briefing on Team Spirit Reported

PM0703105191 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 6 Mar 91 First Edition p 5

[Article by Major M. Pogorelyy: "'If the Storm Clouds Gather Often, Sooner or Later it Will Rain'"]

[Text] This Korean proverb was used at a press conference for Soviet journalists by Major General Kim Zen-chan [name as transliterated], Army, Navy, and Air Force attache at the DPRK Embassy in the USSR, to describe the cause of concern in his country in connection with the joint U.S.-South Korean Team Spirit exercise that is being held for the 16th time.

Is is known, Gen. Kim Zen-chan stressed, that the DPRK Government has repeatedly proposed a suspension of wide-ranging military measures of this kind for at least two-three years, while talks are taking place between North and South on the reunification of Korea. Nevertheless, Team Spirit is picking up speed again this year. The exercises will involve formations and units of the 8th combined U.S.-South Korean Field Army, the U.S. 7th and 25th Infantry and 82d Airborne Divisions, marine units, aircraft stationed on Guam and at bases in Japan, and two-three aircraft carrier groups. The total number of personnel will exceed 140,000.

The first stage (21 January-13 March) of Team Spirit-91 envisages transferring reinforcements from the United States and military bases abroad to the territory of South Korea. The second stage of the exercise (14-23 March) will see a practice amphibious and airborne assault (indeed, units of the 82d Airborne Assault Division are being transferred direct from the Persian Gulf area, where they are at the moment), the forced crossing of water obstacles, actions by special units, air and sea operations, nuclear strikes by aircraft and artillery and missile units. The main areas for the ground forces' exercise are only 30-40 km from the demarcation line that divides the Korean peninsula. Then, until mid-April, the third stage of the exercise will see the forces airlifted back.

Describing Team Spirit-91 as a "dangerous, provocative" measure—as shown, indeed, by the nature of the tasks to be practiced—Maj. Gen. Kim Zen-chan announced that the DPRK was responding by increasing its defense capability. On 26 February all the Republic's regular forces, formations of the Korean security forces, and worker-peasant militia and young guard detachments were brought to a state of full combat readiness by order of the supreme commander in chief of the Korean People's Army. At the same time, there was another appeal for the suspension of the military exercise, which would contribute to the development of trust and peace not only in the Korean peninsula, but in the Asia-Pacific region as a whole.

DPRK Embassy Briefs Media on Military Alert

PM0603113791 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 6 Mar 91 Union Edition p 5

[Report by V. Ganshin: "News Conference in DPRK Embassy"]

[Text] On Monday 4 March a news conference was held at the DPRK Embassy in Moscow in connection with the report published by the Korean People's Army Supreme Chief Command that all Armed Forces had been brought up to a state of combat mobilization readiness. Major General Kim Zen-chan [name as transliterated], military, naval, and air attache to the DPRK Embassy in the USSR, familiarized the journalists present with the official viewpoint of the republic's leadership of the U.S.-South Korean Team Spirit-91 maneuvers taking place in the South of the Korean peninsula.

In Pyongyang's opinion, as was stated, these exercises are of an overtly aggressive nature and they simulate the delivery of strikes against North Korea. Despite the reduction of the scales and duration of the maneuvers announced by Seoul, their essence remains unchanged. Considering that South Korea has refused to accept Pyongyang's proposal to sign a declaration on nonaggression between the North and South and to completely cease the joint maneuvers with the Americans or to suspend them for two to three years for the duration of dialogue, their implementation is "a challenge to the DPRK and its people, who are making sincere efforts for the country's peaceful reunification."

Rejecting these initiatives, at the end of January the United States and Korea embarked on the deployment of their military contingents in the South of the peninsula. On 14 March the second stage of the exercises will begin—the practical rehearsal of combat operations on land and at sea, of an assault landing, and of the forcing of water obstacles—and will last through 23 March.

In this connection the Korean People's Army supreme commander in chief has ordered all subunits of the Korean People's Army and Korean security forces and all members of the Workers and Peasants Red Militia and the Red Youth Guard to be in a state of combat mobilization readiness. The situation which has taken shape on the peninsula, as the DPRK military leadership assesses it, could destroy the shoots of detente which have appeared as a result of the dialogue begun between North and South. The results of this dangerous situation could be most lamentable: A lighted fuse has been brought to the powder store on the peninsula, the report indicates.

Direct Dialogue Between DPRK, U.S. Urged

SK0703102791 Moscow International Service in Korean 0900 GMT 4 Mar 91

[Sergey Petrov commentary]

[Text] The establishment of diplomatic relations between Moscow and Seoul, the exchange of trade representative offices between the PRC and the ROK, and the talks to normalize relations between the DPRK and Japan are some of the important political events of the past half-year. Nevertheless, no road has opened toward ties between Pyongyang and Washington. No doubt, no Korean problem can be solved without the participation of the United States, and, first of all, it is impossible to replace the Armistice Agreement with a peace treaty.

Some people may think it strange for one to say that it is necessary for Pyongyang and Washington to start direct dialogue. They ask whether it is appropriate to raise this issue when the Team Spirit military exercise will be conducted on a full scale in around a week, when the U.S. forces have continuously stayed in South Korea, and when nuclear weapons are based there. I firmly believe that it is absolutely appropriate. I think it possible at present for the two sides to prove their words with deeds.

They have already expressed their willingness for dialogue. As you know, Armacost, U.S. ambassador to Japan, already stated last June that the United States is willing to propose the development of bilateral relations with North Korea. Meanwhile, Kim Yong-sun, secretary for international affairs of the Workers Party of Korea Central Committee, who visited Tokyo last February, again confirmed the DPRK's intention to hold talks at any time with Washington to discuss a series of issues, including inspection of its nuclear facilities. But the two sides each have presented conditions. What are they, and can they be complied with?

For example, the U.S. side demands that North Korea not support terrorism, allow an International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] inspection team to inspect its research-purpose nuclear reactors and other facilities, and return the remains of U.S. soldiers killed during the 1950-1953 Korean war. The accusation that North Korea has been involved in terrorism must be left to Washington's conscience. Such an accusation cannot be rejected or confirmed without special international inquiries. Moreover, I think that there are many episodes in U.S. history that can be considered as international terrorist acts. I point out the U.S. invasion of Grenada, for example.

Pyongyang has said that, as is clear in the remarks by Secretary Kim Yong-sun, it is willing to discuss the issue concerning the IAEA's inspection. As a matter of fact, the North Korean side links this issue to the removal of U.S. nuclear weapons. But the recent report released by the ROK-U.S. Relations Committee clearly states that the withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons will not harm stability on the southern half and U.S. interests. This prestigious think tank, directed by Robert Scalapino, renowned U.S. expert and professor at the University of California, and Mr. Kim Kyong-won, former ROK ambassador to the United States and director of the ROK Academy of Social Sciences, gives advice on

Korean affairs to the Washington and Seoul administrations. I think that the conclusion by this center is correct.

I think that the return of the remains of U.S. soldiers killed in action is no big problem. The first measure was already taken toward this direction last May. Then, the remains of five U.S. soldiers killed in action were returned to the U.S. side. Pyongyang has also said that it is willing to hand over the remains of 11 soldiers. It is up to the Washington side at present.

Dialogue between Pyongyang and Washington is realistic in view of the fact that the officials of the two sides' embassies held talks in Beijing on 12 occasions. The fact that these talks failed to produce any result is a different matter. If such talks are to produce any results, the leadership of the two countries must make a political decision, and the level of official delegates must be significantly upgraded. I expect that such talks between the DPRK and the United States will become a reality in an immediate future and that one of the oldest regional disputes will be resolved.

PRAVDA Welcomes DPRK-Japan Dialogue

PM0703122591 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 4 Mar 91 Second Edition p 5

["Editorial Commentary": "From Mistrust to Dialogue"]

[Text] There has been noteworthy improvement in relations between Tokyo and Pyongyang. Direct contacts between the two countries' leading political parties have been held for the first time. A delegation of the WPK [Workers Party of Korea], led by WPK Central Committee Secretary Kim Yong-sun, visited Japan the other day. What is more, it was invited by both the ruling Liberal Democratic Party and the opposition Social Democratic Party. One would like to hope that the success of this mission will speed up the process of normalizing Japanese-North Korean relations.

The Korean peninsula has recently become a zone of gratifying change and rapid erosion of the confrontational structures that developed in the Far East during the cold war years. Diplomatic relations were established in full between South Korea and the Soviet Union in September last year. A month later, South Korea and China decided to exchange trade delegations. Soon after, North Korea and Japan showed willingness to finally tackle the problem of a postwar settlement.

The first round of these talks has already been held in Pyongyang: The second is to begin 11 March in Tokyo. The Land of the Rising Sun has officially apologized for all the misfortunes to which the Korean people were condemned by Japanese colonial domination in the period 1910-1945 and is prepared to discuss the question of the damage caused during this period. However, the DPRK is also demanding compensation for the postwar period, which considerably increases the final amount. It will take time to reduce these stances to a common denominator.

There is also another source of disagreement. Tokyo wants Pyongyang to open up its scientific research reactors for inspection by the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency]. In response, the DPRK has proposed making the question broader: To turn the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone, which will require the removal of the U.S. tactical nuclear weapons located in its southern part.

One would like to hope that the inter-Korean dialogue begun at head of government level will make it possible to reduce the level of military confrontation between North and South and facilitate the normalization of Pyongyang's and Seoul's relations with neighboring states. The establishment of friendly ties between the DPRK and Japan will benefit the peoples of both countries and contribute to peace and prosperity in Asia. WPK General Secretary Kim Il-song says in a personal message to Japanese Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu conveyed by the North Korean delegation.

These positive changes in Japanese-North Korean relations are not isolated instances but a real trend. It reflects the move away from alienation toward dialogue that is now characteristic of the Asia-Pacific region. The normalization of Soviet-Chinese relations has made an important contribution to improving the political climate in this part of the world. Summit-level contacts between India and China have been resumed; the long-standing disagreement between China and Indonesia has been overcome; and a settlement of the Cambodia problem is drawing closer. Committed to its policy of strengthening security and developing cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region, the Soviet Union welcomes any steps leading to deeper mutual understanding between its peoples.

Soviet General Interviewed on Kuril Islands

PM0803085991 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 8 Mar 91 Union Edition p 5

[Unattributed report: "Marshal Akhromeyev Interview"]

[Text] We cite extracts from an interview with Marshal S. Akhromeyev which has been transmitted by Japan's KYODO News Agency.

[KYODO] Do Soviet military interests preclude the possibility that the four Kuril Islands will be returned to Japan?

[Akhromeyev] The Kuril Islands are of great military-strategic significance to the Soviet Union: They guard the entrance to the Sea of Okhotsk. However, when such problems are being resolved between two major states, the whole range of our country's interests will surely be taken into account—not just the military interests but all

the rest, too. This is no longer a matter for the military. Our job is to express our attitude and relay it to the government. The question will be settled by the political leadership and then the USSR Supreme Soviet...

Since the Soviet Government raised the question of two islands, Habomai and Shikotan, back in 1955 (the possibility of transferring those islands to Japan —editorial note), our two countries can hold talks about their future today as well. I think it is unworthy of a state such as the Soviet Union to repudiate a position which it held before...

Japan claims that there is a territorial problem over the southern chain of the Kuril Islands. That is why we keep troops there, because a situation can occur in which the Japanese Government's position changes and the view prevails that this question must be resolved not by peaceful means alone. We have deployed one division on each of these islands. This does not threaten Japan: There are five divisions on Hokkaido. We are not and have no intention of reducing the number of troops on the islands.

TASS Analyst Rejects LDP's 'Blatant Demarches'

LD0803112491 Moscow TASS in English 1029 GMT 8 Mar 91

[By political analyst Askold Biryukov]

[Text] Moscow March 8 TASS—Passions are running high in Japan over the future of Soviet-Japanese relations in the run up to Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev's unprecedented visit to Japan.

Some believe bilateral cooperation should develop in spite of several unsettled issues. Supporters of this approach maintain that it will help promote the climate in bilateral relations and bridge the differences.

Such sentiments are more transparent in areas far away from the Japanese capital, where residents face the realities of Soviet-Japanese relations and have to settle bilateral issues in the spirit of goodneighbourliness in practice.

Certain business circles, too, believe that trade and economic cooperation should not become hostages to policy and ideology.

There are also other sentiments, clearly the result of an outdated and non-productive approach.

Chairman of the federation of Japan's economic organisations (Keidanren) Gaisi Hiraiwa demonstrated such an approach at a press conference in Nagoya.

Hiraiwa made an attempt to give marks to the Soviet Union, which is now in a difficult situation due to its reforms, and made several demands.

Commenting on Soviet reforms, Hiraiwa claimed they were going "in the wrong direction" and that Japan, thus, has no other choice but to return to old ways in relations with the Soviet Union—and condition economic aid to the Soviet Union on the resolution of the territorial dispute and Moscow's softening up on the Baltics.

On the same day secretary-general of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party Ichiro Ozawa, who plans to visit the Soviet Union by the end of the month, said he would visit Moscow if Gorbachev assures him that he would come up with a radical proposal on the return of four Kurile Islands, when he visits Japan in April, according to Kyodo Tsushin.

The question arises how to regard such blatant demarches. Does Tokyo believe that attempts to set terms before a partner who was invited long ago and has long been expected in Japan are a hallmark of good manners?

I would not want to explain time and again to supporters of this approach that hopes to squeeze successions from the Soviet Union at a time of Perestroika-related difficulties are vain.

The Soviet Union is not a country which will accept the language of preconditions and ultimatums.

A major event is just about to happen in relations between the Soviet Union and Japan, and for this event to become historic, as Tokyo wishes and reiterates at the official level, it is necesary to look forward, rather than in the past.

Southeast Asia & Pacific

Asian Trade Bloc Plans, Effect on U.S. Viewed

BK0703081191 Moscow in Indonesian to Indonesia 1530 GMT 6 Mar 91

[Viktor Viktorov commentary]

[Text] Malaysia made a proposal which deals with the planned formation of a new grouping, an expanded regional grouping. In addition to the ASEAN countries, those eligible for membership in the grouping will be Japan, China, South Korea, and the Indochinese countries, as well as Taiwan and Hong Kong. The main goal in forming the grouping will be large-scale economic integration in the Asia-Pacific region similar to the integration of West European countries or North America to counter the protectionist policies of the Western countries.

In the meantime, it is still difficult to say whether the plan will be translated into reality. There have been different approaches to the plan: some have approved of it, some others are against, while the rest are doubtful. According to Vietnam, for example, the time has come for all Southeast Asian countries to unite in a common organization and jointly work for peace and prosperity. Meanwhile, Japan has also reacted. Perhaps its reaction

is due to the fact that Japan has openly expressed pretenses about its economic leadership in the region, while the proposal advocates creation of a new economic structure under the principles of equality. It should not be forgotten, too, that Japan has traditionally regarded Southeast Asian countries as the market for Japanese-made goods and as the source of its raw materials.

The U.S. stand deserves attention. A White House spokesman has criticized any form of new regional economic grouping in Asia. Apparently, the negative stand is partly due to the fact that the United States is not (?included) in the current project. However, a possible emergence of new strong competitors in the world market predictably worries Washington the most, not to mention the fact that efforts to counter protectionism will be one of the main tasks of the expanded economic grouping in Asia. Of course, such developments will affect U.S. interests.

The United States has up to now been able to impose its terms on each ASEAN country individually. As a result, Thai rice exporters, Indonesian textile exporters, and Filipino coconut oil exporters have incurred losses amounting to millions [of dollars]. It is crystal clear that if the ASEAN countries are able to coordinate their economic policies with those of a number of developed countries in the Asia-Pacific region, U.S. traditional protectionist practices will become ineffective. The United States will have to take into account new realities of the international market in the Asia-Pacific region.

What is ASEAN's stand against this background? In my opinion, it is important that its members have no intention of isolating themselves within their own organization. This was evident in the Bali meeting. They reaffirmed their willingness to hold permanent dialogue not only with their neighbors but with other countries as well.

Aircraft Arrive in Philippines for Air Show

LD0603145191 Moscow TASS in English 1320 GMT 6 Mar 91

[By TASS correspondent Aleksandr Bokhonko]

[Text] Manila March 6 TASS—Soviet SU-25 and SU-27 fighter-planes and the jumbo aircraft AN-124 landed at Manila Airport today. The latest Soviet fighter-plane MiG-29, helicopters, airliners and cargo planes are also expected to arrive. These planes will be displayed at Vilamor Air Base where the second international air show of auxiliary and military equipment opens on March 12.

Aircraft firms and airlines from 20 countries, including Britain, Canada, Singapore, Indonesia and the United States will take part in the air show in addition to the Soviet Union.

The Philippine press writes that the USSR is the biggest contributor to the show. For the first time Filipino people will be able to see Soviet warplanes and other aircraft built in the USSR, PNA News Agency writes.

Near East & South Asia

Belonogov Ends Iran Visit; Activities Recapped

LD0803092191 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0700 GMT 8 Mar 91

[By TASS correspondent Ravil Musin]

[Text] Tehran, 8 Mar (TASS)—The visit of USSR Deputy Foreign Minister A.M. Belonogov to the Islamic Republic of Iran [IRI] has ended. He arrived in Tehran on Wednesday at the invitation of the IRI Government and had meetings and consultations with Foreign Minister A.A. Velayati and his deputy, M. Va'ezi. The sides focused on exchanging opinions on various aspects of the qualitatively new situation that has arisen in the Persian Gulf area since the cessation of military operations. These matters were examined in the context of consolidating the cease-fire and seeking ways of ensuring a lasting peace in the region.

The final talks with Deputy Foreign Minister M. Va'ezi were held on Thursday. In addition to the situation in the Persian Gulf area, the sides considered the latest development of events in Afghanistan and reached an agreement that Iran and the Soviet Union would exchange delegations in the nearest future to consider the matter.

General Staff Officer Analyzes Gulf War Results

LD0703203391 Moscow International Service in Arabic 1500 GMT 7 Mar 91

[Text] Our correspondent has met with the head of the strategy section of the General Staff Academy of the Soviet Armed Forces General (Nikolay Kloktov), and asked him about his views on the results of the Gulf War. We believe that his analysis of matters gives rise to interest today. This is what the general said:

First of all, two groups of forces stood opposing each other in this war: two groups that differed from each other in number, technical standard of weapons, and general preparations. The United States and the other developed states of the world—members of the coalition—brought to the Gulf the most modern weapons and means, some of which are still going through the experimental phase. Iraq at the most possessed weapons which were produced during the past 10-15 years. The difference in the generations of weapons was clear. The allies, for example, made extensive use of space means, which neither Iraq nor any third-world country possesses. Neither Iraq not any third-world country can possibly have such means, not even in the foreseeable future. Therefore I do not agree with those who concentrate on the deficiencies of the Soviet weapons which the Iraqi army possesses.

The question in my opinion lies in the strategic error. Iraq, like other countries, built its armed forces in a manner compatible with a specific would-be enemy, and therefore the Iraqi armed forces' need for supplies and equipment was calculated on the basis of the strength of the current coalition with which Iraq clashed. The progress of the battles in this war has reaffirmed once again that the time of so-called duels—which only use the means of strike—has become a thing of the past as far as the civilized states are concerned. Now one should take into account all the weapons—that is to say not only the means of strike but also means of security such as reconnaissance, radioelectronic combat, means of guidance, and effective defense. Iraq did not possess such structures, which should have entered into the system, and this greatly reduced the capability of Iraq's means of strike, which were unprotected. This shortage led to the great losses sustained by the Iraqi army. The Americans, for example, using radioelectronic combat means, immediately struck at the control systems of their enemy. Their action totally resembled experimental exercises.

Let us now take tactics and operational skill. We Soviet military men did not have the Iraqi defense plan. The calculations of the Iraqi commander on preserving and making available part of his force during the battle were not clear to us. No doubt Baghdad prepared for the battles, but Iraq was put under control right from the first hours as a result of the air war. I believe that the Iraqi defenses were not totally static, but the capabilities of the attackers were greater. One week before the [land] offensive, the allies staged a huge maneuver with a group which was continuously and freely on the move all along the front, thus deceiving the enemy with regard to the direction of the main assault. This group was not affected by the Iraqi air effort. The multinational forces were equipped with the most modern aircraft. As for the Iraqi side, it did not have modern aircraft, except for two squadrons of Mig-29's. Thus the allies, who had the initiative, found out the weakest points for directing the most effective strike and benefited from their air superiority, which was apparent in the land operations. They destroyed many Iraqi tanks and armored personnel carriers. It is known that an enemy who is defending himself without mobility is doomed to defeat.

The main problems of the future of the area have not been solved, in my opinion. As a result of the war, polarization has become more acute in the Arab world itself. This region has never seen such a confrontation. One cannot rule out a continued U.S. presence in the area. Despite everything, the word now lies with the politicians.

Rebels 'Not Very Likely' Now To Oust Saddam

LD0703173891 Moscow Radio Peace and Progress in Arabic 1400 GMT 7 Mar 91

[Text] The uprising of those opposed to the ruling regime in Baghdad has not ended in southern Iraq. News agencies report that the opposition forces have, it seems, taken control of 12 cities in the south of the country.

Our correspondent Andrey Vasiliyev, a specialist in Middle East affairs, said: The operations taking place in Iraq were expected. With the military defeat inflicted upon Saddam Husayn's regime, the feelings of frustration repressed for so many years by the various sections of Iraqi society exploded into the open. This concerns primariliy the Shiites and the Kurds. The Shiites in southern Iraq were subjected to a long period of humiliation during the war with Iran, in other words during the war with those who share their faith. Furthermore Saddam Husayn, the Sunni Muslim, closed the doors of state positions, even the least important ones, to the Shiites. The Kurdish problem, which existed before the arrival of the present president to power, got out of hand when Saddam Husayn decided to resolve it by using toxic gases against Kurdish villages. At the moment, it is impossible to assess the strength and efficiency of the uprising against Saddam Husayn's rule in Iraq itself, but our radio commentator believes that it is not very likely that the rebels will achieve some success in the near future because they are facing an army, albeit the remnants of the Iraqi Army.

There is no doubt that the army commanders loyal to the president of the Iraqi Republic will try to avenge the disgraceful defeat inflicted upon them on the battlefield. Moreover, the rebels are also having obvious difficulties in acquiring weapons. Thirdly, and this is probably the main thing, the multinational forces, which are still present in southern Iraq, are not interfering in any way in the country's affairs and consequently are not helping the forces fighting Saddam Husayn.

John Sununu, the White House chief of staff, has declared that when the Iraqi people become aware of the losses they suffered during the war this will inevitably lead to radical changes in the country. The more the current regime tries to conceal the truth, John Sununu added, the more aware the people will become of what really happened. John Sununu went on to say that the United States believes the Iraqi people have the right to do what they deem necessary, be it to overthrow the leadership or see its natural replacement. In this respect, the White House has hinted that its projects do not include removing Saddam Husayn from power immediately. But it seems that political, economic, and diplomatic factors, which are sufficiently strong, will be utilized to help the forces trying to get rid of the current president of the Republic, whether these forces are inside Iraq or outside. Thus, the Arabian Gulf war is over and lessons must be learnt from every experience, be it sweet or bitter, but one would like to see this happen as rarely as possible.

Commentary: U.S. Seeks To Bring Saddam To Trial

LD0803093191 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 0500 GMT 8 Mar 91

[Commentary by Mikhail Osokin from the "Television News Service" program]

[Text] The allied troops in southern Iraq are engaged in the normal business after any war: working with the prisoners. They are interested in a whole number of questions, from details of the arms and losses of the Iraqi Army to the troops' food rations. The Iraqi intelligence system is of special interest. According to Israeli officials, they found on Palestinian territory people who had sent Iraq information about the areas hit by Iraqi missiles. The Americans now want to know more about the prisoners and through precisely what channels and from whom the Iraqis got their intelligence. It is said the Iraqi troops had special commandoes who shot Kuwaiti citizens, and now the allies are now looking for people who participated in these acts from among these prisoners. Incidentally, they are not only interested in who carried them out; the prisoners are being interrogated as to what kind of orders the troops received from President Husayn. Reports have come to light that the U.S. has started to collate such information so that the Iraqi president may be brought to trial in the future.

The military was very interested as to why Iraq did not use chemical weapons. The allied troops were very afraid of this, and they took antichemical tablets for several days before the offensive. But now, from what the prisoners have been saying, it has been revealed that the Iraqi's themselves had poor protection from poisonous materials, and they were not so confident about using chemical weapons, as it had seemed.

This is one other thing about which many people in the West were guessing, and it is possible this will also interest those who are interrogating the prisoners: One report from Paris spoke about claims in the French newspaper LIBERATION that during the fighting the allies intercepted conversations on frequencies of Iraqi military radio stations in Russian, but the Soviet Government stated that it had recalled all our military specialists from Iraq. In this regard, there were suppositions that some people had refused to go, were bought up by the Iraqis, and started to work for them as mercenaries. Another version says that Iraqi pilots trained in the Soviet Union could have been using Russian terms. Whether this is so or not remains a mystery, one of the many mysteries of the war in the Gulf.

TASS Views Middle East Peace Initiatives

LD0703172591 Moscow TASS in English 1700 GMT 7 Mar 91

[By TASS international news analyst Yuriy Tyssovskiy]

[Text] Moscow March 7 TASS—The period of keenly-fought battles in the Arabian Desert has been followed by a flurry of diplomatic activity over the past several days, based mainly on a desire of various sides to put forward their own plans for a post- war reorganisation in the Middle East so as to rule out the possibility of a recurrence of acute confrontation which has been characteristic of the region over recent decades.

U.S. President George Bush on Wednesday came forward with a U.S. Middle East crisis settlement programme consisting of four main points. Some of them, with reservations though, cannot but be evalued positively. The question is to create a system of regional security measures, for which "the friends and allies of the United States in the Middle East" would be mainly responsible.

It is clear that eight Arab countries—members of the anti-Iraq coalition—are implied in this connection.

It is not clear whether the President reckons Iran among them and, if not, how he visualises a regional security system without Iran.

The problem of U.S. military presence in the Gulf and in the Middle East in general also gives rise to ambiguous interpretation. It is known that many countries in the region view the idea guardedly.

The wording directly concerning the creation of new opportunities for peace in the general context remain contentious. No one will dispute, I think, the U.S. President's remark about the need for compromises on the part of both Israel and the Arabs—it is simply inconceivable to achieve lasting and comprehensive peace without that—just as the maxim that such peace should be based on U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

Bush also mentioned the "territory for peace" principle, meaning Tel Aviv's renunciation of the occupation of Arab Lands in exchange for the recognition of Israel's existence and the ensurance of its security.

Although this slogan appeared in the lexicon of Israeli leaders way back in 1977, the present Israeli leadership would prefer to forget it.

Considerable efforts will be needed, particularly on the part of Washington, in order to "refresh" the memory of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhaq Shamir and his entourage.

Neither was the Israeli leadership enthusiastic about the U.S. President's mention of "legitimate political rights of Palestinians", even with all the unspecificness of the wording.

It was not without reason that Israeli Foreign Minister David Levi stated on Thursday that the Israeli Government and the U.S. Administration were split over how to proceed toward Middle East Peace. "We are in controversy on the matter," he said.

It becomes clear that Tel Aviv will still be the main obstacle to a new Middle East. I believe that Israel's role will manifest itself during U.S. Secretary of State James Baker's visit to the region.

Judging by everything, the Israeli "Hawks", who have been consistently frustrating all attempts at a Mid-East settlement, whatever the side such attempts were made

by, have assumed the defensive in the face of mounting demands by the world public to secure at last the realisation of the new existing prerequisites for a peaceful solution to the crisis.

There is one aspect of the Bush "peace program" that puts one on one's guard: He did not even mention a Middle East peace conference which, in the opinion of many, is the best instrument to attain this proclaimed goal.

Washington's negative attitude to the conference idea is known and in this respect it obviously seeks to please Tel Aviv.

It is needless to emphasise how popular the Middle East conference idea is in the world. The idea is being supported by the closest U.S. allies in the West, in the Arab world, and in the Non- Aligned Movement.

The Soviet Union also favours a widely-representative Middle East Forum. The holding of conferences on security and cooperation in Europe provides a fine example how collective goodwill helps resolve the most complex international problems. This experience is applicable to the Middle East as well.

Baker Urged To Heed UN Resolutions on Israel

LD0703175791 Moscow International Service in Arabic 1600 GMT 6 Mar 91

[Commentary by radio commentator Aleksey Zlatorounskiy: "Baker's Visit to the Middle East—Will There Be Progress Toward Solving the Palestinian Question?"]

[Text] The U.S. Secretary of State, James Baker, has embarked on a tour that will take him to Israel and a number of Arab countries. The tour has attracted the attention of observers who linked it with the possibility of establishing a collective security system in the Arab Gulf and solving the Mideast conflict.

In this regard, we wish to recall that James Baker and several other U.S. officials stated during the Gulf War that it was essential to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict immediately after the end of the Gulf War. This was logical for many reasons, even with Washington's categorical denial of any linkage between the Gulf crisis and the Middle East conflict. Eight Arab countries have joined the anti-Iraq coalition. These are: Egypt, Syria, and six Gulf countries. The position of these countries toward the establishment of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and the situation in the Middle East is well known. Today it is not by accident that these countries are now wondering when and how the United States will settle its promissory notes to them.

This is a serious question, particularly if we take into consideraiton the fact that the strong U.S.-Israeli relations have become noticeably stronger as a result of the Gulf War. Tel Aviv showed restraint, and at the request of the United States, it did not participate in the war against Iraq, a matter which would have led the Arab countries in the anti-Iraq coalition to leave it. Israel, however, was generously rewarded for this. According to reports received from Washington, additional military aid amounting to $650 million has been granted to Israel. THE WASHINGTON POST says this sum is likely to be increased. As soon as the Shamir government sensed the support of the big partner, it moved to the offensive. Shamir himself began an active propaganda campaign advocating the creation of greater Israel at the expense of the occupied territories.

The troublemakers in the rightwing parties in Jerusalem began to occupy the homes of the Muslims, and Israeli planes began to bomb Palestinian positions in Lebanon. Israeli Housing Minister Ari'el Sharon said he plans to double the number of Israeli settlements in the occupied Palestinian territories. On the eve of Baker's visit to Israel, Israeli Foreign Minister David Levi left for London to acquaint his British counterpart with the latest Tel Aviv plan for settlement of the Mideast conflict. The plan, which was published by the British press, does not differ much from the past Israeli plans and was void of any word about the recognition of legitimate Palestinian rights and withdrawal in accordance with UN Security Council which also are aimed against aggression: against Israel's aggression on the Arab countries.

We believe that U.S. Secretary of State James Baker cannot but take this matter into consideration during his current tour.

Commentary Warns Against Disunity Among Arabs

LD0703214991 Moscow International Service in Arabic 1600 GMT 7 Mar 91

[Commentary by Aleksandr Timoshkin: "The Damascus Declaration of the Eight Arab Countries"]

[Text] Arab forces must unite in order to safeguard peace and stability in the Middle East, primarily in the Gulf region, and to call for an international peace conference to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. These are the main points of the statement issued as a result of the meeting in Damascus of the foreign ministers of eight Arab countries, members of the anti-Iraq coalition.

Meanwhile, the foreign ministers of Egypt, Syria, and six Arab Gulf countries stressed their countries' solidarity with the Iraqi people, and their determination to preserve Iraq's unity. Thus, the participants in the Damascus meeting called for the Arab factor to play a decisive role in the arrangements for security and stability following the war in the Gulf. Arabs, more so than others, are concerned to achieve justice and to establish peace in the region. We would like to point out that the stand of the eight has gained the support of the 12 EC countries whose delegation met with the Arab foreign ministers in Damascus. The eight called for the long term strengthening of cooperation with the aim of achieving a more

rational distribution of resources between rich and poor countries to the benefit of all.

It is worth mentioning here that the Iraqi-Kuwaiti dispute was due to economic reasons. Baghdad tried to play the role of a do gooder for the benefit of poor Arabs by seizing the wealth of rich countries. Incidentally, during the crisis, those rich countries stressed their adherence to their previous commitments to help fraternal countries which do not possess large oil resources. However, now the six Gulf countries are planning to finance Egypt and Syria for their participation in the anti-Iraq alliance. We hope that the eight does not become a closed grouping isolated from the rest of the Arab world. Otherwise, the possibility of divisions among the Arab countries, resulting from the Gulf war, will increase.

The Damascus Declaration indicates that the eight do not want isolation, and it seems that there are grounds to expect that the efforts of the five Arab Maghreb leaders, who will be meeting in Tripoli soon, will be in the same direction, that is, toward uniting ranks in the Arab world. This will be a natural outcome, because it is in the interest of the Arab Maghreb countries too to improve political and economic cooperation, not only among themselves but in the general Arab context.

East Europe

Progress in Tirana Embassy Establishment Reported

PM0703145791 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 5 Mar 91 Union Edition p 5

[Report on interview with USSR diplomat Vyacheslav Durnev by A. Nikolayev in Athens, date not given; first paragraph is editorial introduction: "Starting From Scratch Again: On the Normalization of Soviet-Albanian Diplomatic Relations"]

[Text] Athens—Vyacheslav Petrovich Durnev was making a stopover in Athens. On his card it says: "Counselor-envoy, USSR Embassy, Tirana." The group of four people that he heads was bound for the Albanian capital on a quite specific mission: To prepare for the opening of a Soviet embassy in Tirana 30 years after diplomatic relations with Albania were broken off.

"To take the purely technical aspect of the matter, after the protocol on the normalization of relations between Albania and the USSR signed last year we have to begin virtually from scratch," my interlocutor said. "It is necessary to find the appropriate premises for the embassy and create normal conditions for the life and work of its staff. Believe me, this task in itself is by no means easy. In September last year our group went to Albania to work on these questions. Now we are busy with the 'groundwork,' as it were. But it is not completely virgin soil. Of course, the Soviet industrial equipment supplied to Albania decades ago is completely worn out now, and most of the Albanian specialists who were involved in cooperation with the USSR from the outset have retired. However, Albanians have retained their sympathy and affection for Soviet people. The fond memories have been preserved, and that is, maybe, the main thing.

"In general there is a basis for resuming cooperation—and for doing so quite quickly. In January a long-term agreement was concluded on trade, economic, and technical cooperation. Now it must be given concrete content. Our Ministry of the Maritime Fleet already has plans to conclude agreements with Albanian partners. Aeroflot is showing interest in establishing regular flights."

[Nikolayev] One of any embassy's main tasks is to give its government prompt, full, and objective information on the situation in the country where that embassy is situated. As we have no embassy in Albania, how objective do you think is the information that the Soviet mass media give our public about events in Albania?

[Durnev] As before, the specialist writing on Albania is good, that is, it is objective, quite comprehensive, and well informed. But alongside that we also have quite a few people now who pose as experts and often crudely distort the facts. They are even advising the Albanians on what they should do and overtly interfering in their internal affairs.

I simply had to ask my interlocutor to describe to readers the ambassador who will soon be opening the Soviet embassy in Tirana. Vyacheslav Petrovich diplomatically declined to answer, but assured me that IZVESTIYA readers will be first to know his name from the official publication of the president's decree.

Polish Army Rehearses Repulsing East Attack

PM0603132991 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 5 Mar 91 First Edition p 3

[Lieutenant Colonel V. Petrukhin report: "Poland Has New 'Enemy'"]

[Text] Northern Group of Forces—The ink of the signatures on the agreement to abolish the Warsaw Pact's military structures has not yet had time to dry, but Polish military circles have already begun talking out loud about the new "enemy" in the East. One is amazed at such metamorphoses: so many years together, then overnight into different trenches. But the fact remains that Polish Army formations are rehearsing operations on exercises with due regard for the possibility of an offensive by an "eastern enemy." The newspaper RZECZPOSPOLITA recently reported one of them.

"...Inflicting an air strike with 12 aircraft, the enemy crossed the Bug River and drove a wedge into the defenders' disposition. True, success did not attend the 'blues' for long, since the troops of the Pomeranian and Silesian Military Districts inflicted a strike and made them pull back."

On these exercises the small Leg River 200 km from the Soviet border hypothetically became the line of the Bug. It was mainly reservists who participated in the operation: It will take time for the Third Sandomierz Material-Technical Base to be transformed into a mechanized division of the Malopolska Military District, which is being created in southeast Poland.

No Polish Asylum for Lithuanian Draft Dodgers

PM0603095591 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 1 Mar 91 First Edition p 3

[TASS correspondent V. Burbulis report: "Warning From Polish Ministry of Internal Affairs"]

[Text] Warsaw, 28 Feb—In accordance with documents of the UN high commissioner for refugees, Lithuanian young people of draft age who come to Poland with the aim of dodging service in the Soviet Army cannot count on receiving official refugee status. Colonel Z. Skoczylas, director of the Polish Ministry of Internal Affairs Bureau for Refugee Affairs, said this in an interview with ZYCIE WARSZAWY.

"The Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Poland warns against trying to use Poland as a transit country for exit to the West. We firmly believe that it is much easier for Lithuanians to obtain a U.S. visa in Moscow than in Warsaw," Col. Skoczylas stressed.

West Europe

Further Reportage on Visit by UK's Major

Major Describes Talks With Gorbachev

PM0603110091 London ITV Television Network in English 1900 GMT 5 Mar 91

[Interview with British Prime Minister John Major by Gaby Rado in Moscow on 5 March; from the "Channel 4 News" program—recorded]

[Text] [Rado] Mr. Major, did Mr. Gorbachev satisfy you that the fundamental reforms are to continue in the Soviet Union?

[Major] He clearly faces very great difficulties in carrying them forward, but I was left in no doubt that he thinks they're desirable and that he wishes to carry them forward and that it is his intention to carry them forward. What I can't know, of course, is how successful he'll be in doing that.

[Rado] How much of British policy is aimed towards backing Mr. Gorbachev, keeping him in power; and how can that be reconciled with British support for Baltic independence?

[Major] Well, we've supported the reforms in the Soviet Union, which have been carried out under Mr. Gorbachev's leadership, very strongly over the period of the last few years. Mr. Gorbachev, the reformer, we have supported; and Mr. Gorbachev, the reformer, we will continue to support. I made a disapproval of what happened in the Baltic states very clear indeed.

[Rado] Down to the Gulf, now: What was the substance of your discussions with Mr. Gorbachev about the Middle East?

[Major] Well, I think the most remarkable part of that was the clear outcome that the Soviet Union will play a part, with the other members of the permanent five, in bringing about a better security situation in the Middle East. Now, I think that is very welcome news indeed.

[Rado] But are there any differences between you and Mr. Gorbachev on the way ahead, on the future in the Middle East?

[Major] Nobody can be precisely sure yet what the way ahead is, and before we can be certain we need to discuss the matter with the Gulf states and others who are actually in the region, and we need to take their mind [as heard] first. But what we clearly need is firstly to ensure the security of those states who recently have felt threatened and then to look at the wider problems of the Middle East, including, of course, the Palestinian issue, and see if we can find a solution to them.

[Rado] Finally, what was your overall impression today? How secure do you think Mr. Gorbachev is, in that, is he a man you can do business with?

[Major] I can't answer the first question on the basis of one day's visit, talking just to Mr. Gorbachev and members of his government. It's not a judgment I can properly make. As to whether I can do business with Mr. Gorbachev, I have no doubt about that. I invited him to come back to the United Kingdom; he accepted. He invited me to return to the Soviet Union; and I accepted. So clearly, I think we can do business together.

Major Notes 'Intensive Dialogue'

PM0703134791 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 7 Mar 91 Union Edition p 4

[M. Yusin report: "John Major: We Had An Intensive Dialogue; British Prime Minister's News Conference"]

[Text] Having completed the program for his one-day working visit to Moscow, British Prime Minister John Major held a news conference for Soviet and foreign journalists on the evening of 5 March.

The head of the British Government expressed satisfaction with the results of the trip. During the conversations with President Gorbachev (which lasted more than four hours, including a working dinner) there was a "detailed, sometimes very intensive, amicable discussion that produced useful results."

Attention focused on the situation in the Near East, particularly on the postwar settlement in the Persian

Gulf. The sides' approaches to this question remain close to one another; at any rate, Major did not mention any serious disagreements. He welcomed the policy pursued by the USSR at the height of the crisis, singling out Moscow's position during the voting in the UN Security Council.

According to Major, the USSR and Britain agreed that the future of the Near East should be determined primarily by the countries of the region. The prime minister confirmed that neither London nor its Western allies intends to maintain a permanent military presence in the Persian Gulf. "British forces will soon be withdrawn," he said. Major stressed the need for close cooperation among the five permanent members of the Security Council when tackling problems arising in connection with the postwar setup in the region. He announced that the foreign ministers of the USSR, Britain, France, the United States, and China would soon be holding a special meeting to discuss these matters.

Major stated with satisfaction that Moscow agreed with London's view on the need to restrict exports of nuclear, bacteriological, and chemical weapons to the Near East and keep a check on supplies of conventional armaments. When asked whether the Soviet Union had given any guarantees during the talks that it would not supply Iraq with any weapons at all, however, Major replied in the negative.

A considerable part of the conversation with the Soviet president was devoted to a discussion of the situation in the Baltic area. The USSR and Britain still have considerable differences of opinion on this question. The prime minister told Gorbachev of the disappointment that had been caused in the West by the January events in Vilnius and Riga, and expressed the hope that the problems would be solved by peaceful means. Gorbachev did not agree with the Western interpretation of the situation in the Baltic area. According to Major, the Soviet president said that the crisis must be resolved within the framework of the constitutional process: "In that case, in his opinion, the possible end result would be that the Baltic republics would become separate."

During the conversation Gorbachev confirmed his commitment to the reforms that are under way, despite the difficulties that have occurred and will occur in the future. "Britain can still do business with Mr Gorbachev"—Major used this phrase, a slight paraphrase of Margaret Thatcher's famous pronouncement, to sum up his impressions of the four-hour talks with the Soviet leader.

The prime minister touched on the differences that exist between the two countries on questions connected with the treaty on conventional arms Major told Gorbachev and Defense Minister D. Yazov of "Britain's concern about the transfer of Soviet Army troop formations to new commands," which, in his opinion, is a violation of agreements that have been concluded. The Soviet interlocutors presented their arguments. Major called the exchange of opinions useful but, to all appearances, the differences were not eliminated.

In answer to the question why he had not met with B. Yeltsin while in Moscow, the prime minister explained that this was due to the extremely tight schedule for the 22-hour visit. "I hope to meet with Mr Yeltsin in the near future," he said.

Yazov-Major Talks Detailed

PM0703113591 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 7 Mar 91 First Edition p 1

[Major M. Pogorelyy report: "Meeting in the Defense Ministry"]

[Text] On 5 March British Prime Minister J. Major, who is on a brief working visit to Moscow, had a meeting with Soviet Defense Minister D.T. Yazov.

Describing the range of topics discussed, the USSR defense minister told journalists that attention focused on questions connected with the problems of implementing the treaty on conventional arms in Europe. The need for such a dialogue was dictated by the necessity to eliminate our sides' different understanding of questions of arms reduction. As Marshal of the Soviet Union, D.T. Yazov emphasized, the preparation of this treaty lasted more than three years. During this time the Soviet Union has withdrawn a large proportion of its troops from the territory of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic and Hungary and eliminated the "tank attack forces" previously concentrated there. The process of eliminating obsolete arms and commissioning new ones is taking place. All this was explained to the British side.

The USSR defense minister also pointed out that questions concerning the situation in the Persian Gulf region after the end of combat operations there were also discussed at the meeting. According to D.T. Yazov, the world community has gained experience in organizing a united rebuff to aggression.

Answering a question from KRASNAYA ZVEZDA's reporter, British Prime Minister J. Major called the conversation very useful and productive and said that it had made it possible to ascertain more exactly the USSR's position on the problems discussed. J. Major also reported that he had invited Marshal of the Soviet Union D.T. Yazov, USSR minister of defense, to pay an official visit to Britain.

Participating in the talks in the Defense Ministry were, on the Soviet side—Aviation Colonel General Ye.I. Shaposhnikov, commander in chief of the Air Force and USSR deputy defense minister; Admiral of the Fleet V.N. Chernavin, commander in chief of the Navy and USSR deputy defense minister; Col. Gen. V.G. Denisov, deputy chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff; and L.M. Zamyatin, USSR ambassador to Britain; on the British side—R. Braithwaite, British ambassador to the USSR.

UK Media Coverage Examined

PM0703125591 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 7 Mar 91 Second Edition pp 1, 4

[A. Lyutyy report: "John Major: 'Worthwhile Day'"]

[Text] London, 6 Mar—"It was a worthwhile day." These words spoken by Prime Minister John Major are picked out by many of the British mass media today as encapsulating his one-day visit to the USSR.

The trip itself, albeit brief, was very important, according to the BBC. First, Major himself established direct contact with the Soviet leadership after the resignation of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. Second, he was the first Western leader to visit Moscow since the end of the war in the Persian Gulf and had an opportunity to receive information about the Soviet vision of the security system in the region after the war. On neither "front," as can be judged from press reports and the accounts given by aides to the head of government, was John Major disappointed. According to THE TIMES Moscow reporter, he left Moscow "confident that he had restored the special relations which existed between his predecessor, Margaret Thatcher, and President Gorbachev." "Despite certain differences of opinion," the reporter goes on to write, "very good personal relations seem to have been established."

Very broad understanding regarding the postwar structure in the Persian Gulf, as can be judged by press responses, was revealed by both sides. As THE DAILY TELEGRAPH writes, "Major was heartened by the Soviet Union's readiness to work along with the other UN Security Council members to achieve peace." "Moscow," THE INDEPENDENT notes for its part, "would like to regain its role in a region where it was once the formidable champion of the Arab governments most hostile to the West." London, by all accounts, recognizes the importance of the USSR's playing an active part in any postwar settlement. The fact that Secretary of State Baker is coming to Moscow soon makes it possible to talk of the possibility of forming a security structure acceptable both to the West and the Soviet Union. THE INDEPENDENT describes John Major's mission to Moscow as "delicate," since the British prime minister "had to demonstrate the West's concern over Soviet Government interference in the Baltic republics at the time of the crisis in the Persian Gulf and over breach of agreements on conventional armed forces in Europe."

The newspaper considers that the prime minister "managed to convey this to the USSR leadership without causing offence." Discussion on the Baltics was very frank. As a mark of courtesy the visitor met with representatives of the three republics, who, according to British press reports, expressed to him their doubts in and mistrust of the Kremlin's political line." Major, however, while supporting the republics' desire for independence on the whole, noted that "these republics should realize that independence can be attained in stages and only in accordance with a realistic formula." The prime minister was, as can be judged, satisfied with the president's explanation on the need for strict adherence to the constitutional process.

As for the West's objections concerning USSR observance of the aforementioned agreements, Major received appropriate explanations from the USSR defense minister, but THE TIMES intimates that he may not have been fully satisfied by them.

One of the main goals of the British prime minister's visit to Moscow was to learn about the state of the reform process in the Soviet Union. It is, of course, extremely difficult to do this in 24 hours, but Major's conversation with Gorbachev, newspapers comment, did make it possible for him to draw the conclusion that the Soviet leader is committed to continuing reforms. London intends to closely follow the situation inside our country and to determine its stance subject to the general thrust of the reforms.

It is perfectly natural that British reporters and commentators should have compared the present visit with those made to Moscow by Margaret Thatcher and drawn parallels and comparisons. The general opinion is that, although Major's visit was noticeably more modest than Thatcher's visits, the prime minister was nevertheless able to make an impression on the Soviet leadership and Soviet people. THE TIMES, among others, notes that more journalists attended the final news conference than were present at Margaret Thatcher's comparable news conference during her last trip to the USSR.

Missing Journalists in Iraq To Be Investigated

LD0603133191 Paris Domestic Service in French 1300 GMT 6 Mar 91

[Text] The USSR has agreed to intercede with Iraq to find the 15 French journalists who have disappeared. The Soviet ambassador in Baghdad has already requested that all information regarding, for example, the route they intended to take be communicated to him. Because Iraq and France have broken off diplomatic relations, Moscow represents the respective interests of the two countries. Catherine Tasca, minister-delegate for information [as heard], points out that there has been no reliable news about the fate of the 28 [Western] journalists since they were reported missing in the region of Basra on 3 March.

Conditions Still Seen Attached to EEC Aid

PM0703151991 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 6 Mar 91 Second Edition p 5

[V. Peresada report: "Decision Revised"]

[Text] Brussels, 5 Mar—A meeting of the 12 EEC countries' foreign ministers has been held here. They resolved to resume their preparations to implement the program of financial aid for the Soviet Union.

Thus the "Common Market" has, for all intents and purposes, renounced its own decision to block this program—a decision that was adopted hastily several weeks ago in the wake of events in Vilnius and Riga. The position was revised after an EEC delegation, comprising the Italian, Luxembourg, and Netherlands foreign ministers, visited the USSR. It was noted during the meeting that the delegation held exhaustive debates in the course of the visit on the situation in the Baltic and advocated continuing cooperation, making the appropriate recommendation to EEC leadership organizations.

Now, at the decision of the Brussels meeting, the Commission of the European Communities, the "Common Market's" executive body, is to resume talks within the framework of the mixed commission for cooperation with the Soviet Union. I would remind you that we are talking about almost 1.2 billion European Currency Units—the sum that has been allocated for guaranteed credits for the purchase of food and the provision of technical aid.

The documents of the meeting and its participants' statements indicate, however, that the real granting of aid will not happen automatically but will depend on two main factors: First, on whether reforms continue in our country, and second, on how the situation connected with the Baltic region develops.

EC To Give 'Immediate Food Aid', Credits

PM0803093391 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 7 Mar 91 Second Edition p 4

[V. Peresada report: "Go-Ahead Given"]

[Text] Brussels, 6 Mar—The "Common Market's" Council of Ministers has approved a series of directives linked with financial aid for the Soviet Union. They have been coordinated with the European Parliament, which recently was vigorously advocating "holding back" owing to events in the Baltic. Thus, LA LIBRE BELGIQUE writes, this aid has been given the go-ahead.

I must say that some of the delay was due not only to political but also to purely economic considerations. To be specific, the problem of finding the requisite funds within the EEC budget. As announced, these funds have been found and the decisions taken at the Rome meeting of the "Common Market" heads of state and government making provision for aid totaling almost 1.2 billion European Currency Units [ECU's] will be implemented.

This means that the Soviet Union will be given immediate food aid worth 250 million ECU's and guaranteed credits for food purchases from EEC countries worth 500 million ECU's, along with technical aid totaling 400 million ECU's. The Council of Ministers has authorized the Commission of the European Communities to resume talks.

It is curious that EEC leadership services have voiced a proposal to extend the operation of the credits to the Soviet purchase of food not only within the "Common Market" but also in Eastern Europe. This proposal was put forward by Italy in the belief that the traditional ties that have developed between the former members of CEMA should not be severed. Although the Council of Ministers did not approve this proposal, the European Parliament recommended that the Commission of the European Communities consider the possibility of "tripartite operations" with the Soviet Union as the purchaser, Eastern Europe as the vendor, and the "Common Market" as credit guarantor.

Troop Withdrawal, Issues Discussed With FRG

PM0703150391 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 7 Mar 91 First Edition p 3

[Colonel V. Markushin report: "Meeting in Karlshorst"]

[Text] The Soviet garrison in Karlshorst was the venue for a meeting between plenipotentiary representatives of east German laender and the Bundeswehr's "East" territorial command and Colonel General M. Burlakov, commander in chief of the Western Group of Forces.

The purpose of the meeting, as the commander in chief of the Western Group of Forces defined it, was to brief the German side on the tasks facing the Soviet contingent in connection with its withdrawal from Germany. Maybe it is not worth dramatizing the fact that laender premiers, despite the invitation, refrained from participating personally in the meeting. Yet it will not be out of place to stipulate that personal contacts between the top people in this case would only have been of mutual benefit.

The attention of those present was drawn, above all, to such problems as the transit of Soviet troops across Poland and the cooperation between FRG law enforcement services and Western Group of Forces administrative organizations on the question of returning Soviet servicemen who have deserted to the West. In addition, the question of selling movable property and real estate, whose removal is unprofitable and hardly possible within the time allotted, was raised.

The discussion of the third problem proved the most detailed, and it will evidently be necessary to revert to it repeatedly. For now I will point out that there are approximately 40,000 apartments alone that belong to the Soviet side, including, incidentally, those that are now standing empty in military camps that have already been transferred to the German side's protection. In addition to the apartments, a huge number of other installations was constructed with Soviet money. You cannot quantify the total value down to the last kopek—they were constructed throughout the postwar years. This is why our economists name only an approximate figure of 10.5 billion marks.

Of course, there will be the costs of meeting the German side's claims; however, there is a possibility of obtaining real money and channeling it into constructing the same

apartments for Soviet servicemen in the motherland. Here we have a right to count on the Germans' support: We have this right if only because we have a bilateral treaty and it must be fulfilled through joint efforts.

The representatives of the FRG laender and journalists were shown examples of property which is ready to be sold. Television and photographic cameras operated simultaneously, and there were many questions too. We will wait for the first trade deals.

Burlakov-Genscher Bonn Meeting Reported

PM0703101191 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 1 Mar 91 First Edition p 3

[Major S. Popov report: "Meeting in Bonn"]

[Text] On 26 February a meeting was held in Bonn between Colonel General M. Burlakov, commander in chief of the Western Group of Forces, and H.-D. Genscher, FRG foreign minister.

Col. Gen. Burlakov informed Genscher about progress in the withdrawal of forces, the tasks being resolved by the personnel in the new conditions, and other aspects of the life and activity of the Western Group of Forces. A mutual desire was expressed for the further development of amicable relations based on mutual respect between the servicemen and the local population.

The FRG foreign minister accepted with thanks an invitation to visit a unit of the Western Group of Forces.

Deputy Defense Minister on Property in FRG

LD0703120691 Moscow TASS in English 1102 GMT 7 Mar 91

[By TASS correspondent Oleg Moskovskiy]

[Text] Moscow March 7 TASS—Transfer of real estate that is the FRG's property and utilisation of buildings and structures built at Soviet expense for its forces in the FRG (the Western Group of Forces) remains difficult to decide, Vladimir Arkhipov, soviet deputy defence minister, logistics chief, told TASS today. He gave an interview in connection with the ratification of a package of treaties between the USSR and the FRG by Soviet parliament early this week.

Arkhipov said that by now the Soviet troops have turned over to the German side 844 facilities, 431 of them built at Soviet expense. Still the utilisation of property should be more effective, Arkhipov said. He believes that the buildings and structures transferred remain unused and gradually decay.

Arkhipov said that a joint Soviet-German commission decides on the composition, value and uses of real estate owned by the USSR. The commission has run up against some difficulties. "The German side has not yet worked out the procedure for the utilisation of this property", he said.

Arkhipov said the FRG raises the question about the compensation of its expenditures for the restoration and overhaul of structures and buildings used by the Western Group of troops, as well as for environmental improvement. There were also difficulties about settling questions of property of land on which these facilities are built.

The difference of approaches was manifested and it has not yet been possible to reach understanding, the general said.

In view of the need to settle all property and financial matters involved in the utilisation of Soviet real estate in the FRG, Arkhipov expressed the wish that the text of supplement to the treaty about troops, that would settle property questions, be drafted by the German side within a brief period of time.

German Navy Chief's Visit Confirms Good Relations

LD0603100391 Moscow TASS in English 0908 GMT 6 Mar 91

[By TASS correspondent Oleg Moskovskiy]

[Text] Moscow March 6 TASS—"The visit to the Soviet Union by chief of the German Navy, Vice-Admiral Hans-Joachim Mann patently confirmed the striving of the Soviet and West German sides for the further and [as received] development of military contacts," Soviet [words indistinct] told TASS.

Chernavin said that the visit of his German colleague to the USSR returned the visit of the commander-in-chief of the Soviet Navy to Germany made in February 1990. "These visits have become possible due to the profound changes in the world, due to the new stage of relations between the USSR and Germany," Chernavin said.

The admiral said that contacts between the navies of the two countries were discussed. "We agreed that such meetings should continue, and we noted the importance of functions to prevent incidents on the high seas," Chernavin said.

The admiral said the German guest noted that considerable changes had taken place in military relations between the USSR and Germany. Mann believes that they are aimed at the elimination of mutual distrust.

Mann added that neither the Bundeswehr, nor the navy, nor NATO forces regard the USSR as an enemy and see a menace in its combat potential. Mann stated his views regarding numerical cuts in the German Navy.

"We have confirmed the importance of regular meetings between chiefs of the Armed Forces and navies which, alongside other ocntacts, will benefit our peoples and European security," Chernavin said.

USSR Draft Dodgers 'Not Wanted' in Finland

LD0603164391 Moscow TASS in English 1425 GMT 6 Mar 91

[By TASS correspondent Aleksandr Surikov]

[Text] Helsinki March 6 TASS—Tallinn waiter Allan Allixaar (23) has been living in a Finnish motel for quite a time now together with his wife and child. They get from 50 to 60 marks a day, a miserable sum by local standards. The family can hardly make ends meet in a country with the highest cost of living in Europe. "At the beginning," Allixaar recalls, "we used to get free breakfasts, but now we have to buy all food and clothing ourselves."

Allixaar escaped to Finland because he did not want to serve in the Soviet Army. In other words, he simply fled the country in order to avoid punishment, envisaged for such offences in the Soviet Union. According to the newspaper UUSI SUOMI, there are about 20 such Estonian draft dodgers in Finland. They all expect to get political asylum there.

Each of them has his own story to tell, but there is one thing in common among them: They all regarded Finland only as a transit point in their flight to the West. Some draft dodgers managed to reach the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark or Norway. But they were not welcome. The unwanted guests were returned to Finland on the basis of the rule, applied by many states, that political asylum should be sought in the first country to which an applicant escapes. In their case it was Finland.

What can the Estonian "refusniks" expect in Finland? The UUSI SUOMI notes that the hearings of their cases could last many months. The police have not yet questioned them all.

"A resident's permit and a political asylum certificate may be issued only if there is real evidence that an applicant is threatened in his own country," chief of the Centre for the Affairs of Foreigners Visto Vijalainen said.

"I am referring to some sort of danger to his life or possible personal immunity. Refusal to serve in the Army does not give any right to political asylum either in Finland or in other countries. There is even a special government decision on this score in Sweden."

One of the Estonian applicants for asylum, interviewed by the UUSI SUOMI on condition of anonymity, described how the "refusniks" were deported from Sweden. "Policemen knocked at the door at 0700. They took us to the police station without any explanations and then to the airport. We were not allowed to telephone our lawyer or anybody else. We were put on a plane for Finland."

No matter what the Finnish immigration authorities decide to do with the Estonian "refusniks", other people, who plan to follow their example, are warned by the UUSI SUOMI in an article entitled "You Are Not Wanted Here".

Latin America & Caribbean

Official on Soviet Arms Supplies to Nicaragua

LD0703200591 Moscow World Service in English 1210 GMT 7 Mar 91

[Text] Reports in the United States media speak of continuing Soviet arms supplies to Nicaragua, with the WASHINGTON POST indicating that these help the Sandinista leaders and the Nicaraguan Army to sell weapons to left-wing and terrorist groups in central America. Our correspondent Sergey Koshkin got on the line with the man in charge of the Soviet Foreign Ministry's Latin American department, Valeriy Nikolayenko.

Valeriy Nikolayenko denied U.S. media allegations, saying that his country halted arms supplies to Nicaragua in 1988 and had no intention of resuming them. He said the Nicaraguan Government had pledged not to transfer the weapons to any third party without prior agreement by the Soviet Union. Valeriy Nikolayenko said that his ountry was working on the assumption that Nicaragua strictly abided by the agreement.

United States officials speak of the need for military cooperation to be stopped between the Soviet Union and Nicaragua. However, the Soviet Union is known to be maintaining relations with the Nicaraguan Government rather than with parties or movements there. Accordingly, the two countries are engaged in a small-size military-technical cooperation, with the Soviet Union sending small supplies of spares, equipment, and food to the Nicaraguan Army in line with the wish of that country's government.

Mrs. Violeta Chamorro's government is in favor of continuing such cooperation and reports from Managua say that the government's response to U.S. media attacks was negative. Valeriy Nikolayenko said they were seen as a case of involvement in Nicaraguan affairs.

Laverov Receives Cuban Legislative Delegation

PM0703105991 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 2 Mar 91 Moscow Edition p 4

[TASS report under general heading: "Official Reports"]

[Text] On 28 February N.P. Laverov, USSR deputy prime minister and chairman of the USSR State Committee for Science and technology, received a Cuban parliamentary delegation headed by Juan Escalona Reguera, president of the Cuban National Assembly of People's Power, which has come at the invitation of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Supreme Soviet

Gorbachev Addresses Supreme Soviet

LD0703171191 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1200 GMT 7 Mar 91

[Address by President Mikhail Gorbachev at USSR Supreme Soviet's morning session at the Kremlin in Moscow on 7 March—recorded]

[Text] Tomorrow [International Women's Day] is a day, a big day, not just nationwide but internationally, and therefore on behalf of myself and on behalf of all men—I hope they will soon come and join me here, and there will not be any other opinions or any dissent—and cordially, the members of the Supreme Soviet and people's deputies—our dear women, for whom it is always more difficult, and even in the Supreme Soviet it is exactly the same—to cordially congratulate them on this holiday. [applause] With these congratulations I express sympathy—I cannot help but say this—in connection with the immense burden all of us in the Supreme Soviet, the executive power, the president, and of course, women in the structures of power carry at this time.

I hope that what we are doing now with the greatest responsibility, with a feeling for the country and for our people, will turn into positive results; and we, I think, as a result of this work, can count on success. Permit me also to wish the Supreme Soviet success in its great affairs. I would like to take this opportunity—yes, the last few days have been very full ones and I would like to inform you briefly—I say briefly because this will not be a report, since we have been here this morning.

Yesterday's session of the Council of the Federation was preceded by a session of the cabinet, but I will begin with the Council of the Federation session. We examined yesterday the draft union treaty, which has been prepared by plenipotentiary representatives of the republics, not all the republics, but the majority of them, and the others were also present either as observers or at the level of some kind of experts and made their contribution.

Nevertheless, yesterday we already were able to obtain a document expressing the point of view of the majority of the republics on the future of our federative union state. I must say that—on the basis of the work that had been carried out, on the basis of the decisions and positions of the USSR Supreme Soviet and USSR Congress of People's Deputies, and taking into account the work that had been carried out in all republics and the declarations of sovereignty adopted by all republics—it was possible to attain such a document that, in my view, means a great advance. The main idea is reforming, seriously reforming our multinational state while preserving it as a federation. At the same time, by delegating and extending powers and rights to a very considerable extent, by implementing the sovereignty of republics and through the center's new role, we thereby—if the document is approved in republics and in our society—are attaining our new federation, a union state indeed.

Yesterday practically the whole day was devoted, after all, to studying the issues that emerged in connection with the discussion at the Federation Council. The thing is that the draft was submitted—given all the huge work, all the gains that had been made as a result of joint work of plenipotentiary representatives with the participation of experts from the Supreme Soviet, the government, and the president. There were problems and many issues that had to be discussed yesterday. This document, which was distributed and presented to members of the Federation Council, contained alternative proposals on many very important issues, on at least 10 major issues of the draft.

As a result of a very careful analysis—I must say a committed and constructive discussion, although emotions were expressed, we cannot get by without this at the moment; this is also an element, so to speak, of our political culture, precisely our political culture—nevertheless, we managed to examine nine alternative variants and find a common position on nine questions. One question remained and we decided to put it forward in the form it was presented by the preparatory groups for discussion by the republican Supreme Soviets and to publish the alternative positions; and the points remaining concern the problem of representation in the lower—we'll call it that—and upper chambers, the future bodies of the union, so that we can find a variant that would also reflect the new situation in our union. The fact of the matter is that there are proposals containing the idea that in the upper chamber, all the republics, irrespective of their numbers—for example, in the U.S. Senate, irrespective of the size of a state, and the population of the state, each state has two senators—so in this instance, it is a matter of the lower chamber reflecting all the existing realities, including the size of population of each republic—this was present—and in the upper chamber—I don't know whether this title will remain or not, but I will use this word for now—there the principle of equality would apply.

Well this encouraged further arguments that one might move in this way, or it might be possible to carry out elections in the old ways on the basis of established traditional approaches, but to conduct such a mechanism of adopting decisions that would also ensure equality. Or, perhaps, one should look at questions that could, say, determine the structure of problems, or questions, on which when they are discussed and decisions made. In some cases, a consensus could be made, and not otherwise. If at least one republic is against this—if this is a fundamental, vital, fateful question—a veto could be imposed.

In the second case, two-thirds will be required, and in the third case, a simple majority. That is, to make a long story short, this subject was discussed and discussed. I would say that it became overgrown with more and more

new proposals; and to continue this discussion both in the republican Supreme Soviets, and already during discussion, and in familiarizing our society with this document, now, in order then not to remove these two alternative proposals, and to continue this, this has remained. (sentence as heard)

Today more precise definitions will be introduced on the basis of agreement and I hope we will be able to send this draft to the republican Supreme Soviets tomorrow, and to publish it. So that the work in this case of all who made proposals and contributed soul, heart, and mind has not been wasted, has not perished in the sand. In this case I want also to note the constructive work that was done by the Supreme Soviet at all stages of the work and in the move toward this document. I will tell you that on the whole this is a great event, a great event, and the fact that we will publish this document, the draft of this document, on the eve of the referendum will be a timely contribution of clarity to many questions. The people, having read it, having put some kind of questions and having cleared things up for themselves, can go to the referendum with an open heart, with understanding and awareness of what it is about.

This is how I counted on reporting to you, even if in a brief way, on this very important result of work, and so the Council of the Federation has spoken. So the decision was ... the position of the Council of the Federation was brief.

To take this document as a basis, to send it to the Supreme Soviets for discussion, and to publish it. The process will move on, clearly within the framework of some kind of conciliation commissions, and other bodies, and then, the idea is this—it was heard yesterday, and it will later take shape—I am talking about the possibility of each Supreme Soviet, on the basis of certain criteria and certain quotas, putting forward representatives for each republic. There will be meetings of plenipotentiary representatives who will finally put their signatures to and endorse this treaty.

A great deal has been done to coordinate the positions of the republics; and now these are not just the former and present Union republics, but also the former autonomous republics, and now these are Union republics. Generally speaking, the words Union republics are not being used there, just the word republics. This was a very complex task, and I must say that in this instance, too, the question found what I would call a positive solution. In particular, on one of the central issues: How can the republics enter the Union—the treaty, so to speak? A flexible formula is envisaged there. Either they enter the Union directly or as part of another republic. This is the right of those plenipotentiary bodies to come together and to adopt a decision. This also takes in the whole diversity of things, evident today, and comprising our real situation, and we had to find this formula. There has been a great advance in this draft. It has been greatly enriched compared with what we discussed previously, because all the proposals and objections voiced at the Supreme Soviet, at the Congress of People's Deputies, and in the press, all this has been discussed and analyzed and, of course, a particularly strict and responsible attitude was taken to what is contained in the declarations of sovereignty adopted in the republics. So, a great job has been done, and a very important stage has been passed. That's the first thing.

And now a few words about the Cabinet of Ministers session. This session was instituted under the influence of those processes which are going on in the country, primarily within the economy, first and foremost on the basis of an analysis of the processes which have been taking place in the economy during the first two months of this year. The situation has forced us to return once more to the economic agreement and the agreement on foodstuffs which were signed then, you will recall, and which received the backing of the Supreme Soviet and the Congress as being documents which were essential to stop the collapse of our national economy, and to prevent the further development of the processes of disintegration in the economy, which generally speaking threaten very serious economic and social consequences.

Thus, these two agreements, very important ones, were signed in these circumstances. On the basis of these, it was then also possible for the Supreme Soviet to confirm the budget and the forecast for the development of our economy. This was the basis, and it remains the basis for the work of the whole country, of all the republics, of all the production and labor collectives, and of all our people.

I must say that we are very alarmed by the fact that to date, in spite of the presence of these documents, and in spite of the fact that we have also managed to achieve something—in particular, we have concluded contracts for 86 percent [as heard], the situation in the economy remains extremely grave; and I would say that not only has it not eased, but it is even growing more acute and is worsening and the threat is a large one.

All the same, economic links were destroyed and ruptured during the second half of last year, in particular during the fourth quarter of last year, and time was lost on the conclusion of contracts; and now, while this entire process is being renewed, our economy is, simply, in a most serious state. Links have been severed; the market has been ruptured. Everyone has rushed to protect himself, thinking that he will save himself, and this is the greatest mistake, because our economy is such that we can only emerge from this critical situation by mutual cooperation—not by shutting ourselves off from each other.

It only seems that we will manage by adopting certain decisions, be it barter or conditions, so to speak, dictated to your other contractor who will deliver what you need. All this, you know, is temporary, nothing more than temporary gains. If we fail to restore normal economic ties, these live ties, then these individual solutions will not save us; they will not save us. For the time being this

is the main reason many people continue to believe that they will be able to save themselves on their own. There are those who wish to dictate some conditions to somebody. This reminds us once again that one should act within the framework of the agreements we have adopted.

You know, very many things can be explained by the fact that we, our economy, have found ourselves in the following situation: On the one hand, there is the state order and on the other hand, there are economic agreements between republics. These two processes were not organically integrated together and as a result neither the state order nor economic ties between republics worked. This approach continued when the center and the departments related to implementing the state order and solving the issues of material and technical supplies were not doing everything to take reality into account. In this case I have in mind ties between republics and the accords signed. In precisely the same manner, too, I think, republics proceeded to a considerble degree from the illusion that one can go straight over to direct links between republics, and everything, so to speak, will fall into place. This is not the case. After all, the market is the basis; there is a link with production collectives, primarily, within this economic space and there are instruments that served it. That economy, performing well or poorly, had its own infrastructure and tools. But these interrepublican links to a considerable degree have been left dangling.

Therefore, following very difficult debates and mutual recriminations, the process nevertheless developed toward combining ... toward cooperation along these two lines and, eventually, I believe, this will be achieved. Now to finally solve these issues, the Cabinet of Ministers has deemed it necessary to set up a group for examining all the practical topical issues; it is headed by Comrade Doguzhiyev and includes first deputy chairmen of the governments of union republics.

This has to be said and of course it has to be said also that many of the proposals adopted here both by oblasts ... we will start with ... and republics, oblasts, krays, and even towns ... also had their negative influence, but that is what I was talking about. It began with the sovereignty of the republics and under the banner of sovereignty such things were done that by no means proceeded from—by no means took into consideration—the genuine interests of the republics and the peoples, but to a significant degree they were simply some kind of political ambitions, demonstrative acts and decisions, but this added elements to our transitional economy that complicated the situation even more. But the regions joined this. The towns joined this and enterprises joined this—and to add to this, the main thing now ... the main burden of all of this situation falls on the production collectives. There is what emerges from the decisions of the center, what emerges from the decisions made by republics, and the decisions of local bodies. The matter reaches the village soviet, the rayon soviet, and the town soviet. Everybody is issuing commands. In such a state of affairs, of course, not one production collective, labor collective can work. Therefore a natural economic medium is required.

I did not manage to read properly to the end today, but attention was focused on the fact that somewhere ... Comrade Ovchinnikov, I think, wrote in PRAVDA that: Verily, we alone ... the whole world marches in step and we alone are not marching in step.

Integration processes are going on and they are emerging to a new stage in Europe; integration processes are going on in North America, and they are emerging to new readings of situations and processes, how they develop—that is, they take into account the realities of the economy. These integration processes are going on in South America, and so on and so on.

As for us, we moved on toward a feudal fragmentation. Here politics did a poor service to the economy and social affairs. That is why we need to speak about it openly. Now everyone understands it, though not everyone has drawn conclusions from it. Could one believe that everyone has drawn conclusions in this situation when the threat is looming and there is a real danger of a disintegration of economic links? Even now there are shortfalls in the deliveries of oil, gas, and coal; and we have a 10-12 percent shortfall in meat and milk, though, as you can remember, and we know, feed was approximately at last year's level.

In this situation, when everything is so tense, there are people whose cry is "the worse, the better." Just look, there are deputies—they are from the Russian Federation, yesterday I spoke about it at the Council of the Federation—who are doing the rounds of the miners and calling on the people to strike. Well, you understand that this is suicide and irresponsibility. Why is it being done? For what purpose? To show their dissatisfaction with the activities of the USSR Supreme Soviet, with the activities of the president, and with the activities of a new Cabinet of Ministers, we have not yet formed. Listen, our people should know that now we are seeking ways to keep the economy under control, to stabilize it, and to proceed along the way of developing market relations. Here I appeal to you, members of the Supreme Soviet, do not delay the examination of all those draft laws you have in your hands. I mean those on taking things out of state hands and on antimonopoly legislation. I mean here what is connected with the development of enterprise and everything that is connected with the development of enterprise and everything that is connected with forming a market structure. We need to do it, in exactly the same way as we need to keep moving the processes in the countryside from the point of view of implementing the needs of land reform.

It is today here, at the Supreme Soviet, that we need to say once again that now is the time for the most important practical deeds. Many have already been adopted and decided. We must act to change the situation for the better. We will, within the framework of the

government, irrespective of all that is poured now onto the pages of the so-called democratic press and irrespective of the fact that there is already a calculation on how to bring this government down: on the 10th to do that, on the 16th to do this, on the 26th to do this, vote against the referendum, as this is the general secretary's venture and he is crazy about imperial stances, etc.

That is what they want to do. Look how this public—I do not want to call it anything else—how they want at this moment to leave, even resign in token protest that they do not agree and that the policy is not right. That is not the point. The point is they cannot conduct constructive work and they want to desert to keep for themselves the right of perpetual opposition that is always right in everything.

Comrades, maintain calm in the USSR Supreme Soviet, and we will act. The people are now starting to realize what is what, who is doing business, perhaps even with mistakes, perhaps even being late in undertaking some steps, and who is engaged in political demagogy and incitement. Today, during these days, especially, people will see much and understand, and we will act calmly. Today will see the completion, after an exchange of opinion on these same questions in the Federation Council, of the shaping of the decision of the Cabinet of Ministers. Here all these practical questions have been examined: what must be done so that economic relations may be strengthened and to fill in the gaps wherever they have occurred. This is another reason gaps have occurred, comrades: The fall in the extraction of oil led to us exporting last year 125 million and this year 60 million. In other words, we have lost more than 6 billion dollars. This was raw material for the light and food industries. It was raw material for our machine-building. We borrowed on this money. Now we have limited opportunities.

I should say here frankly that we in this case are taking note of and are giving their due to those who in token of solidarity, so to speak, with our cause of perestroyka are prepared to allocate credit in support so that the perestroyka processes may continue. Not everyone; some people have faltered. All our democrats—in quotation marks—who have been invited at others' expense have been engaged in all countries calling on governments not to allocate credit—those which were promised, and some 11 billion was promised, so far half has been allocated already. Suddenly, you know what, the situation becomes difficult: Don't risk it; you know what sort of government it is for, a conservative one that is dragging us backward or toward dictatorship!

Your deputies and mine are saying that. Incidentally, the Supreme Soviet should take a look at the procedure for deputies' trips abroad in other legislatures. [commotion in hall]

First, there is the procedure that without permission of the Supreme Soviet, the leadership of the commissions or the chambers, no one travels. [more commotion]

Second, the basic activity is here.

Third, especially the financing of these trips. To tell the truth, they say: We go as scientists. But they deliver speeches, but not for deepening and speeding up the process of moving toward the truth. We need to sort everything out. Don't be embarassed that such attacks are made on us now. These are the signs of death throes. We need to welcome anything rational from any critical position, no matter what the source is.

The issue of foodstuffs was examined with particular attention. We have very serious questions here. I and the comrades alongside me—I mean the entire cabinet—are examining these issues closely and we will do everything to keep the situation in hand, despite the disruptions taking place in this sphere in the first 2 months. This is very important. Of course, we will do everything possible to prepare for spring—spring will be very difficult—and to help those who live in the countryside. This is a short report on those meetings, discussions, and adopted decisions that took place in the past few days at the Council of the Federation and the Cabinet of Ministers.

As to the Security Council, yesterday...[pauses] in accordance with the Constitution, I have to receive agreement from you regarding the Security Council and take into account the opinion—as you remember, we wrote it down—take into account the opinion of the Council of the Federation. The Council of the Federation approved these proposals which you were presented with. As a matter of fact, yesterday, at the Council of the Federation, there were no objections, a question of the following kind arose. I think we must solve it later in a proper fashion, not just within the framework of a discussion, but to create some legal prerequisites for it. It is the question of the functions of the Council of the Federation and the functions of the Security Council. You probably have a similar question. I must say that with regard to the Council of the Federation we already have a draft law on it.

After examination by our learned institutions—and first of all, by the legal and political—we will present it to the Supreme Soviet. In this way, the law will come about.

We look upon the Council of the Federation as a very important body in our renewed Union, in our renewed federation, engaged, first of all, in elaborating and forming the main questions of policy, based on ideas and legislative initiatives that may be born later. In this way various laws may be adopted that would meet, would strengthen that political line between the interests of the whole federation. Of course, the agreement and coordination of the activity of the Union republics within the framework of the renewed federation. That's to put it briefly. We are preparing the draft law on the basis of such an approach. That, as it were, is the key to that law. It will be presented to you.

As far as the Security Council is concerned, I think you will see, and we have already spoken about that time and again, that there is the life of a state such as ours and

there are questions which constantly have to be discussed in some body or other on a regular basis. That body, I would say, should operate practically daily and decide all the questions to maintain our security in the proper way, in broad terms, in the understanding of security that was present when we discussed what the Security Council was. I mean here also questions of security from the point of view of defense, security from the point of view of the economy, security from the point of view of ecology, security from the point of view of stability, and that means in connection with conflicts on an interethnic basis, and so on and so forth.

I think you will be right if you say that what I am proposing to you does not allow you to be sure that everything, all these aspects, are already being taken into account here.

But after all, I ... [pauses] these very proposals are not the end, so to speak, not the finish. That must be done now and I ask you to support it.

I don't know if I need to describe Comrade Yanayev, Comrade Pavlov, Comrade Bakatin, Comrade Bessmertnykh, and so on. You know them all. [commotion in hall, deputies shout out] Boldin? You don't know Comrade Boldin? In my opinion, you all know him but you want me why he is here. Boldin is in the presidential apparatus and fulfills the role of coordinating the activity, I would say, of the whole apparatus attached to the president. I must say that there was an idea that perhaps there should be a special president's assistant responsible for Security Council matters. It turned out, after thinking it through, that the present version was the most suitable to avoid creating a parallel competing firm. Moreover, Comrade Boldin has in his hands everything necessary to ensure that the Security Council is serviced normally, and to guarantee the reliability of that servicing. You must see that great reliability is necessary here, even from the point of view of keeping safe everything that will be at the disposal of the Security Council, that will be examined. Some kind of decisions will be adopted in connection with this. On the whole, that is the explanation.

I have spoken already of Comrade Bakatin. You know Yevgeniy Maksimovich. You realize that the others are present by dint of the position they hold in the state, and the need for them to be here is simply dictated by that position.

Vitaliy Ivanovich Vorotnikov asked a question: Could you answer as to whether the question of the referendum on 17 March was discussed at the sitting of the Council of the Federation? It is a question of the formulation as adopted at the Supreme Soviet. Deputies are saying that the main text allegedly has been changed. Is that the case?

Well, I think that the congress placed all the responsibility on the Soviet—on the USSR Supreme Soviet—and I must put questions to you as to how you are fulfilling the instructions of the congress. Questions arise, comrades. In some cases there are attempts to change the main question in some way, in other cases to include questions in parallel. But I think it is already a question of practice. As far as I know, you have already heard a report here at the Supreme Soviet, as has the Council of the Federation. In any case, many problems arise there from the point of its implementation. Nevertheless, the date and the referendum itself are not in question. As to the wording, Anatoliy Ivanovich, all his colleagues, you yourselves and lawyers, are working on it.

There are some Supreme Soviets that adopted decisions and believe that essentially it is not different from the wording aproved by the USSR Supreme Soviet. In this case the USSR Supreme Soviet and the Central Electorate Commission must make sure that we don't have a situation where we cannot compare information on the referendum. Such a problem exists, Vitaliy Ivanovich, and today, the leadership of the Supreme Soviet will have to deal with it.

When is the reform on retail pricing to be continued, and measures for social protection introduced?

I understand that it is no longer a question of the essence, but of the date. The work has been completed. All the republics have signed. Russia has signed—comrade Khasbulatov signed on behalf of Russia—but he received the authority to do so. Well, that is what I spoke to you about.

In connection with the fact that—this question was discussed at the Council of the Federation, yesterday—the final I's have been dotted as far as all these questions are concerned, and in the next day or two, after having studied everything, the cabinet should put forward proposals.

It is a question of the rise in prices being preceded by the payment of compensation; of the rise in prices being preceded by compensation. In Russian, that would seem to be correct. A week is required for that as a minimum, a minimum. Obviously, part of that will be in the course of the payment of wages, but the beginning of the payment of compensaiton should precede—at the minimum by a week—the date of the declaration, of the introduction of the new prices. That is how it is.

So, now the question of the political decision has been adopted. It is a question now of practical implementation.

Will the Union budget for the first quarter be fulfilled? Well, I did not go into it deeply when I was analyzing our economic situation, examined at the Cabinet of Minsters. I only spoke of the consequences, in the sense of production, and this means the growth of production, of commodity circulation, and how this affects our lives—the provision of the people, first of all, with goods, and of the national economy with means of production. But if production falls, it means that profits are reduced also, it means that contributions to the Union and to the republican budget are reduced. Therefore, there is also a

serious threat to the budget. All of this is linked, indissolubly linked. Just in the same way that we and you, and then all, spoke out in favor of having...[pauses, changes thought] it was adopted, and finally it was reflected in the economic agreement—of having a stabilization fund, an extrabudgetary one.

At first, when this topic was raised, there was a large-scale discussion: What kind of funds are these? But when we and you elucidated the purpose of this action, that is, to help our basic industries—oilmen, miners, metallurgy workers—for whom we have established wholesale prices at a definite level and who are dissatisfied with these prices since they do not provide them with normal possibilities for entering the market, then the decision was made not to go along the path of raising prices in the basic industries and thereby giving a powerful boost to a rise in wholesale prices and, consequently, of retail prices later.

We went along the path of creating these extra-budgetary stabilization funds. The principles—based on the formation of stabilization funds—is proceeding. In this case, too, there are violations of, and deviations from, what was recorded in the economic agreement. So, this will have a very serious effect on the situation in these basic industries, too. You have noticed that the Cabinet of Ministers examined the situation with the oilmen, in the coal industry, metallurgy, and transport, I think, too, and all the decisions have been adopted for these basic branches of the national economy to function in a stable manner. Therefore, these issues, too, were examined at the meeting of the Cabinet of Ministers. I must say that the Russian Federation has committed the greatest number of violations regarding deductions to the stabilization funds.

Yesterday, at the Federation Council, the situation in South Ossetia was discussed. I know that you examined this issue here, too, and perhaps you are counting on my information. We agreed at the Federation Council yesterday, and that was a unanimous view, in connection with the fact that, as it seems to us—and, I think, this was already confirmed yesterday—South Ossetia's leadership had been formed since representatives of the Georgian Supreme Soviet and government used to refer to the fact that there was nobody to hold talks with, and allegedly they could not keep their promises and sit down at the negotiating table. Now there is someone to negotiate with, there is a promise to sit down to hold talks. Let us assume that these talks will start. To promote success at these talks, we adopted a decision yesterday to send representatives of the Supreme Soviet and the government both to Georgia and South Ossetia without delay to advance this process within the framework of seeking a political solution and untangling this situation, together with Georgian comrades and representatives of South Ossetia.

The situation is acute. People are either dying or being injured practically every day. In addition, they have agreed at the Federation Council that if this doesn't lead to anything either, then the president has to examine the whole situation and on the basis of consultations with the USSR Supreme Soviet and the Georgian Supreme Soviet find other measures for solving this problem.

I nonetheless hope that we will be able to solve this problem amicably, or it will be bad for Georgia, for Georgians, for Ossetians, for all those who are living there, bad for all of us. We hope that the present leadership in Georgia will gain in wisdom, responsibility, and in balance.

Comrade Pupkevich says: While we're deciding and discussing, everything will collapse. But, you know, I think if we hold the referendum and the people have their say, if we publish the draft Union treaty, then the opportunity opens up for us for completing this whole process leading to the new Union treaty during the first half of the year, Comrade Pupkevich. Furthermore, in this situation we and you are not going to sit with our arms folded.

Question: In what way can Comrade Bakatin, who concluded treaties that run counter to the laws of the USSR and the decisions of the Supreme Soviet, be a member of the Security Council? By his actions he has ruined the USSR Internal Affairs Ministry. Are there not some personal motives in his nomination? Not everything is clear with Comrade Pugo, either. [From] Comrade Kogan.

Well, comrades, I don't want to get a discussion underway now on these questions. Everything is clear here—to me and to you. And when I spoke at the time I was putting forward the proposal to switch Comrade Bakatin to other work and recommending Comrade Pugo to you, I gave an explanation on this score. I said that Comrade Bakatin would be used, taking into account the potential, qualities and you and I are very well aware of that and I hope that he will benefit the work of the Security Council. I proceeded from this standpoint. Incidentally, comrades here put the question that they were worried that the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh was becoming exacerbated.

Well, who needs this, then? Who needs this? Over the past few months there have been moves on the part of the leadership of both republics to come toward each other. I will not hide the fact that within Nagorno-Karabakh, too, there is also a feeling on the part of sober-minded Armenian people who live on this land together with the Azerbaijanis that a new page must be opened. The peoples—two republics—can no longer be kept in such a psychological and sociopolitical situation. As soon as this sort of talk is discovered and as soon as it goes further than contacts between the leadership of the country and the republics, as soon as it goes a little further—you immediately have such mechanisms bringing it to a stop, on both sides. Powerful forces have been formed which are not interested in normalization, even though people expect that.

Instability is an environment—just as in the case of parasites that can only thrive in a certain environment. I would very much like us at last to amicably get the situation back to normal, and then the restoration of human relations would ensue slowly—it will not be quick—and also perhaps they will not only become healthier but also improve. For this, I think, the time will come and perhaps has already come for us to say firmly to some people: No, that will do! That's enough of speculating in people's lives, in their well-being, and of setting people at loggerheads. People do not need that. This requires acting so that everything is decided in the interests of the two peoples. I am convinced. Some people now want ... [pauses] they have joined this destabilizing torrent, in implementation of a timetable of destabilization of the situation in the country to give no peace to the present leadership, Supreme Soviet, president, and cabinet to take realistic steps, and they are also bringing this subject into it. So there is a whole interconnection here.

There is talk about oil here, too. I must say that the decision of the Cabinet of Ministers that has been adopted is a major decision for the development of the oil industry. Everything is envisaged in it: questions of a current nature, to maintain extraction, and even increase it through exploitation of the existing wells, but to have this exploitation there is the question of the lack of pipe, pumps, and so on. These questions are now being studied by an emergency group, led by Comrade Velichko. But there are also long-term questions, such as exploration. A program should be developed in conjunction with increasing oil reserves. What we have at our disposal allows us to draw the conclusion that if we act as we agreed in the Cabinet of Ministers, then we can ensure a high level of oil production.

Comrade Gorinov notes: You did not say anything when you spoke about the draft Union treaty, if in this treaty there is preserved, determined, stressed, that the transformation of our federation is taking place within the framework of the socialist choice. Well, I think this has been reflected in many of our decisions and there is no necessity to write this into every document. I think, moreover ... [pauses] do you remember when I told you that when we discussed the Union treaty, prepared within the framework of the Supreme Soviet instruction and the framework of consultations with the republics, that probably all these questions need to be referred to our Constitution? I must say that in connection with the fact that we are approaching a draft of the treaty, a new draft Union treaty, the possibility opens up for us to renew work in the Constitution Commission. We have there at our disposal 12 drafts; there is also the base draft, and we will have the possibility of clarifying and defining all these questions.

Apart from this, in the referendum we have put forward the question so that every citizen expresses his attitude to the preservation of the USSR as a renewed federation, where the rights of citizens, the rights and freedom of citizens of all nationalities are reliably defended and guaranteed. Maybe I am not giving the sense exactly, but those three elements are all there. For this reason, this opinion at the referendum will have great significance for the subsequent work.

The comrades recommend that I speak once more about the referendum. I spoke at the beginning, and the comrades consider that sometime before the referendum, after everything that has happened, as president, I should take the floor and speak once more on television.

Well, thank you for the advice. I will think about it. I don't know. Do you all hold that opinion? [deputies say "yes"] Alright.

Comrade Sukhov stresses a thought about which I spoke—that the political process, as it is unfolding in our country, has a negative influence upon the processes in the economy. Well, I can say only that this is the case, and the adoption, the appearance of such basic documents as, in this case, the treaty, that, first of all, clarifies the problem of the distribution of power, will regulate the activity of all bodies—union, republican, and local.

Therefore, in all directions, in the activity of the president and of the cabinet, and in reforming our union, we are going toward guaranteeing political stability, the normal distribution of labor in our state and the effective work of executive bodies of power.

Shall I continue to answer questions? [deputies call: "yes"]

What is the fate of the USSR Supreme Soviet in the light of the new Union treaty? I think, comrades—and it concerns everybody—that when a new Union treaty is adopted, and everything is approved, when there is a constitution prepared and signed taking account already of that, on the basis already of that new Union treaty, then we will decide upon all structures of power—legislative, executive [words indistinct caused by unidentified person's voice, and noise in hall) So, we will decide all that.

Comrades say that there is less and less talk of construction in general at various union and republican forums, and less and less talk of the program 2000. I think that things are bad as far as capital construction in our country is concerned. And not just because we were forced, in the interests of the stabilization, of the country's financial stabilization, to cut back the volume of capital construction. That is quite normal.

It is matter of something else. I was in Belorussia. In Belorussia, construction workers said a very great deal. They said that the situation as far as material and technical supply was concerned, as far as providing construction workers with equipment, with attention on the whole ... [pauses] that construction workers did not get their fair share. And, after all, you know what happened. After all, in our time, we all spoke out in favor of such sectors as the agrarian sector ... [pauses] and 3 years ago we adopted decisions, where the whole

agrarian sector is subordinate to the republics. A year ago, probably, or a little more, we adopted a decision, and all construction work went to the republics. All the ministries are in the republics. And I am afraid that this transitional period has had its effect. But I do not think we must go back. In my opinion, the decisions we took then were correct. I think that, after all, without construction workers, without concern for them, concern for the construction cadres, concern for the construction workers' material and technical base, there will be no transformation or renewal of our economy, and we will not resolve social problems either.

I think that these problems should be subject to special examination by the USSR Cabinet of Ministers, and, in the first place, in the republics.

Comrade Akhromeyev asks what should be done in connection with the fact the president of Moldova assembled the leaders of city and rayon soviets and warned them that holding the referendum on 17 March on the territory of Moldova is not allowed, and that soviets holding the referendum would be dissolved after the referendum by the Supreme Soviet of the Moldova Soviet Socialist Republic. How can that be assessed? As an anticonstitutional and illegal action, illegal steps and warnings, all the more so since the same leadership of Moldova stated prior to this that although it was against it, it said people themselves should decide, and those who wanted to take part in the referendum in those regions should take part.

It seems to me that if they take that course, then neither the USSR Supreme Soviet nor the USSR president will remain uninvolved in that situation. We must, I think, base our actions on the decisions you recently adopted in this connection. The referendum must be held throughout the country, and all assistance must be given through the channels of the Supreme Soviet and the Central Electoral Commission to ensure this. I hope they will not in the end lose their heads. Comrade Samarin is defending the democrats; but, as he says, the true democrats. He usually sits there, and that is where he now sits. Yes, stability is a good thing, Comrade Samarin. Not all the people's deputies, he says, were engaged in persuading the governments of foreign countries not to give us credits. Many people's deputies who number themselves among that camp have done quite a lot to establish economic relations with the West. Names must be named. I think it would not be a bad idea for the Planning and Economic Commission to analyze and see what each person is up to abroad, and submit that information to the Supreme Soviet. [voices of assent in hall] Fine. Let us instruct Comrade Samarin to head a group of deputies to deal with this matter. [laughter] That is my suggestion. [noise from hall] No, you sorted it out without Krychkov.

Comrade Bimbayev asks, or rather raises the question, that much of what is destabilizing the situation is connected with the fact that the normal operation of the law enforcement system has been torn asunder and disrupted. I have to say that within the framework of the new Union treaty, this is borne in mind, and in particular it is assumed that that interaction must be provided for.

Ubaydullayeva asks: Mikhail Sergeyevich, we women know that you always support us in all that we do and undertake. Now, there is someone who knows how to ask a question! [chuckles heard in the hall] Thank you. Good. I take note of that.

And a further question: Do you not consider it possible for women to participate in the Security Council?

I consider that it is possible for women to participate in all the structures and even—it was mooted here somewhere, or in the press: Would it be possible for a women to become president in our country? I believe it is possible. The democratic processes have now developed in such a way, and are bringing so many new people to the fore that I think that this should in no way be ruled out; on the contrary, these processes should be encouraged. I do not know how you view this, but we will propose that in the cabinet structure—I believe we have designated this [murmurings of assent in the hall]—there will be a Ministry for Family and Women's Affairs. We are intending to table such proposals in exactly the same way as we are reacting to the proposals of the Committee for Youth Affairs, and we will table the proposal that there should be such a subdivision within the government structure as well. I believe this is essential.

Will the program for the activities of the USSR Cabinet of Ministers for the forthcoming term of its authority be submitted? From Comrade Demakov.

I think that after confirmation, Comrade Pavlov will address you, and I know—he is holding consultations all the time—that he is preparing a proposal regarding this. The basis for the program of its activity is the resolutions adopted by the Supreme Soviet, the laws, the resolutions of the Congress, and, of course, what life will add to this.

Comrade Yudin asks: What will be the mutual relations between the Cabinet of Ministers, the Security Council, and the committee for cordination of the activities of the law-enforcement bodies?

I think, comrades, that they all have their own sphere of activity. The Security Council is, after all, the body that will have dealing with the problems which, one way or another, affect the present or the future security of the country. To competently and professionally judge the processes now under way, how they may turn out and what could be the future consequences of them, it needs to integrate into its structure the principled opinions and judgments of the leaders of our departments from precisely this standpoint.

But all the others operate within the constitution and their own powers, tackling their own practical questions on a day- to-day basis.

Yes, I expected this—comrades Yablokov, Kazannik, and Desyatov remind me in timely fashion that at the moment these proposals do not make clear who will be responsible within the Security Council for ecological security. I think that if you look again at the list you will see that there are people there who are capable of taking responsibility for this. But I think that the question refers to the professional aspect of the matter. The plan is for us to ponder this question, too.

Comrade Bronshteyn again asks a question on the old theme. Can't we begin with the economy? I have to say that, generally speaking, all the republics are participating in the whole debate on the economy, on all the economic agreements, and the agreements on food supplies. All are taking part, without exception, all 15 republics, including ...[pauses] representatives and leaders of all three Baltic republics are contributing a great deal that is useful to the discussion on these questions. I understand their feelings. They have experimented with life in isolation. They have sought a better life on their own. Now they have a better idea than others of what it means to break ties with the Soviet Union. I think that this is a realization which, increasingly, is shared by everybody. This is good, since true interests have always been the only real basis for developing fully fledged cooperation.

Nevertheless, this does not change the fact that we have a specific situation, and that all these three Baltic republics have specific positions as regards their attitude to the new Union treaty.

Nevertheless—by the way, I can disclose that yesterday I met the leaders of three groups set up by presidential decree to discuss the entire range of questions connected with the future of the Union and these republics. I mean that yesterday I had a meeting with Comrade Doguzhiyev, Comrade Velichko, and Comrade Laverov. They already have had the first contacts—so far they have not held full-scale meetings or talks. I see that they have studied that material thoroughly, and wanted to compare... [pauses] exchange opinions with me. We had such an exchange of opinions yesterday—comrades empowered by me, together with experts—and discussed all these questions open for discussion. I think that process will work out. [Moscow Central Television Second Program Network in Russian at 1905 GMT on 7 March broadcasts a shorter version of the speech by USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev to the USSR Supreme Soviet in Moscow today, adding the following passage:

They have something to say to the representatives of the Baltic republics if the Baltics have something to say, and I am sure that they have, only without any ultimatums, without any conditions. In general, no one is going to play these games.

In general, I should tell you that great changes have taken place in the CEMA just as they have in the Warsaw Pact. We have seen that very much has accumulated that caused offence and dissatisfaction in cooperation within the framework of this organization. When we had weighed up everything we decided to take a calm position and allow time to tell. Now, the whole point is how to find time to hold meetings and discussions of the whole complex of questions with all of these countries. They are all insistently raising the question of holding meetings including...[changes thought] we are receiving initiatives from the new Polish leadership. I think that we are undoubtedly open to this. The peoples of these countries are old friends of ours. It is not for nothing that we have lived with them over these past decades. We have links. They must be preserved and improved. There are some things that must be rejected that are, so to say, a superfluous burden and oppressed those relations. But, nevertheless, we should enhance and step up this cooperation. You know life is richer than all outlines and political slogans.]

Gorbachev Answers Questions

LD0703222191 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 1800 GMT 7 Mar 91

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Excerpts] Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev answered legislators' questions [at today's USSR Supreme Soviet session]. There were more than 20. They touched on a wide range of problems concerning the economic and political situation that has developed within the country. Here are just a few of his answers:

[Begin Gorbachev recording] [passage omitted] Comrade Kryshkin puts forward this argument: With the introduction of the laws on ownership and enterprise, with the accumulation of capital and the concentration of ownership, the economic basis of the Soviet system is eliminated. The work of the Federation Council is like the elimination of the power of the Soviets and of the Union. Does this not seem like counterrevolution? [commotion in the hall]

Well, I am already used to any question, so... [commotion in the hall] that question does not surprise me either. Since it exists, that means it has to be answered. It seems to me, moreover, that the answer is definitely not. I think that by treading the path of reforming property relations, and by achieving a mixed economy through that reform—a new form of economic life and economic management—we can at last properly bring into play a person's interest and incentive, and strengthen his work motivation. So this does not contradict the socialist idea. It does not contradict our conceptions of a democratic society, in which the interests of the working man are staunchly defended, in which questions of social justice, freedom, and so on are resolved. It does not contradict them. As for the process of removing state involvement, I think that, as you discuss that question, I am sure you will come to the conclusion that is being reached by our society: Namely,

that, as a result of that process, property must, nevertheless, find itself in the hands of the people, the working people, rather than in the hands of those who took advantage of our weaknesses at the previous stage and at the current stage, and, to put it bluntly, have made a fortune through robbery. [end recording]

Political & Social

Moscow Unions Debate General Strike

LD0703122491 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1200 GMT 7 Mar 91

[Text] The Moscow Federation of Trade Unions is demanding that price rises be halted until the law on indexation is adopted, union chairman Shmakov stated at the meeting between trade union leaders and Prime Minister Pavlov. Now the issue of whether or not to hold a general strike in the city is being decided at trade union meetings.

Centrist Bloc Urges End to Planned Demos

PM0703170791 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 7 Mar 91 Second Edition p 3

[I[illegible]ributed report: "Centrist Bloc Appeal"]

[Text] The centrist bloc of political parties and movements has appealed to the "Democratic Russia" movement and their supporters not to hold the political demonstration planned for 10 March and "not to fuel passions further."

The bloc's appeal, transmitted by TASS, asks the leaders of all parties, unions, movements, and social organizations to meet at the Central Tourist House in Moscow 11 March for a roundtable discussion on the eve of the 17 March referendum under the slogan "Who Is Who?" and clearly define their attitude toward the referendum.

Kryuchkov Speaks on Perestroyka, Gorbachev

OW0803052791 Tokyo NHK General Television Network in Japanese 1228 GMT 7 Mar 91

[Interview with KGB Chairman Vladimir Kryuchkov by NHK correspondent Yamauchi at a KGB Headquarters conference room; date of interview not given; from the "NHK News 21" program—recorded in Russian with subtitled, abbreviated translation into Japanese; translated from the Russian]

[Text] [Yamauchi] They say that perestroyka has already died and is finished in the Soviet Union. How do you see the present situation regarding perestroyka?

[Kryuchkov] Perestroyka here has not ended; it has not died. It has probably entered the most difficult and responsible period in its development. When perestroyka was beginning, no one thought its path would be smooth, and everyone thought that there would be great difficulties. But, of course some things, obviously, could not be foreseen. So, we are continuing perestroyka, and as a result of analyses, we are already introducing changes, and I hope, rather I presume, that in the future we shall also have to change a few things in our approach.

[Yamauchi] It seems to us that President Gorbachev is becoming conservative under great pressure from conservative elements and law enforcement organs, including the KGB. What is your opinion about this?

[Kryuchkov] Well, first of all, I disagree with this point of view on two aspects. I shall not begin with the most important thing, the KGB. We do not consider the KGB to be a conservative organization. Our president has relations with everyone—with leftists, rightists, and centrists. He is answerable for all of them. They are all his—the left, the right, and the center. If, let us say, judgments, views, and actions which contradict our constitutional norms emanate from the so-called left wing, I think it is the president's duty and responsibility to react to this in a corresponding way. And Mikhail Sergeyevich reacted to this correspondingly, particularly in his speech yesterday in Minsk.

[Yamauchi] Is there a real possibility that President Gorbachev will retire in the near future?

[Kryuchkov] I would say that demands of this sort are indeed being made, and recently Yeltsin demanded the President's resignation. But, I consider that, in this instance, Yeltsin reflects only a small part of our society and our population. I would say that, since then, literally tens of thousands of telegrams have been addressed to the president, supporting the political course of Gorbachev.

But, as far as a coup is concerned, in order for this to become a reality, a number of conditions must be met. There must be an organization, forces, and people willing to take the risk, as well as some kind of social basis. Now, this is something the KGB has not yet seen. That is why I can say that, so far, we can guarantee that this will not happen.

Akhromeyev Interviewed on Union

LD0603233891 Moscow Central Television Program Network in Russian 1940 GMT 6 Mar 91

[Interview with Sergey Akhromeyev, people's deputy and member of the Supreme Soviet, by unidentified correspondent; in Moldova; date not given—live or recorded]

[Text] [passage omitted] [Ahromeyev] If we look at values, our main values, Soviet values, the values of the Soviet Union and the Soviet people—and these basic values now include our country's unity, the fact that we have a single homeland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, I think, and, secondly, republics, independent and sovereign in political and economic respect, that

join in a union and are given the main rights that, on the whole, determine society's life, the country's development and the life of each family and each individual—then I would not say that I am rigid and conservative. I am, however, for a unified union within the framework of the Soviet socialist federation. I am a Communist, therefore I am in favor of our society developing along the socialist path. If people, opponents, come out with a different program, I fight against it in a very tough manner. I speak out frankly, I call a spade a spade and behave likewise even toward people, my specific opponents. If someone recognizes these basic values, I am ready to cooperate with these people on the broadest scale and to examine problems proceeding from the broadest positions.

[Correspondent] Thank you, Sergey Fedorovich, for your frankness, and I would like to ask you yet another question in this context. You have given your point of view, your position. In your view, however, in what way should relations between various public and political formations be built today? Secondly, here is a very topical questions: How do you see future relations between the civilian population and the Army?

[Akhromyev] You see, regarding the first question, our society's misfortune lies in the fact that we—well, when I say we, I mean all groups, parties, and public movements; I must say frankly that we, communists, have this weakness, too—that all our competing public groups drag everything into political struggle, including the economy, too. One must not do this, however. It is impermissible to make the well-being of the family and each individual—that is, his normal life, an object of political struggle.

Speaking about relations between the people and the Army, I would formulate this question somewhat differently from the way you did it.

Again, this is my point of view. I am convinced that the problem of society and the Army, the people and the Army exists, but it is not an acute one. The people in our country still love and respect the Army. Nowadays however, the idea of "the people" is not as straightforward as it used to be. After all, there are different parties and public movements within our people and society, and even authorities in different republics adhere to different political positions. Therefore, there is this problem of power and the Army. Especially, say, in the center, the president, the Supreme Soviet, and the People's Congress adhere to these positions of the country's unity—I am not going to dwell in detail on that—sovereign republics, human rights. There are no problems with the Army there.

Where one problem is over-emphasized—only the sovereignty of the republic, going as far as talk about leaving the Soviet Union—there problems arise immediately. There the problem arises of authority and the Army, society and the Army. In other words, here it is also necessary to stop the war of laws. As soon as the war of laws begins anywhere, the Army inevitably and immediately joins in here, and not because it is such a force that it wants to establish some kind of dictatorship, but because it lives on the basis of union laws. Where union laws are violated, there the laws and obligations of the Army are immediately violated.

[Correspondent] Well, alright. All the same, whether we like it or not, we will hardly be able to get away from this question. You personally—how do you appraise the Army's interference in the Baltic?

[Akhromeyev] I will tell you immediately that I reject the word interference here. There is no interference, but namely what I was talking about when I was answering your previous question, and now I will give it concrete expression:

The Baltic republics rescinded the USSR law on universal military service and they said that young lads of the corresponding age—Estonians, Lithuanians, and Latvians—did not have to go into the Army any more. These republics, however, have not left the composition of the Soviet Union. You see, despite that fact that they are trying to rescind the laws of the union, the laws are in operation over these republics, in these republics. The Armed Forces are operating according to union laws and the union Constitution and if the authorities have cancelled the union law and established their own, while the Army operates in accordance with the union law, that means that direct confrontation arises immediately between these two state institutions, and everything depends further on the degree of heat, on how far and to what degree it is taken. In this case, inevitably, if this continues, one cannot say that conflicts, including armed ones, are excluded.

Society cannot survive when on the same territory a part of society is living according to one law while the other part of society is living according to another law. That is the subject of the tension.

[Correspondent] We are in Moldova right now. You have visited the rayons. You are a USSR people's deputy. You have met the people. How do you appraise the present sociopolitical situation in the republic?

[Akhromeyev] Well, I have to say in honor of all of our society in Moldova, as they say, I include here both the people and the highest state power—the Supreme Soviet and the president—and the Army, and all the remaining parts of society ... [changes thought].

A lot more common sense and reason was revealed here. The problem of army and power does not really exist in Moldova now. It has been removed. Due to the fact that those two conditions—we have discussed them at some point—saying that the law stating universal military service should exist and there should not be any discrimination against officers and their families were abolished, it has become far quieter. Notice that the acuteness of the problem of army and power has become far less prevalent in newspapers and even in conversations.

Due to the fact that it existed, however, it cannot be removed overnight, and in this respect the situation in Moldova is far better than that, let us say, in the Baltic republics.

[Correspondent] You have been talking from the position of a military person. What about your position as a politician?

[Akhromeyev] Well, now then, I will always remain a military person, but at the same time I am a citizen and USSR people's deputy, and that is why, being a citizen of the USSR, internal processes throughout the country interest and worry me. Being a people's deputy from Moldova, I am especially concerned with the situation in Moldova. Here it is just the same. Those three problems we were talking with you about—whether it should be a unified union, what should Moldova be like if it joins the union, that was the second question, and the third one is the guaranteeing of rights of all the people, and all the families, and all the nationalities in such a way that these rights will be the same for everyone—also worry Moldova at the moment.

Because it is no secret that, let us say, the people's front has chosen one of these three—a problem of the republic's sovereignty of the supremacy of Moldova and Moldovan people. I think that this position is erroneous. It is not advantageous for the people. Moldova's Communist Party is adhering to this triad position meaning that all these issues should be tackled together. A political fight is, of course, going on.

I will tell you—it is probably my subjective opinion, but I do not count on the fact that what I am saying is the absolute truth—but having visited the republic, its cities and villages, especially in my constituency, I can see that people are turning in this particular direction—tackling this task that consists of the three points. It is very clear that the majority of people think that Moldova should join the USSR as a sovereign republic on the federative basis. The majority, the absolute majority of people think that there should not be any discrimination.

In this sense it is of great significance, of course, how the referendum question is resolved, how the question of the Union Treaty is resolved. If these questions are resolved, the people will begin to calm down in Moldova.

[Correspondent] Sergey Fedorovich, if I have understood you correctly, you said that the leadership of the republic today contains quite sober politicians. Have I understood you correctly?

[Akhromeyev] Yes, I think that this is so because we have been able to normalize the most acute issues and, of course, the initiative in this matter belongs to the leadership, to the authorities.

[Correspondent] One more question in connection with this. What is your assessment of the actions of the leaders of the Dnestr region and the so-called Gagauz autonomous republic?

[Akhromeyev] I have never concealed my position. I have always stated it openly everywhere—in Moscow, in Kishinev, in Beltsy, in Tiraspol, and in Komrat. I consider that the separatist actions of the leadership of the Dnestr region and the regions where the Gagauz live are mistaken and incorrect. They have promoted exacerbation; they have poured fuel on the flames, and exacerbated the situation at the end of last year.

But to say only that would be to sin against the truth. One should ask: Why did this happen? What engendered this separatism? Here it is necessary to return to the policy of the Popular Front of Moldova. This social force arose as a progressive one. It fought to raise the self-awareness of the Moldovan people, to develop the culture and language, and all of society recognized this. The program of the Popular Front of Moldova was approved at the first Congress—I am not a member of the Popular Front, but I approve the majority of the points of that program.

But the situation altered radically after the second congress when the Popular Front adopted a program that was in effect a program for the isolation and then secession of the Union Republic of Moldova from the USSR. But when this program was announced and adopted, then the exacerbation occurred, and then a different separatism got under way—the separatism of the Dnestr region and Komrat.

[Correspondent] My last question. What is your attitude to compromise?

[Akhromeyev] I consider that in our society today this is inevitable and totally essential. It is necessary to look for compromise because we live together. Now, evidently, this is a permanent state—a multiplicity of parties, various opinions, political struggle—and if one rejects compromise while admitting political struggle, then this could lead to civil war. Therefore, I consider that compromise is totally natural, a natural way of life for our society.

[Correspondent] Many thanks.

Pugo Explains Government Actions in Baltics

OW0803060391 Tokyo NHK General Television Network in Japanese 1228 GMT 7 Mar 91

[Interview with Interior Minister Pugo by NHK reporter Yamauchi in the Internal Affairs Ministry conference room; date of interview not given; from the "NHK News 21" program—recorded in Russian with subtitled, abbreviated translation into Japanese; translated from the Russian]

[Text] [Yamauchi] Why are joint patrols of Army and MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] troops necessary? Could it be that the MVD intends to restrain the activities of the democrats and independent movements in a number of republics under the pretext of strengthening order?

[Pugo] Recently, this question has resounded rather widely both in our country and abroad. But, I would like to say that this measure was to some extent obligatory. A great number of crimes are being committed on the streets, and in particular, acts of hooliganism, robbery, and violence. The authorities are receiving many petitions from citizens demanding a restoration of order.

You know that, currently, we simply do not have sufficient money for many very important programs. So, we searched for a way to permit us to restore order without additional expenditures.

[Yamauchi] Why were MVD and Army troops unable to avoid military confrontations in Lithuania and Latvia in January?

[Pugo] In answer to the question of why the troops were involved, it ought to be said that the situation in these republics is generally very complex. There is a conflict of laws there. After all, today, these republics are still a component part of our country. They are part of our country. So, the action of Union laws and of the Union Constitution extends to them.

At the same time, parliaments or supreme soviets are working in them which adopt decisions often in contradiction of Union decisions. This gives rise to what today is called a war of laws. But, there are many people who consider that they should live according to the laws and Constitution of the USSR. On the other hand, there are people who maintain and want to adhere only to the laws of the Lithuanian or Latvian Republic.

Unfortunately, a split in the procuracies of these republics has occurred. At present, a split is occurring in the militia in these republics. This is a very dangerous process. As the country's Minister of Internal Affairs, I would not very much like to see these processes going any further and am doing everything possible to hinder them.

[Yamauchi] What do you think, as the minister, about your responsibility in these events?

[Pugo] If they establish even some elements of my personal responsibility, I will have to take responsibility for it. But, today, I am firmly convinced, and can reiterate this, that I knew nothing about it, although the circumstances did indeed take shape in this way.

[Yamauchi] Some Western specialists say that President Gorbachev is becoming conservative under strong pressure from conservative elements and law enforcement organs, including the MVD. What is your opinion about this?

[Pugo, laughing] It would appear from your question that the MVD itself is a conservative organ. But, I would very much like to disagree with this. I would like to refute the view that it has moved to the right or that the country's leadership has moved to the right. I think it is simply realistic in its views and acts in accordance with the tasks and sentiments existing today in society.

Semenov's Open Letter To Gorbachev

LD0703131291 Moscow TASS in English 1228 GMT 7 Mar 91

[Text] Moscow March 7 TASS—Despite a host of fledgling opposition parties, the Communist Party remains the most formidable political force in Soviet society and has no viable alternative so far, according to Rostislav Semenov, chairman of the Soviet Union's Democratic Party.

People in the world and Soviet people pin their hopes on processes of revival began by the Soviet Communist Party and Mikhail Gorbachev, Semenov writes in an open letter to the president, published in THE GLASNOST WEEKLY today.

"However, what is happening today in the country with direct connivance by central authorities cannot but alarm and prompt the idea that these developments are not accidental," the leader of the non-Marxist and non-Communist party writes.

Further connivance with forces aiming to eliminate the state will lead to irreversible political processes, Semenov writes to Gorbachev.

"The people will never forgive if their right to their own history and fate is not protected. The unity of all sober-minded forces and all honest people who care can avert tragedy. There is no other way but to get out of the crisis together," he writes.

"Although small, the democratic party is prepared to do all it can to promote reforms on the basis of respect for human rights, law and state," he stresses.

'Slandering' Gorbachev Charged Dropped

90UN1015A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 5 Mar 91 First Edition p 4

[Report on interview with USSR Procurator General N.S. Trubin by Yu. Nikolayev; place and date not given; "Avoiding Responsibility"]

[Text] *ARTEM TARASOV: The president is selling the Kuril Islands to get rid of democracy and the market.*

MOSCOW. In his speech at the press conference of the leaders of the Democratic Russia movement in the Moscow Soviet, the president of the Russian Innovation Center and vice president of the Union of United Cooperatives of the USSR stated: "The USSR president has turned his back on the West and placed his bets on Japan. According to available information, during the Japanese premier's recent visit to Moscow a secret document was signed or agreed upon concerning the transfer to Japan of the notorious four Kuril islands. In return, Japan promised to invest no less than $200 billion in the Soviet economy. This will lead to a considerable rise in the standard of living in the USSR

and enable Gorbachev to retain his dictatorial power while simultaneously eliminating democracy."

(From a report by the POSTFAKTUM agency of 28 January 1991.)

To the USSR Procuracy.

In response to your inquiry No. 35/5/91 of 4 February 1991, I am sending authenticated copies of the information summaries from the news service of the POSTFAKTUM agency concerning the issue that interests you. As editor in chief of the agency, I take full responsibility for the information contained in them.

Gleb PAVLOVSKIY, editor in chief of the POSTFAKTUM information agency.
4 February 1991.

From the report of the USSR Procuracy to the RSFSR Supreme Soviet.

"On 1 February 1991 the press service of the USSR president published in the press organs an official refutation of A.M. Tarasov's statement, calling deliberately false and intended as a political provocation.

"According to a report of the Japanese minister of foreign affairs which was conveyed by the Soviet mass media, there are no such transactions concerning the transfer of the four islands of the Kuril chain.

"Keeping in mind that these materials contain sufficient data indicating a crime involving slander of the USSR president committed with the press, data that requires careful investigation, guided by Article 38 of the USSR Law 'On the Status of USSR People's Deputies' and Articles 31 and 32 of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Law 'On the Status of the RSFSR People's Deputy,' I ask the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation to give its consent to open a court case against RSFSR People's Deputy Artem Mikhaylovich Tarasov for the crime stipulated in Part 2 of Article 1 of the USSR Law 'On the Protection of the Honor and Dignity of the USSR President.'"

Excerpt From The Law

"On Protection of the Honor and Dignity of the USSR President"

Article 1. Public insult to the USSR president or slander against him—

punishable by a fine of up to 3,000 rubles or corrective labor for a period of up to two years or incarceration for a period of up to three years.

The same actions committed using the press or other mass media—

are punishable by corrective labor for a period of up to two years or incarceration for a period of up to six years.

USSR Procurator General N.S. TRUBIN: "We intend to appeal to the congress"

[Nikolayev] Nikolay Semenovich! Millions of television viewers have had the opportunity to follow the discussion of the issue involving A.M. Tarasov at the session of the Russian parliament, so apparently there is no need to discuss this in detail. What are your impressions...

[Trubin] In connection with the refusal of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation to open a court case against RSFSR People's Deputy A.M. Tarasov, I consider it necessary to state the following. First of all the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation has taken on too much; it has practically taken over the function of a judicial authority. If the people's deputies of Russia think that deputy immunity is a basis for sparing people from their deserved punishment, that is really too bad. As I see it, obtaining consent from the legislature to open a court case against a deputy was intended to prevent possible arbitrary behavior on the part of the state authorities. But if there are good reasons for making a positive decision about the issue that was raised, then a positive decision should be made. Obtaining consent does not mean that the legislature should take over the functions of the judicial authority and decide whether to punish or pardon. Its business is to be convinced that the procurator's proposal contains a certain fact that justifies giving consent.

[Nikolayev] But the opponents of initiating court proceedings against the deputy have their own arguments too—in particular, they refer to RSFSR legislation.

[Trubin] I must say that I consider the Russian law on the status of the people's deputy in and of itself to be undemocratic to a certain degree. Here is why. As distinct from all other laws on the status of deputies, including foreign ones, here they have established a procedure whereby even opening a court case against a deputy requires the consent of the Supreme Soviet. Imagine for a moment that the people's deputy, because of coincidence, deliberately, or out of carelessness murdered someone or was involved in a serious highway accident. What would you order the investigation organs to do? Begin to investigate or apply for permission to open a criminal case? For an investigation cannot be conducted without opening a court case. Plus the law on the status of the RSFSR people's deputy prohibits the initiation of proceedings.

[Nikolayev] As far as I know, you participated in the development of this law as well...

[Trubin] Yes, and I remember well how it was prepared. There were a lot of arguments and I tried to prove that to protect deputy immunity it was enough to agree upon the question of giving consent for initiating criminal proceedings and arresting a deputy. To obtain consent to open a case is utter nonsense. A case should be opened each time indications of a crime are discovered. This, incidentally, was also the requirement of Russian procedural legislation. And here we waited a whole month for

a decision: Would they or would they not give their consent to open a case. They did not give it to us.

In this same law there are other loopholes for avoiding punishment. A deputy is relieved of the responsibility of giving testimony about facts (this is the way it is written) he has learned as a result of performing his deputy duties. It turns out that the people's deputy is like a confessor in a church, to whom the faithful entrust their secrets, and he does not have the right to disclose them... I assume that the people's elect have tried very hard to protect themselves from the people with this line of red flags. Do not ask them to testify, do not dare to open a criminal case against them, not to mention the fact that they cannot be held criminally liable.

[Nikolayev] Let us return to the refusal to open a criminal case for a specific fact. What do you intend to do?

[Trubin] I do not think that this decision will be without consequences. The extra, or extraordinary, as they call it, RSFSR Congress of People's Deputies is approaching. There is every justification and possibility of transferring to the congress the consideration of the issue of giving consent not only to open a criminal case but also to hold People's Deputy A.M. Tarasov criminally liable for slander. For this is a matter not only of the president but, above all, of the very meaning of slander. In my view, it will cause a great deal of harm to the interests of the Soviet Union. It touches on a very sore subject for Japan as well. When the president of the Soviet Union is preparing for a visit to Japan, when these issues will probably be the subject of discussion, does a people's deputy from Russia have the right through his fabrications to pour oil on the fire and express judgment to the effect that our head of state...intends to or already has sold the Kuril Islands.

[Nikolayev] At the session of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet and in the press a comparison is drawn between the speeches of People's Deputies Artem Tarasov and Viktor Alksnis. But in the one case they say that the USSR Procuracy was strict and in the other it paid no attention to criticism.

[Trubin] This has to do with public statements that are not comparable at all. Look at the USSR Supreme Soviet decree concerning the procedure for applying the Law "On Protection of the Honor and Dignity of the USSR President." There it is written in black and white: "Public statements containing critical remarks about the activity of the head of the Soviet state, the president of the USSR, and also about the policy conducted under his leadership do not come under the USSR Law 'On Protection of the Honor and Dignity of the USSR President.'" V.I. Alksnis presented his own position—I agree, sometimes harshly and without substantiation—he criticized the president, but his statements that I know about contain neither slander nor fabrications besmirching the honor and dignity of the head of state. So there is no basis for opening a criminal case. How can one fail to see the difference between criticism and slander here?

In concluding our conversation I would consider it necessary to emphasize this circumstance. We are now speaking about fabrications and slander against a high official. But is there really any less need to protect the honor and dignity of each citizen of the USSR if there are encroachments on them by anybody at all? Including from people's deputies. Everyone must be equal before the law.

Enciting 'Civil War' in USSR Deplored

PM0803100191 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 6 Mar 91 Second Edition p 2

["My Opinion" by Anatoliy Karpychev: "Do the Russians Want War?"]

[Text] Someone seems to want war in their own home. And I am not only referring to the Russians...

There is no need to ask the silence—to take Yevgeniy Yevtushenko's advice in his well-known poem—or "those soldiers lying under the birch trees," you only have to attend rallies and listen to press and television statements to draw this bitter conclusion.

While in Belorussia, the president said clearly whence trouble might be expected. Here are his opinions. The peak of the crisis is not past, we are short on time and have lots of problems. The crux is that a most severe power struggle has been set in train. The crisis threatens to develop into civil war.

Did the president have grounds for giving such an alarming assessment of the situation? I think that he did. A divergence of political forces can be seen. It can be traced, in particular, in the statement entitled "The Crime of a Regime Which Refuses To Quit the Stage," in B.N. Yeltsin's homespun effort on television when he declared war on the president, in the frenzied support for the Russian leader from his champions. People did not previously feel too calm, but this calm is obviously disappearing today once and for all.

A few days ago a woman called the editorial office from Sverdlovsk. She was crying. "Comrades, what is happening? Is a coup really beginning? People want to submit the question of the president resigning to a meeting..."

We received another alarm signal about a meeting of this kind from the Moscow area. The editorial office gathered personnel together to make the journey, but it turned out that someone was going round the plant collecting signatures against the president...

No need to panic—let them carry on, although it mighty be worth looking to see whether their importunate action is legal or not. It is something else that puts me on my guard. It is now—when our home most needs peace and

accord, when there are indeed plenty of problems and time is short—that confrontation suddenly flares up and the signal is given: The worse it is for Gorbachev, the better. For whom is it better, one wonders? And this is happening now—not before and not later...

I am in no doubt that all this is no accident, that a center is trying to direct the antipresidential campaign, even calling for a strike. Practice has shown that miners most frequently respond to the "call" at most difficult times in the fate of the country. Not all of them, of course. The strikers feel they are having a hard time... As if things are easier for nonstrikers in the cities or the countryside...

I would like to point out that it is not only us but also the West who are concerned by the situation that has taken shape. The possibility of the crisis escalating into civil war possibly alarms the latter more than it does us since we are always wise after the event. The West asks: "Who wants war and why?"

"The approach of the referendum on the question of preserving the Union is forcing M.S. Gorbachev to join battle with his political adversaries," France's LA CROIX L'EVENEMENT writes. "This is happening at a time when several Soviet republics have advocated boycotting the upcoming vote, while Russia intends to decide the same day on the creation of the post of RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] president."

"Gorbachev, who is fighting forces who are tearing his country to shreds, wants the Belorussians and other citizens to vote in favor of a renewed Soviet Union in the referendum," the LOS ANGELES TIMES (United States) writes.

"That neither Yeltsin nor reformers like the charming mayors of Moscow and Leningrad have much of a chance of obtaining power is nearer the truth"—this is from THE NEW YORK TIMES. "They do not have nationwide support, nor do they enjoy substantial support among the people with the power. Reformers speak dreamily about coming to power on the basis of 'the people's support.' However, a sad smile plays over their faces like characters in Chekhov, and this shows that they understand the situation correctly."

Feeling sorry for the "Chekhov characters," some people will probably think that Gorbachev is employing "scare tactics" and ask who in fact needs war... Let's not be naive: Anyone who wants power will not ask you and I how to obtain it. That is why we heed the president's advice: "Let's rid ourselves of our illusions and naivete."

Our democracy is growing up—albeit with difficulty. It is time for us to grow up too. In the wake of the president I would like to say this to the readers: Take nothing on trust unless it makes sense to you. No matter who is addressing you. The president will not be offended if you subject his ideas regarding his assessment of the current situation to reasonable doubt. B.N. Yeltsin would also understand your skepticism over his conclusion that Gorbachev is supposedly deceiving the people while he is not. Think also why, ahead of the referendum, some people are fighting for measures that clearly cause dissatisfaction and are unpopular with the people—raising prices without waiting for subsidies. Who benefits from the fabrications about a "presidential tax" destined supposedly for the president personally?

These are not trivialities. Everything connected with the rumors about the president is part of the political struggle. For that reason people must themselves know how to reflect, listen attentively, know how to see and tell truth from falsehood, and... trust in that which is good and everlasting. Without trust, there is no stance, no choice, no man.

As far as trust is concerned, all is not well in our country by any means. We had trusted so much in the "glorious future" and in life in the eighties under communism as announced by dear Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev that for a long time we lost our ability to give credence to official sources. Remember the advertisement: "Buy hake!" "Not likely," people grinned. "You don't fool us." There was no deception—during the years of stagnation there was an abundance of hake. But when at the same time the official authorities slated anything (the cinema, a play, or a director) and advised people to avoid them, people, on the contrary, refused to do so, saying, "No, you can't fool us."

There's no hake today. No fooling. Drop into Moscow's stores—they're empty. There's no milk, meat, or groats—nothing at all. Where's it all gone to? Is Ryazan to blame? Or someone else's relatives? Maybe we're looking in the wrong place. Look at the prices. Shoes cost 300, 400, or 700 rubles [R], a bag costs R450, a suit costs over R1,000, while a coat costs R1,900. Who can afford that? This is an insult to common sense and to people unable and unwilling to steal. He is paid an ordinary wage and offered goods at commercial and contract prices. Excuse me, but who agreed what with whom? A man's right to smoke an extra cigarette at a normal price has been taken away—this is considered today to be showing concern for Muscovites. I am not against commerce, but where are ordinary prices for ordinary people? How are we to go on living? Everything that you could see at state trade outlets yesterday is now obtainable from speculators, who are reselling it. Do we have a state trade system? Private traders have foreign goods, they have stalls under lock and key on Moscow's boulevards and streets—we don't. I don't think the people will thank you for that, Comrade People's Deputies.

Why, strictly speaking, are they called people's deputies. Perhaps it is better to call the people elected to the legislature and local soviets just deputies? How can you be a people's deputy if the people have nothing and if you are acting in such a way as to break up the Union and cause civil war? I remember what Leningrad Mayor Anatoliy Sobchak said in an interview with NEWSWEEK magazine. He does not hide the fact that plenty of unworthy people have been elected deputies. "They

swept in on a wave of dissatisfaction and are not prepared to take responsibility. One of our deputies has a daughter who is a habitual criminal who has received four convictions for various crimes and is now serving time for homicide. Another three of his relatives are also doing time. I don't know how he got elected. All he does is just sit there, only waking up when we discuss new judges. He then starts to fight with all his might, calling them rascals."

And he's a people's deputy? If the magazine didn't make a mistake, this simply makes me feel unwell.

The state of our minds is now such that we are not fit to live in conditions of democracy. The "hake" principle is still at work: We believe those things that we should doubt and vice versa. In civilized states political choice is not made in waiting lines [ocheredi]. Although there are no lines in those states. Our lines are indeed a unique phenomenon. They represent a street parliament and at the same time a Gallup public opinion research service.

Opinion in the lines is now divided. Some people support the president, while others support Yeltsin, and a third group don't support anyone. I have before me on the table responses to the articles entitled "They Are Not Giving Up Through Love," "Listen Attentively," and "Attack on the President." Responses that defend the president. At the same time what bitterness, perplexity, offense, and recrimination there is there. We can unleash a civil war but we cannot feed people. Children see no cheese, sausage, or milk. Yet every Tuesday they now see the capital's leaders. Muscovites want to hear from them when there will be a glimmer of hope.... They are promised... even harder times.

Render unto the president the things that are the president's; and unto mayors, the things that are mayors'. If you can't feed your city, provide it with amenities, or make people happy, step aside. That is also what the letters say.

Political blather won't fill stomachs. I feel ashamed when a draft law on protecting consumers is being discussed but there is nothing to buy since there is nothing anywhere... You feel like sobbing helplessly when you are meticulously issued with ration coupons but there is nothing to exchange them for. That is also what the letters say.

At home, at work, in the newspapers people are seeking an answer to what is the main question now: What can we expect?

The president spoke about this in Belorussia.

B.N. Yeltsin has not said anything new since his statement on television. His comrades-in-arms indicate that Yeltsin's next step in the war against Gorbachev may be to disband the Russian Parliament. "If direct elections of the RSFSR president are approved, the Congress of People's Deputies may be abolished," that is the suggestion made by I. Silayev, chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers, in an interview with Italy's CORRIERE DELLA SERA. What would replace the Congress? There are thoughts of a "standing parliament."

Incidentally, ration coupons have been issued in Moscow entitling you to buy one bottle of vodka a month. The muzhiks [common people] are indeed grumbling.

Democratic states which the people's chosen representatives love to visit are considerably surprised by events in our country. People there are amazed that the ruling party voluntarily surrendered power and started the cleansing process itself. That people can insult the USSR president and not be punished for doing so. In the United States, for instance, the president is called "Mr. President" to his dying day. There is amazement that some Soviet editors have effectively become the "owners" of their newspapers, having declared them people's or independent newspapers, without contributing a ruble out of their own pocket. There is surprise at how the authorities can encroach on other people's property and consider this encroachment a legitimate act rather than daylight robbery. And we ask in astonishment: What's the source of the threat of civil war?

Order cannot be restored without a strong authority. The question of who is best—Gorbachev or Yeltsin—indicates nothing. Sympathies are divided over another issue—how do you want to see your home? Are you able to tame arrogance for the sake of the fatherland? Tranquillity in the country can be preserved by joining forces, but not by confrontation and abusing Communists. Incidentally, there are plenty of sensible people among them.

We have been able to change a great deal as a result of Gorbachev's new policy in the world arena. War threatened from that quarter has been made more remote. But war threatened from here, from within, we have brought closer. Who needs this? We have failed to fully understand some things and made some mistakes. It is not too late to rectify the mistakes. But this must not be done at any price.

We certainly know how to fight; we have proved this by six years of perestroyka. But no one, after all, wants, as Yevgeniy Yevtushenko's poem says, "soldiers to fall in the battle for their melancholy land..." No one wants that, but they are already falling... In my view, this is the right time to stop. Why? Because tomorrow, more than ever before, it will be too late.

Maslyukov on the Difficulties of Reform

PM0803111191 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 1 Mar 91 Second Edition p 2

[S. Karkhanin report on 28 February interview with USSR Deputy Prime Minister Yu.D. Maslyukov under rubric "Discussions in the Kremlin": "The Creative Vertical"]

[Text] "God created the tortoise, everything else on earth was put up by builders." Thus joked one of the deputies who spoke at the USSR Supreme Soviet 28 February, trying to show that his sector should be properly represented in the new Cabinet of Ministers structure. The draft law on the government was under discussion, and there is nothing surprising in the fact that the participants in the session—metallurgical workers, miners, and farmers—compared the interests of their own sectors with the general tasks of the economic reform.

What is the outline of the new system of executive power? Why are many deputies, who were recently demanding that the number of "sector headquarters" be sharply reduced, now trying to preserve their own ministries? Is there any basis for the attacks made on the CPSU because there are no representatives of other parties among the candidates for the cabinet who have been nominated by the president? USSR Deputy Prime Minister Yu.D. Maslyukov reflects on this in conversation with SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA'S political observer:

"The system of presidential power is a continuous chain, a garland of administration. But process structures exist that are determined by industrial complexes working on a single major task. If there are no structures bringing these complexes together, the important questions of scientific and technical progress can remain unsupported. If we get rid of the Military-Industrial Commission, bringing ministries together on problems where their jurisdictions overlap and at the same time determines the level of scientific and technical progress, who will deal with optoelectronics, for instance, if optics and electronics are split between different departments?

"If we chop up the unifying cells like this commission now, then we shall almost certainly lose out in a whole series of promising areas of science and industry. The same goes for other complexes: If we split up the oil and gas sectors, production and processing, we could be left without the subtler branches of chemistry, or biotechnology... This is why V.S. Pavlov's idea seems right to me: that the tasks of the Cabinet of Ministers should include the formulation of long-term goals linked to scientific and technical progress, investment policy, and the preparation of programs on an all-Union scale.

"Of course, the rights and autonomy of enterprises will be extended, and all complexes, including the military-industrial complex, face a transfer to market relations. We favor starting the production in the USSR of modern passenger aircraft and household electronic equipment in conjunction with leading foreign firms. Concerns and associations formed by conversion within our ministries are capable of doing this.

"Although we must not forget that in our work there are basic questions I should describe as sacred for the country—defense capability, security. And it will certainly be right to protect them with a vertical administration system operating from Cabinet of Ministers level down to the enterprise. It is true that these questions are few in number.

"As regards the calls that used to be heard for a reduction in the number of sector ministries, and speeches today that say completely the opposite, there seems to me to be no mystery here. With time ministries as structures will probably be wound up. In South Korea there are no industry ministries, but there are four associations bringing together 70,000 firms, and moreover strict control is exercised over all internal and external policy, licensing, and quotas. The associations do not interfere in production, but nothing happens in the firms without their knowing about it. It is obvious that a similar prospect awaits us, but only in the future

"The danger of a breakdown in the sector's process structure must be averted. Today the coal industry was mentioned from the rostrum—this can indeed be divided into 10 concerns dealing with coal production. But then there is still the development of technology and new prospecting methods, and no single concern has the resources to tackle these areas on its own. Science and the bodies that develop equipment and technology must be subordinated to the person at the top of the sector chain. In the West this has been taken on by the major corporations. We, however, have not yet reached this level at the present time. When we are all able to understand that the process structure is a continuous chain, the time will have come to bid farewell to the sector ministries.

"On the whole, I think that to get rid of the Ministry for the Coal Industry now would be a major mistake. If there was no ministry, the Fuel Committee would start to do its work instead. But this would lead to a loss of control, because the new committee is being encumbered with all routine and policy questions. Consequently we would have nothing but misfortune and would probably have to return to the old structure, having just wasted time.

"Discussions will soon get under way on who is going to be in the Cabinet of Ministers. When the list of candidates proposed by the president was made public, the deputies noted that many candidates worked in the previous government. What do I think about this? In my opinion, a man should be assessed by his work. One newspaper laments the fact that there were many people in N.I. Ryzhkov's entourage whose work experience had been in the military-industrial complex. But is it such a big deal where a man came into government from? Far more important are his business qualities, his level of professional training, his conscientiousness, and mainly, the level of his concern for the future of the country. If he is a patriot and spares no effort to help the economic situation, then that is all right. After all, in saving the state you have to be constructive rather than destructive.

"If a man is able to be constructive, he has a right to work, and here, in my view, is the chief criterion of his suitability. We keep hearing now that the Cabinet of Ministers ought to be supplemented by representatives of other political parties. But in my opinion these parties are currently too small to put forward their own government team. Although, if bright new personalities appear who are capable of doing the job and taking on the task of managing a given sector or complex of sectors to make the country flourish, then, I think, the session will consider their candidature."—with this Yuriy Dmitriyevich concluded the interview.

It should be added that the problems of the defense complex cited by the deputy prime minister should not be put down to departmental problems. We know that in the next few years civil output will account for two-thirds of this complex' production volume. As soon as a unified scientific and technical policy has justified itself in a sector, there can hardly be a reason for destroying the system by which it is administered—such is the position of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Defense and State Security Questions. The more so since the appropriate ministries have quite recently been reorganized, and their staff numbers have been almost halved.

CPSU Lauds Chuvash Party's Referendum Work

91UN1008A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
1 Mar 91 Second Edition pp 1, 3

[Unattributed report: "In the Secretariat of the CPSU Central Committee"]

[Text] The CPSU Central Committee Secretariat has examined the question "On the Work of the Chuvash Republic Party Organization in Forming Public Opinion in Support of the New Soviet Treaty."

The resolution that was adopted notes that the Chuvash republic party organization bases its work in forming public opinion in support of the new Union treaty on the main positions of the Fourth USSR Congress of People's Deputies, the 28th CPSU Congress, and the decisions of the December (1990) and January (1991) plenums of the CPSU Central Committee. Communists organized a broad discussion of the question of the integrity of the USSR as a renewed federation of equal sovereign soviet socialist republics. The closer the referendum gets, the more this problem shifts into the center of political life.

There are 1.35 million persons and representatives of 55 nationalities living in the Chuvash SSR, including 67.8 percent Chuvash, 26.7 percent Russians, and 2.7 percent Tatars. A concluded expert sociological analysis shows that the significance of the unity of the Union for the fate of the republic and for each person is recognized by a majority of the citizens as a very important factor of stabilization and as a condition for the development of society along the path of a socialist choice. In the opinion of experts, more than 90 percent of the population are ready to express themselves for the preservation of the USSR as a renewed federation. Almost 97 percent of the representatives of all nations living in the republic are for the development of Chuvashia within the structure of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic) and the USSR, and 92 percent prefer the designation of the union as the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

In the social conscience of the population of the republic, the future of the Union is tied in with a renewed federation where the individual rights and freedom of any nationality will be guaranteed in full measure. On the whole, the mood of all strata of the population of Chuvashia is defined by an aspiration for a speedy signing of the new Union treaty by all republics. The positive attitude of the population of the Chuvash SSR and the preservation of the Union as a federation of equal sovereign republics in many ways is determined by the work of republic party organizations whose content is characterized by clear positions and specificity.

For several years, the republic committee of the party, with the involvement of the broad public, has been conducting purposeful work in harmonizing interethnic relations in the international education of the population. In past rayon and city party conferences and meetings, Communists outlined a program of actions for the period of preparation for the signing of the new Union treaty.

The republic committee of the RSFSR Communist Party and the primary party organizations are employing various forms and methods of work with Communists and the population. Remarks and proposals made in the course of discussions were summarized, and, on this basis, practical measures were determined that are directed at intensifying economic reform, preparing for work under conditions of market relations, and establishing direct ties with other republics. Important meaning is attached to the preservation of the traditions of people's enlighteners of Chuvashia in strengthening friendship with Russian and other peoples and also to the family of Ulyanov's who made a notable contribution to the organization of people's education in this kray. The principle of representation is consistently implemented in the organs of authority and administration, the national makeup of the population is taken into account. The republic has established national-cultural societies, centers, and friendly associations of people from the area, in whose work Communists from the artistic and scientific intelligentsia take an active part. The Chuvash sociocultural center through its work actively promotes the renewal of spiritual life and strengthening the friendship and unity of the people of our country.

Sociopolitical readings, "roundtables," and discussions on the problems of preserving and developing national traditions are being held in enterprises and in educational institutions. The efforts of party committees are being concentrated on the resolution of problems in the

sphere of youth policy: A republic committee on youth affairs was set up, and its structure is being formed in cities and rayons.

Party committees have succeeded in achieving a mutual understanding and business-like mutual relations with organs of Soviet authority. CPSU members constitute a majority among people's deputies at all levels. On the initiative of the republic committee, a group of Communists is operating that unites more than half of the deputies in the Supreme Soviet of Chuvashia, and party groups have been established in all city and rayon soviets. The declaration on the state sovereignty of the Chuvash SSR defines the socialist nature of the development of the republic as a subject of the RSFSR and the Union SSR.

On recommendation of the Communist deputies, a law was adopting Chuvash and Russian as the state languages of the republic. The law envisages favorable conditions for the development of other national languages. A Tatar culture center has been established on the territory of Chuvashia, and work is being conducted on the organization of centers of Mordovian and Russian culture. In a year and a half in the republic, the number of publications in the Chuvash language has increased from 20 to 37 percent of the total volume of the literature that is produced.

Continuous contacts are being conducted by party and soviet organs of Chuvashia with many party committees, soviet organs, and public organizations of other republics and oblasts. Agreements have been concluded on artistic cooperation with the ministries of culture of the Tatar, Bashkir, Mordovian, and Mari Republics, newspapers in the Chuvash language have been established in Bashkiria and in Ulyanovsk Oblast. A Chuvash culture center has been established in Moscow.

Under the influence both of internal and all-Union factors, the economic situation in Chuvashia in 1990 got noticeably worse. The rate of industrial production has dropped, many projects in the social sphere have not been initiated, including housing, and the consumer market is having difficulties. One of the main reasons for this was the disruption in economic ties. For 1991, contracts were concluded at a level of only 80 percent, and for the delivery of material resources, only 30 percent of the requirement.

Under these conditions, party organizations are arranging close cooperation with economic leaders, trade union organizations, and enterprise collectives in order, through joint efforts, to strengthen production discipline and contracted deliveries. Particular attention is being paid to the need for a quick signing of the Union treaty, ensuring the functioning of an integrated economic expanse and uniting the efforts of all republics and all people in the spiritual and material rebirth of society, including Chuvashia.

Discussions on the draft Union treaty are being held in open party meetings. The mass media has initiated a discussion of the mechanism of Chuvash SSR participation in its signing. These questions are also being discussed at meetings of deputy groups of Communists of rayon and city soviets, the Supreme Soviet, and Communist people's deputies of the RSFSR and the USSR. For the purpose of averting a "war of laws," the Chuvash SSR Supreme Soviet has suspended action on the declaration of state sovereignty in the part on the hierarchy of republic laws until the conclusion of Union and federation agreements.

At the same time, the resolution directs attention to the fact that not all party organizations of the republic were included in the work in connection with the preparation of the new Union treaty and the conduct of the referendum.

Analysis shows that, in the complicated political situation, a number of party organizations and their elected organs weakened the organizational and mass political work in the labor collectives of public organizations. The opinion is developing among the population that individual primary party organizations have swung into work on explaining the position of the CPSU on the stabilization of the political and economic situation and ensuring civic peace. First and foremost in this category are party organizations of educational institutions, spheres of trade, and everyday services.

The CPSU Central Committee Secretariat gave a positive evaluation to the work of the Chuvash republic party organization in forming public opinion in support of the Union treaty, and it recommended that party committees and primary party organizations utilize more fully their capabilities for strengthening influence on the entire population of the republic, and achieve the active participation of citizens in the referendum for the preservation of a renewed Union as a federation of equal sovereign soviet socialist republics. That they cooperate closely in this work with public organizations and movements that are for the integrity of the Union and in support of the new Union treaty.

It is recommended that the Central Committees of the communist parties of the Union republics, republic party committees, kray party committees, oblast party committees, district party committees, city party committees, and rayon party committees, and primary party organizations, take into account the experience of the Chuvash republic party organization in their practical work.

They must define specific measures for the participation of each Communist in the preparation and conduct of the USSR referendum that explain the necessity for preserving and renewing the Union SSR. They must demonstrate greater independence and activeness, search for nonstandard forms of work with people, accurately catch the mood of collectives, reach every individual, and they must be concerned about his daily needs. There is a need for persistent and daily work to create a healthy psychological climate in relations

between people of different nationalities and to overcome nationalistic and chauvinistic manifestations, including on an everyday basis. It is recommended that they continue the policy of reviving national culture, which enjoys the support of the population.

It is recommended that particular attention be paid to strengthening the ties of party committees with artistic unions and the scientific-technical intelligentsia, youth organizations, and, most of all, with students. An atmosphere of trust and mutual understanding must be formed, creative undertakings must be supported, help must be given in every way in the creation of normal conditions of work, training, the resolution of housing problems, and the creation and activity of national-cultural societies, associations, and groups of fellow countrymen from the same area.

It is important that the work of the groups of Communist people's deputies in the soviets at all levels promotes the solidarity of the entire deputy corps in support of the conclusion of a new Union Treaty, and that it evokes the trust of the workers in Soviet authority and in Communists. That it consistently and with reason comes out against attempts to prevent the conduct of the referendum. That it tries to achieve the cessation of the "war of laws," which is damaging to the cause of stabilization of the political and economic situation and assuring civic peace.

A broad arsenal of means must be employed, such as, the organization of mass campaigns, special newspaper issues, rubrics on the most critical questions, and effective replies to workers' questions. There must be a consistent defense of the position of the party on the national question.

The resolution emphasizes that the paramount task of Communists is to achieve agreement of the citizenry on the basis of the ideas of patriotism, internationalism, and the friendship of people.

New Look at IZVESTIYA Staff Conflict

91UN1011A Moscow GLASNOST in Russian No 7, 14 Feb 91 p 5

[Article by S. Lutskiy: "A Conflict in IZVESTIYA"]

[Text]**Several newspapers have published materials about a conflict in the IZVESTIYA office. The conflict was described in the following manner: Editor in Chief N.I. Yefimov "several times spiked challenging articles and the journalists viewed this act as political censorship." (ARGUMENTY I FAKTY, No 5). This explanation does not seem very convincing as there is no lack of challenging materials in the newspaper, but the editor in chief has the inalienable right to decide the fate of any article.**

The real reason is different. At the time when I.D. Laptev was editor in chief of the newspaper, its political line became biased; the periodical often served as a mouthpiece for the Interregional Group of Deputies. People's deputies holding to other viewpoints naturally objected to this.

The newspaper leadership underwent a change in May 1990. The new editor in chief, N.I. Yefimov, put serious effort into making IZVESTIYA more objective as it reflected the processes going on in the country, as it reflected the entire range of opinions in the USSR Supreme Soviet and in our society. He tried to make the newspaper stick to a constructive, rather than destructive position. This effort met with active resistance from some members of the editorial staff.

They are led by first deputy editor in chief and CPSU member I.N. Golembiovskiy, who does not even try to conceal his anti-communist views. In January of this year he signed the statement by the co-founders of MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI that labelled the USSR social and government structure a criminal one.

Journalists were called for an urgent meeting in IZVESTIYA on 23 January. I.N. Golembiovskiy demanded that the editor in chief come over to his platform and renounce his membership in the CPSU Central Committee. N.I. Yefimov refused to obey such flagrant diktat and requested that the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium transfer I.N. Golembiovskiy to a different post. A new general meeting was urgently called for the newspaper staff. Those attending the meeting made up only about a third of the total number of over 400 but in spite of that they demanded N.I. Yefimov's resignation on behalf of the entire staff. I.D. Laptev's open letter was also read at the meeting. In it he defended I.N. Golembiovskiy and his political line.

The meeting participants characteristically produced ultimatum-like demands addressed to the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, they threatened strikes and hunger strikes. Proposals were heard to make I.N. Golembiovskiy the editor in chief without delay or to restore the decision to give this post to I.D. Laptev as had been approved in the old days by K.U. Chernenko.

On 7 February the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium discussed the IZVESTIYA situation. However, they had to postpone the solution of the problem because N.I. Yefimov felt ill during the session. From the premises he was taken straight to the hospital. The opponents of the editor in chief rushed to each other, in full view of the public, to congratulate each other happily...

Journalists Criticize Poltoranin

91UN1011B Moscow GLASNOST in Russian No 6, 7 Feb 91 p 8

[Unattributed article: "A Warning for Poltoranin"]

[Text] On 4 February the board of the USSR Union of Journalists met for a plenary session where they heard reports of the USSR people's deputies they elected. Not

all of them, however—A.S. Yezhelev, V.P. Zuykov, and D.Yu. Shnyukas did not show up at the meeting.

The plenum participants recognized that the majority of the deputies performed their duties conscientiously even though they did not fully employ their parliamentary opportunities to defend the press from the diktat of the paper and communications industries. The plenum emphatically rejected the insinuations coming from the leaders of the Krasnoyarsk journalists' organization, who joined the shameful campaign to persecute L.P. Kravchenko, chairman of USSR Gosteleradio [State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting]. His work received a positive evaluation from his colleagues.

The RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Minister for Press and Mass Media, M.N. Poltoranin, had to hear a number of seriously critical comments. He was elected as an individual who had distinguished himself by his active work in the party press where he was affirming communist concepts. But after he became a deputy and minister, he quit the CPSU and started a campaign against the local party press. Poltoranin himself, as well as the mass media subordinate to him, are speaking consistently from extreme anti-communist positions. It was mentioned at the plenum that Poltoranin's threats, directed at the journalists who are communists, call for a categorical protest. It was not accidental that they came to mind after the assassination of I.I. Fomin, editor of the Kaluga Oblast newspaper. Proposals were heard to recall Poltoranin as deputy or to submit a resolution of no confidence in him. They discovered, however, that the former was not possible as there was no corresponding law yet, nor there was a provision for the latter in the description of a deputy's status. Nevertheless, the warning pronounced at the plenum was quite definite. Time will tell whether it results in any conclusions at all.

Foreign Reporting Pros, Cons Viewed

91UF0529A Moscow TRUD in Russian 3 Mar 91 p 3

["Commentary" by Rudolf Puchkov: "Advisers and Common Sense"]

[Text] The bits of information and comments provided by the world press concerning our country are so diverse that sometimes it does not seem possible to even compare them. But the American CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR tried to classify them all anyway. According to this newspaper, everything that is being written about us now can be divided into two large groups.

The first group, says the newspaper, consists mostly of tragic opinions. In the view of their authors, the entire political culture of Soviet society—from its institutions to its ethnic makeup—is sick.

The second group embraces the views of those who seem to notice a rejection of the grandiose reforms in the Soviet Union—reforms that had started in our country. Attempts to eradicate the empire, acceptance of the reunification of Germany, confrontation with the military-industrial complex, radical economic changes—any country would have required decades for all of this but the Soviet Union wanted to do it all in two years, the newspaper writes. Now they need some time to digest what has already been achieved, to create some new social structures.

This classification might present certain interest but I would single out two other trends in the foreign reaction to our events.

On the one hand, there are writers who simply state the facts. Sometimes they do it from their own angle and quite maliciously at that. A typical example of such interpretation can be found in the Czechoslovak weekly FORUM: "The Soviet economy now resembles a falling plane unable to avert the fall. We can only hope that it will not fall anywhere on our territory."

On the other hand, there are people who openly try to interfere in our affairs. They give us their ultimatums, they make any help from the West dependent on the changes desired by its businessmen and politicians. Their hidden intentions are, at the same time, disguised by the good wishes and pronouncements of their desire to help normalize the situation in the USSR.

We have to tell these advisers: If you want to deal with a normal and strong partner, then you have to maintain normal cooperation with him, without any hint of a diktat. Fortunately, there are quite a few people in the West also, and on the highest levels at that, who understand this well.

On this page today you can learn the opinion of the British prime minister. He supports non-interference in Soviet affairs, he stands for the preservation of political stability in our country. His words are filled with common sense and many people in the West as well as in our country should listen to them.

Official Sees Continuing Need for Foreign Labor

LD0703120591 Moscow World Service in English 0800 GMT 7 Mar 91

[Text] The Soviet Union will continue to import foreign labor this year, spokesman of the National Committee for Labor (?Peter Rudit) says. According to him, there are 168,000 nationals of China, Vietnam, North Korea, Bulgaria and a number of other countries in the Soviet Union. They work in remote regions where Soviet citizens refuse to go, or take up unskilled jobs. At the same time many people in the Soviet Union are seeking to sign contracts for work in the West. A labor force migration, Rudit says, is a normal process for a market economy of the kind we want to build in this country.

CPSU's Falin Meets With Lenin Museum Workers

PM0603154091 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 4 Mar 91 Second Edition p 2

[TASS report: "Meeting at the Museum"]

[Text] V.M. Falin, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, had a meeting 1 March at the Central V.I. Lenin Museum in Moscow with participants in the All-Union Seminar of Leaders and Employees of Lenin Museums.

Economic

More Mines Join Strike; Demands Issued

LD0703094191 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0700 GMT 7 Mar 91

[Report by correspondent from Syktyvkar]

[Text] As from midnight last night, work on extracting and unloading coal came to a complete halt in five mines in Vorkuta, the Komsomolskaya, Oktyabrskaya, Tsentralnaya, Promyshlennaya, and Yuzhnaya. Five mines are working according to their previous regime, including the major one in the field, the Vorgashorskaya. The remaining three mines in the polar region are partially functioning. In the neighboring mining town of Inta, work has partially come to a halt in two of the five mines, the Intinskaya and Kapitalnaya. The others are producing coal as before.

Before the night shift, a report reached all the mines of the Pechora coal field that late that evening, a telephone conversation had taken place between Cabinet of Ministers Chairman Pavlov and Khudyaev, the chairman of the Komi Republic's Council of Ministers. An agreement was eventually reached regarding talks; that is to say, what the Komi Republic's miners were asking the Union government a week ago.

The strike by the miners of Vorkuta and Inta has been going on for 24 hours. The basic demands of the men from Vorkuta are economic ones: They want their wages increased 2.5 times. The men of Inta, along with this, also have political demands. They are now demanding the resignation of the USSR president and the country's Cabinet of Ministers and the dissolution of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Strikes in North Reported

LD0703150491 Moscow TASS in English 1441 GMT 7 Mar 91

[By TASS correspondent Viktor Makarov]

[Text] Vorkuta March 7 TASS— Most pits in the Pechora coal field in northern Russia went on strike today, demanding that the government meet their economic demands such as higher pay.

Only five out of thirteen mines in the polar area continued work during the night shift. The decision not to lay down tools had been taken by secret ballot by their personnel themselves.

They said they wanted to press ahead with their demands for better conditions and higher earnings at talks with the national government.

The other pits of the Vorkutaugol coal-mining trust were either completely or partially idle.

During the morning shift merely three mines—Khalmer-Yu, Vorgasharskaya and Zapolyarnaya—worked normally. The Yun-Yaga pit continued to produce coal but suspended its deliveries. Promyshlennaya also cut off supplies to contractors.

The other pits, however, continued their contracted deliveries.

According to preliminary data, more than 1,300 miners in Vorkuta, whose miner population stands at over 4,000, joined the industrial action during the morning shift, reflecting a lack of unity among local workers on whether to strike.

Two out of five mines in Inta, in the Pechora coal basin, were also idle during the morning shift. A total of 500 or so miners were on strike at the two mines—Kapitalnaya and Intinskaya.

The other pits have decided to refrain—for the time being—from resorting to this extreme measure in the hope that even without it, economic demands made to the government will be fulfilled.

Intinskaya workers made also political demands, including the resignation of President Mikhail Gorbachev and his cabinet and the dissolution of the federal parliament.

Prime Minister Valentin Pavlov talked over the phone with Vyacheslav Khudyayev, who heads the government of the Komi Autonomous Republic where the mines are located. Pavlov agreed to receive representatives of Vorkuta and Inta mines to discuss their demands—on condition that all pits will resume normal operations.

Miners in the Pechora coal field are now discussing this news, as well as the issue of whether to go on with the strike or stop it.

'Uncertainty' Prevails in Pechora

LD0803135991 Moscow TASS in English 1344 GMT 8 Mar 91

[Viktor Makarov report]

[Text] Vorkuta (Komi Republic) March 8 TASS—The atmosphere of uncertainty is now prevailing at the collieries of the Pechora coal basin, most of which were

on strike on Thursday. Some mines have an off-day today, while others are busy with repair and preparatory work.

The number of miners, necessary for these operations, reported for work today. But it is too early to speak about the end of the strike, since nobody took any decisions on this score.

Only five collieries out of 13 in Vorkuta mined coal during the last night shift, the Promyshlennaya mine does not deliver, as before, coal to customers. Only one out of five coal-mining sections worked during this night shift at the Kapitalnaya mine in Inta.

The Vorkutaugol Amalgamation fulfilled its daily coal production quota by less than 50 per cent. The damage from one day of the strike is substantial.

Nevertheless, representatives of strike committees in the Pechora coal basin are today agitating to continue the strike until the government agrees to miners' demands.

However, many miners at collieries are inclined to push for the implementation of their economic demands through negotiations with the Soviet Government rather than strikes.

Ukraine 'Hottest Spot'

LD0703204191 Moscow TASS in English 2020 GMT 7 Mar 91

[By UKRINFORM-TASS reporters Anatoliy Gordeyev and Vladimir Yurkevich]

[Text] Donetsk March 7 TASS—Krasnoarmeisk remains the hottest spot of the Donetsk coal basin, southeastern Ukraine. Miners at some coalmines have been on strike since the beginning of this month. The strike now involves five coal mines of the Krasnoarmeiskugol amalgamation. During the period of the strike, users have not received about 100,000 tonnes of coal and suffered losses because of that amounting to about 15 million roubles.

The situation at Donetsk coal mines remains tense. Three mines have stopped coal production by now and another three mines discontinued the transportation of coal. In the region as a whole, eight out of 122 mines are out of operation. In addition, a number of mines suspended the transportation of coal to users.

Strikers continue to insist on the satisfaction of their demands for a pay rise by 100-150 per cent and a solution to the provision of pensions for coal miners, a spokesman at the Donetsk workers' (strike) committee told the correspondents.

These demands find support among a majority of coal mining collectives. But not all miners agree with the idea of a strike as the only way to achieve the goal. Therefore, most coal mines of Donetsk—15—continue to produce coal.

'Tense' Situation Reported

LD0703232791 Moscow TASS in English 2041 GMT 7 Mar 91

[Text] Moscow March (7 TASS)—The situation in Soviet coal-mining regions remained tense today.

The strike is expanding force in the Donbass coalfield, southeastern Ukraine. At the beginning of the month, several work collectives went on strike. Now, their number has exceeded ten. Miners demand a 100 to 150 per cent pay rise and better legislation on pensions.

Krasnoarmeisk, where the strike began at the beginning of March, has remained the hottest point in the region. Five mines of the Krasnoarmeiskugol amalgamation have joined it. Since the beginning of the strike, they failed to produce some 100,000 tonnes of coal, the loss amounting to some 15 million roubles.

In Donetsk, three mines have ceased work and stopped delivering coal. A total of eight out of 122 mines in the region are on strike. In addition, several enterprises have stopped delivering coal to consumers.

Only three out of 13 mines worked normally in Vorkuta in the afternoon today. Their collectives fully support economic demands by miners in the Pechora coal basin to the Soviet Government, but they have decided not to lay down tools.

The Yun-Yaga mine continued producing coal, but it is not supplying it to consumers. All other coal mining enterprises in Vorkuta are on strike completely or partially. Some 700 out of almost 2,000 miners did not work in the second shift, beginning work at 13:00.

In Inta, only one mine, Kapitalnaya, out of five mines has not worked from 13:00 local time. Miners are taking necessary measures to ensure mines' workability.

In Vorkuta and Inta, miners' work collectives have formed delegations for talks with Soviet Prime Minister Valentin Pavlov. Miners in the Pechora coal basin are expected to limit the strike with one day. They are expected to resume work at midnight.

Two mines, Bungurskaya and Bolshevik, are on strike again in the Kuznetsk basin. The basin lost less than one per cent of coal, and today miners sent 100 trainloads of coal to various regions of the country.

Metal Workers Appeal to Strikers

LD0703114991 Kiev International Service in English 0000 GMT 7 Mar 91

[Text] An open letter of the Presidium of the Trade Union [TU] of Metallurgical and Ore-mining Workers to the republic's miners was made public today. Singled out is the fact that in connection with the undelivered coke, the entire metallurgical complex is now operating at half-capacity. [passage indistinct] The trade union called upon the miners to manifest worker solidarity and

support the interests of the coke and chemical industry, and prevent a closedown of plants.

Article Examines Kuzbass Coal Field Discontent

914F0159A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 5 Mar 91 Union Edition p 3

[V. Kostyukovskiy article: "Political Map—Kuzbass: Fire Underground"]

[Text] Kemerovo—What is happening now in the Kuzbass, which only recently was considered one of the hottest spots in the country?

Of course, when fire moves underground, having burned itself out on the surface, not everybody—especially outsiders—can smell the smoke of an underground fire. But that does not mean there is no longer a fire.

I agree that confrontation between different political forces has become a commonplace, so to say, everyday fact. However, this does not make it any less acute.

The CPSU Oblast Organization

The peak of the crisis in the oblast party organization most likely was passed last year. The numbers leaving the party are substantial, and have been growing increasingly larger from month to month. But official statistics do not present the whole picture. For a long time they overlooked those who simply stopped paying their party dues. Here, however, is a fresh fact: There were 300 members registered in the party organization of the Chernigovskiy quarry. When requested to re-register, only 15 communists confirmed their membership. So, it appears that the crisis is much deeper than originally thought. Many party organizations, including some sizable ones, simply disintegrated. At some major enterprises, for instance the Yurgin Machine Building Plant and many mines, the collectives demanded that the party committees move to the raykom [rayon party committee] and gorkom [city party committee] buildings. At some enterprises they simply disbanded themselves.

Perhaps the most vivid illustration of this situation was the third phase of the oblast party conference. Originally, 770 delegates were elected. When the delegates started to arrive for the September (1990) phase, only 480 showed up. An inquiry opened: What happened to the remaining 290 delegates? This and that, including the fact that 59 resigned from the party. A new quorum had to be established taking into account the general decrease in the size of the oblast organization—by almost 30,000 people since the spring. The quorum requirements were barely met....

Nevertheless, there are some signs that the CPSU oblast organization is gradually pulling itself out of the crisis. Some "prodigal" sons and daughters, who did not pay dues for several months, came back to the party's bosom. After the strike that was called on 18 January but never really took place, the obkom [oblast party committee] bureau has become increasingly bold in going to the people with its statements and appeals. Party officials talk more and more often of "coming out of the trenches," "seizing the initiative," and the necessity of resuming the "leading role." Nevertheless, one feels that there is less and less hope for a radical reform of the party and its renewal along the lines of, for instance, the 19th party conference. The spirit of orthodoxy in party work is becoming stronger.

This is probably the reason why the party organization is not going to be able to regain its past influence on the people and on oblast affairs. Such different, and perhaps controversial, but unquestionably outstanding personalities—former obkom secretaries—as A. Eshtokin, N. Yermakov, and V. Bakatin are a distant memory... Who has come to replace them?

—Anatoliy Maksimovich ZAITSEV, CPSU obkom first secretary. Born in 1942, mining engineer. Until recently was in charge of the Belov Gorkom. Criticized his rather "rightist" predecessor A. Melnikov from even more "rightist" positions. Not always consistent in his statements. His attitude toward the miners' strike in 1989 fluctuated in his various statements from all-out support to total rejection. Having reached the position of obkom first secretary, he has become more tranquil and... less noticeable in the distribution of political forces. One idea he favors lately: Party organizations should be preserved at enterprises so that they can push the soviets' line. That is because the smallest soviet cells are at the rayon and rural settlement level; they do not go any lower. A rather strange idea: Generally, the voter should be considered a "primary cell" of soviet power.

The Labor Movement

Until the January strike that fizzled, the authority of workers committees appeared to be unshakeable and beyond any doubt. It is true that some of the most fierce critics persistently tried to hammer in the idea that committee leaders have removed themselves from the "masses" and now express not so much the interests of the workers as those of Moscow politicos of leftist-radical persuasion. These disparate voices merged into a harmonious and powerful chorus after 18 January. It did seem that there was finally irrefutable proof: The Kuzbass workers showed their awareness; they did not fall for the workers committee council's provocation," and did not support its extremist demands that went as far as calling for the resignation of the president and of Union organs of power.

"Let us not delude ourselves with lies. It is harmful," warned V.I. Lenin, whose authority is still high, at least among those who criticize the position of the workers committees. Why not listen to a smart warning? The working people had indeed shown awareness, but the disagreement was not at all about the demands. During numerous rallies of workers collectives the workers supported the demands but rejected the form—the strike; in

this respect, the workers committees council indeed committed a blunder. To call for an strike for an indefinite period in the middle of winter... The council's decision was not unilateral, though. It had been reached with the participation of many chairmen of strike committees and the labor union committees of many Novokuznetsk enterprises; many of them bluntly told the council members: If you do not start it, it will start without you. It is hard to imagine what consequences a disorganized, chaotic strike could wreak. Still, to be honest, the decision to strike with no time limit smacked of adventurism and madness and could not fail to affect the authority of the council and the movement as a whole.

The movement, of course, remains a sufficiently formidable power. In the balance of political forces it stands as a prime opponent of party forces. Yes, such an evolution: As recently as in the "hot July" of 1989 these two powers were allies; now they are irreconcilable opponents. Communists used to make up a majority in the committees; now there are none, although it is mostly the same people except that they have resigned from the party. The labor movement has become if not anticommunist then, roughly speaking, "anti-CPSU." I am not in a position to tell what, or who, is the main culprit in this development—whether it is the obkom, with its former head A. Melnikov (now Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Communist Party Central Committee secretary), who attempted to limit the committees' influence on the people and discredit the movement leaders, or the movement leaders themselves, whose outlook on social development has undergone an evolution (and it would be surprising if it stayed unchanged). Besides, the Kuzbass labor movement activists are not known for their flexibility or tolerance of strangers' opinions. They learned this attitude from the months of confrontation.

Should it be mentioned how important for the labor movement the contact with progressive intelligentsia—engineers and technicians, scientists and social scientists—was? This contact was established, and played its role: A consulting center had been created under the council of the workers committees. To my knowledge, the consultants were against calling an unlimited strike. They were not listened to....

—Vyacheslav Mikhailovich GOLIKOV, chairman of the Kuzbass council of workers committees. Born in 1952. Graduated in mining from a technical school; recently worked as a metal worker-electrician at Berezovskaya mine. During the very first strike committees conference (June 1989) surprised many by his erudition and deep knowledge of political and economic problems. Oblast soviet deputy. Member of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet chairman's coordinating- consultative council.

The Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies

It would hardly be a mistake to say that our current deputy corps (almost all of it new) more than ever reflects the entire spectrum of opinions of the Kuzbass population. This, of course, is good. But... it is also difficult. Having moved away from the mindless "unanimity" of the past, the deputies have encountered unresolvable contradictions on many issues, and almost every decision is made the hard way, through a battle. Time is wasted; both they and their voters (each session is broadcast over the radio in its entirety) get irritated, and the session chairmen have to announce frequent breaks to allow passions to cool.

The oblast soviet has become a true arena of political struggle. Besides the communist faction and various "geographic" groups, a considerable part of the soviet belongs to the so-called "Labor Committees Platform" group. In any case, this group is numerous enough to block a decision, or to leave the meeting hall and leave the session without a quorum—a method, it should be noted, that they have put to use.

It is a painful process of a new power coming into being, but finding itself, time and again, without power. There is a division of loyalties between the Union and Russia. The sessions lean more often to the Russian positions, which, as is known, are being blocked by the Union ones. Therefore, recently many have developed an attitude that may described as "for neither reds nor whites"—let us make our own decisions and live by our own wits. But this is not always possible, not because they do not have enough wit but because their hands do not reach far enough, in addition to being tied by laws emanating from two different levels and sometimes mutually exclusive.

The recent session produced a novelty: The democratic deputies bloc announced its arrival in full force. In their evaluation of the political and economic situation in the country most deputies generally took B. Yeltsin's side. One can say that by doing so, the session once against pitted itself against the obkom, which has unequivocally supported the opposite side. This has happened before—for instance, on the issue of attitude toward the recent events in the Baltics.

No matter how different the deputies are, their sum of interests is determined by the majority. Judging by adopted decisions, the majority is in opposition not only to the party obkom but quite often to the council of the workers committees as well. Especially in regard to the forms workers' activities should take.

—Aman Gumirovich TULEYEV, chairman of the oblast soviet of people's deputies. Born in 1944. Communist. Rail transport engineer. Worked for three years in the CPSU obkom, then lately as director of Kemerovo Railroad. Has unquestionable and the highest "authority" among the "people" of political leaders. A surprisingly good and imaginative speaker. Extremely sincere in his desire to do as much as possible for the people, but this does not always work and then out of habit tries to pull administrative levers, which increasingly often do not work. A hothead, impatient. RSFSR people's deputy.

The Oblast Soviet "Roundtable"

There are several dozen parties, social and sociopolitical organizations, societies, groups, and movements registered in the Kuzbass now. The spread in opinions is extreme, as they say, from the CPSU to the Democratic Union. Is any kind of consensus between them possible, cooperation in order to achieve at least those goals on which they agree? These were the questions that ushered the first "roundtable" organized by the deputies' commission for the protection of glasnost, public opinion analysis, and liaison with sociopolitical organizations. The majority of them are of left-of- center persuasion, although there is, for instance, a national- patriotic "unity" (by the way, the people in Kuzbass are not really infected by nationalism, although they do not suffer from cosmopolitism either).

A union was achieved, although not right away but after several false starts, and not without some "losses" along the way—the Democratic Union members demonstratively walked out, not wanting to cooperate with communists. A document "Toward Civic Unity" was signed. It takes into account, to the degree possible, the interests of all movements. Besides, the participants in the political consensus acquired what amounts to the right to legislative initiative in the soviet: They participate in sessions, bring out proposals and draft documents. Everybody undertook an obligation not to destabilize the already tense situation.

Such a union has a future, of course. It is precisely this, the approach that was built into it, that is capable of bringing us out of this dangerous state of political confrontation. This young seedling of consensus is still very weak and unstable, though. Two circumstances recently brought it to the verge of extinction. The first was that same strike that never took place. Some "roundtable" members accused the council of workers committees of breaching the agreement. The council somehow managed to prove that everything was within the rules. Then another incident arrived on top of the first one: G. Oganesyan, representative of the Armenian community (yes, there is such a strictly cultural grass-roots organization) read aloud some material published in a Novokuznetsk paper—a resolution of the Novokuznetsk Tsentralniy CPSU Raykom conference: The party members are alarmed by the draft of the new Russian Federation Constitution prepared by the constitutional commission. In the case that it is adopted, they call for civic disobedience, strikes, and hunger strikes... "We call on our voters," the resolution said, "to start the procedure of recalling deputies who signed and supported this draft project..."

The "roundtable" made its decision. The consensus agreement was signed by the CPSU obkom, not by Tsentralniy Raykom; the obkom representative, by the way, was among those who had voted for the draft project at a previous "roundtable." So let the obkom state its position in regard to this unfortunate resolution. I would like to add on my own: This would be a difficult task! By distancing itself from such a position, the obkom would also have to distance itself from the very similar position of the RSFSR Communist Party Central Committee. It is hard to say where it will all end. So much for consensus...

Very often I see this image: paper ships on still water. Some on the left, some on the right, and some in the center. They stay where they have been put, tilting back and forth only slightly. When the water starts boiling and swirling, though, it is impossible to stay in the center. Inevitably, you will have to move either right or left. It is the same in our seething life—it is hard to stay in the center...

—Vladimir Aleksandrovich Lebedev, chairman of the oblast soviet commission for the protection of glasnost, public opinion analysis, and liaison with sociopolitical organizations. Until last year a party functionary, CPSU obkom secretary for ideology. Blackballed at obkom elections for "breakdown in ideological sphere," although he had only worked in that position for one year. In reality, he was not forgiven his "pluralism" and "betrayal" of apparat interests. Is not resigning from the CPSU as a matter of principle, hoping for its eventual fundamental renewal. He says: "Whatever comes, let me be among the last democrats to leave the CPSU." Such a position irritates others, especially his former comrades in the apparat, among whom this irritation turns to hounding.

I have to end my notes about the political state of Kuzbass society with a piece of bad news. Responding to the demands of some mine collectives, the council of workers committees called for a 24- hour strike on 4 March. The oblast soviet appealed not to support this decision. Will the strike take place? The future distribution of power in the Kuzbass depends on this. It is true that we suffer from hunger and cold here. But at least we could keep it "quiet"...

P.S. I was told in the Kemerovo Oblast Executive Committee that today, 4 March, 18 of 101 coal-producing enterprises halted work, either entirely or in part. In Prokopyevsk, the center of the current strike, there was a rally on Victory Square under the banners of political demands.

Goskomtsen Official Discusses Moscow Price Hikes

914D0162B Moscow TRUD in Russian 2 Mar 91 p 4

[Unattributed article: "Goskomtsen Versus the Moscow Soviet Executive Committee"]

[Text] **What is happening with prices for food goods in Moscow and the oblast? For the time being it seems there has not been an official increase, but in the state stores a number of goods are already being sold for two to three times their normal cost.**

[Signed] **K. Chistyakov, Lyubertsy**

This is what we were told at USSR Goskomtsen [State Committee on Prices].

State retail prices for food have not increased. The sale in Moscow of goods at increased retail prices is taking place in accordance with a ruling and an order of the Moscow Soviet Executive Committee that were adopted in violation of the existing system for demarcating authority between Union and republic administrations and soviet executive committees; they were also adopted without the passage of measures to provide social protection to the population by way of compensation. These rulings of the Moscow Soviet also contradict an order adopted by the republic administration that stipulates that, pending special instructions, food will be sold at state retail prices.

The uncompensated increase in prices in certain regions of the country such as Moscow gives rise to justified resentment on the part of the population and stimulates speculation and an uncontrolled increase in prices. At USSR Goskomtsen they believe that such an increase in state retail prices on basic food goods under the pretense of an expansion of contractual prices (and even those food goods that were imported are being sold at an increase) is in essence extortion of the population, and that as a result the illegal rulings should be abolished.

Agricultural

Smaller 1991 Grain Harvest Predicted

PM0503154691 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 8 24 Feb-3 Mar 91 p 3

[Andrey Sizov article: "Smaller Harvests, Greater Imports for 1991"]

[Text] As spring approaches, it's time to think about what we will eat next autumn.

A couple of months ago, the leaders of the State Commission on Food and Provisions of the USSR Council of Ministers declared with authority that "the improvement in the delivery of staple foods to retail trade networks will continue in the coming year" (1991 - Ed.). It's an interesting idea, but I wonder how we are going to measure the growth. If we go by the inflated prices, we might find a certain growth all right, but if we use natural indicators, we won't find any growth at all.

Why am I so categorical about it? Because conditions for a drop in agricultural productions have already been created. The areas reserved for winter corn diminished by over three million hectares last year. Areas sown with spring corn have been decreasing year after year. One can be sure the tendency will continue in the same direction this coming spring. All in all, the areas under grain crops are down by four to five million hectares. There is little hope of another record harvest. The corn yield is likely to average 18 to 19 centners per hectare, or less, as a result of growing disorganization and chaos, lower output of fertilizers, and lack of motivation for increased productivity on collective and state farms.

To summarize, this autumn we can expect to produce a total of 190 to 200 million tons of grain. Given the outdated system of state purchases, we are likely to end up with 53 to 58 million tons, which is almost an all-time low. The grain resources needed for centralized production of bread, pasta and animal fodder run up to 100 to 105 million tons. The necessary amount was never obtained by domestic production. Grain imports always played a role. To reach the usual standards of centralized supplies, we will have to import more than 40 milion tons of grain.

Is this what the top food authorities are counting on? But how are they going to pay for the imports? The loans we got from France in October and the USA in January have already been used by Eksportkhleb. (We have to give them their due: the purchases were made quickly and at the least expensive prices.)

Now we are seeking to "borrow" a million tons of grain from India, and negotiating for another French loan to buy another three million tons. What then? Following the January events and Prime Minister Pavlov's recent interview which shocked the West, the attitude to this country has grown more than cautious. No one seems to be in a hurry to offer us fresh loans. Of course, we could buy for cash, but where will the hard currency come from?

Therefore, we can realistically count on importing 27 to 29 million tons of grain, and still fall short by about ten to 15 million tons.

The shortage will hit cattle farming worst of all because imports of feed grain will be the first to be cut. As a result, meat production will be a mere two million tons, i.e., eight to nine per cent of today's level. While cattle may still be expected to survive on feed crops, poultry needs grain to pull through the winter.

No doubt, the above is just one of the possible scenarios, based as it is on real tendencies apparent today. Therfore, we might not have many chickens in autumn.

Has anything been done to revert the tendency? Nothing substantial. Has the land reform started? No. Instead of the reform, a referendum on private land ownership is to be held at the very time when agricultural work must be in full swing.

What about providing the agrarian sector with necessary machinery? There is still no wholesale market in view. Nor has a normal rouble appeared. On the contrary, bartering is gaining ground in all sectors of the food and agricultural industry. Barter is likely to aggravate the food situation in industrial centres: what have they got to exchange for food? Pig iron or weaponry?

In the given situation, our agricultural lobby will continue to ride their high horse. The lobby dictate their terms to the government and the guaranteed supplies of materials promised, favourable conditions offered - and another round of inflation will begin, for the sake of yet another hypothetical harvest to be reaped from the collective farm system. But the system no longer has anything to yield.

Baltic Republics

Baltic Command Demands Riga Explosion Inquiry

LD0703174991 Moscow TASS in English 1643 GMT 7 Mar 91

[By TASS correspondent Valeriy Zaytsev]

[Text] Riga March 7 TASS—The Military Council of the Air Force of the Baltic Military District has described as "another round of whipping up internal political tension and confrontation with the military" the explosion, staged by unidentified people in the building for families of servicemen on March 6. This statement was published in the republican press today.

According to experts, the charge contained no less than 15 kilogrammes of trinitrotoluene. As a result of the explosion three floors of the building were destroyed so much that people can no longer live there. Housing will have to be found for 24 families.

The Military Command demanded most serious investigation into the crime. If proper measures are not taken, this will be regarded as "the lack of interest of official authorities in conducting the investigation, or the inability to control the situation in the republic."

Several similar explosions were staged recently in Riga and other districts of the republic, including a hostel of Riga militia workers.

Latvian Left-Wing Bloc To Hold Referendum

LD0703192691 Moscow TASS in English 1325 GMT 7 Mar 91

[By TASS correspondent Valery Zaytsev]

[Text] Riga March 7 TASS—Latvia's left-wing bloc has decided to go ahead with the referendum in the republic. This decision was made after the republican Supreme Soviet announced on Wednesday that Latvia's state structures will stay away from the referendum.

Representatives of 17 public and political organisations and movements decided to pool efforts to enable every Latvian citizen to express his/her will on the future union. It was decided to start an intensive propaganda campaign among the population, although radio and television are in actual fact subordinated to the Popular Front and even opposition members of parliament have difficulty getting access to television.

The majority of local bodies of power, demonstrating the priority of republican legislation over that of the union, refused point blank to take part in the referendum. All this causes certain organisational difficulties.

The Soviet referendum will be held by labour collectives and public organisations, including associations of labour collectives, the international front of working people, and the "Soyuz" deputy group.

CP Aide Hits Latvian Front Poll Results View

PM0703172591 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 7 Mar 91 Second Edition p 3

[Interview in Riga with K. Gerkis, secretary of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee, by O. Meshkov; date not specified; first paragraph is editorial introduction: "Latvia: Not in Favor of Separatists"]

[Text] Riga—The republic's mass media under the control of the People's Front [LPF] are hyping the results of the 3 March poll of residents and claiming that the Latvian people have given a resolute "yes" to an independent Latvian state outside the Soviet Union. But is that actually the case? PRAVDA correspondent O. Meshkov asked K. Gerkis, secretary of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee, to assess the poll results.

The organizers of the poll were undoubtedly expecting unconditional support for their course from the vast majority of residents, Karl Karlovich said. The poll turnout was quite high. But the fact that 73.6 percent of those who voted said yes is not evidence of their unreserved support for the LPF's course of withdrawal from the USSR. One may even conclude that over one-third of the republic's residents do not support this course: 24.7 percent openly said "no" to this course, and add to them those who voiced their protest by not voting at all—that is, 13 percent of those with the franchise. The combined total is 35.5 percent. Add to that figure the disfranchised servicemen, seamen, and fishermen who were at sea at the time. Here is a radio-telegram sent from the fishing boat Jan Rainberg. The crew write indignantly about the republic Supreme Soviet's decision which deprives them of the right to express their opinion. More than half the crew's members are permanent residents of Latvia, many were born here.

We have learned from Jelgava that officers who were denied the vote asked two foreign observers: "Do they allow Bundeswehr officers to take part in similar events in your country?" "Of course they do," was the answer.

Look at how many instances of outright violations of the poll regulations were recorded by members of the "Soyuz" local soviet deputies' group monitoring the observance of legality in the conduct of the poll. At electoral precincts 66 and 67 at 30 Hukste Street in Riga they even installed mirrors in the polling booths so as to check which way people were voting. Before the poll election notices were sent to residents who included citizens who were dead—in other words, they were employing "dead souls." Women received election notices addressed to them in their maiden names and their married names. These, of course, were the people whom the organizers were sure would vote the right way.

There is much discussion in the republic now about the results of the poll, for of course, people want to be clear in their own minds what the poll actually showed. I would like to remind you that the law governing the

secession of a union republic from the USSR requires at least two-thirds of the population's votes which, as we can see, the People's Front did not achieve this time. This can be viewed as a triumph for the republic's left-wing forces who adhere to internationalist positions. This must be consolidated during the all-Union referendum.

Speech by Rubiks More 'Insult' Than Analysis

LD0703202291 Riga Domestic Service in Latvian 0500 GMT 7 Mar 91

[Text] A conference was held yesterday at the Political House of the Communist Party of Latvia in which representatives of the public political movements that are in the same bloc as the Communist Party participated. The participants discussed how to organize the referendum declared by the USSR president for 17 March. There was also a report on the political situation in the republic by the first secretary of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee, Alfreds Rubiks. His speech was more an insult to the nationalists and separatists than an analysis of the political situation.

Also speaking at the meeting was a representative of the Central Committee for the USSR referendum, (Valeriy Lashkov). He emphasized that the referendum must be performed in work collectives; however, for example, a representative from Bauska said that in his rayon that will not be possible, because not a single work collective has expressed the wish to take part in this venture.

Godmanis Departs for Talks With Gorbachev

LD0503125791 Riga International Service in Latvian 2030 GMT 4 Mar 91

[Text] Yesterday, the chairman of the Supreme Council of the republic, Ivars Godmanis, and Minister of Finance Elmars Silins went to Moscow. They are expected to have a meeting with the president of the USSR, Mikhail Gorbachev, and Prime Minister Valentin Pavlov. The Latvian representatives hope to achieve agreement on Latvia's deductions in the USSR budget, which may amount in the best case to five million rubles.

Observers Claim Estonian Referendum Irregularities

PM0703164491 Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 5 Mar 91 p 9

[Jorn Mikkelsen report: "Danish Criticism: Attempts To Confuse"]

[Text] A group of Danish legislators noted serious irregularities at the recent Estonian referendum on independence from the Soviet Union.

At a news conference in Copenhagen yesterday the group put forward the conjecture that the irregularities were centrally orchestrated from Moscow.

It was in the region around the town of Narva, some 225 km east of the capital of Tallinn on the border with the Russian Republic, that the Danish politicians—Niels Ahlmann-Ohlsen (Conservative), Arne Melchior (Center-Democrat), and Tom Behnke (Progress Party)—observed what they interpreted as clear attempts to obstruct the voting.

The group of observers was sent to Estonia by the Folketing Presidium.

Apart from the episodes in the Narva region, the parliamentarians concluded that the referendum in the rest of Estonia passed off satisfactorily.

"But if the voting had been closer we would have recommended that there be an international investigation into the voting in the Narva region," Arne Melchior said.

Alongside the referendum proper in which people were to vote "yes" or "no" on whether they want an Estonia with full independence from the Soviet Union, the local authorities in Narva held a vote on whether Estonia should be free but remain a member of the Union.

According to the Danish observers, the alternative vote—locally called "a sort of opinion poll"—also included Soviet troops from the region. The soldiers cast their votes at their barracks, it was announced.

It was also noted that many Russians who live on the Russian side of the border but who work in Estonia were able to vote.

"We became aware that the parallel vote was carried out to confuse. It seemed to achieve its aim. We were able to look into several polling booths and saw that many people put a cross against both questions," Arne Melchior said.

Around 60,000 people live in the Narva region. The region is dominated by immigrant Russians, and in the referendum here there was a clear majority against a break with the Soviet Union.

"It is undemocratic, and it is irritating that Moscow was not able to resist the temptation to interfere in the referendum," Niels Ahlmann-Ohlsen said. He added that during its stay in Estonia the group felt itself to be under surveillance by the Soviet security authorities. There were also examples of harassment. Ahlmann-Ohlsen, for example, was woken in the middle of the night several nights in a row by people who said they belonged to the local militia.

Conversations of a more confidential nature had to be held in hotel corridors for fear of bugging, Arne Melchior said.

Vilnius Cites Gorbachev Poll Results

LD0703224291 Vilnius Radio Vilnius in Russian 2020 GMT 7 Mar 91

[Text] Recently the Moscow press has been publishing the results of various sociological investigations carried out by the all-Union public opinion center. The polls show that Mikhail Gorbachev's rating is constantly falling. In 1988 he was regarded as the most prominent leader in the country. His actions were approved by 55 percent of those taking part in the poll; a year later—by 46 percent and in 1990 the first place was occupied by Boris Yeltsin who is supported by 32 percent. Gorbachev is supported by only 18 percent.

What qualities does Gorbachev have as a politician? Twenty-eight percent—the largest number of those taking part in the poll—think that the most distinctive features of his character are duplicity and hypocrisy. One-fifth of them think that, most likely, it is weakness land lack of confidence in himself. Eighteen percent of those polled maintain that the USSR leader is indifferent to human sacrifice.

A rather interesting answer by Muscovites is to the following question: Do the actions by the USSR president help to solve the country's most important problems? Only 12 percent of Muscovites replied positively, and 38 percent stated categorically: no!

Further on Poll

LD0803092591 Vilnius International Service in Lithuanian 0100 GMT 8 Mar 91

[Text] Who is responsible for the tragic January events in Lithuania and Latvia? Of people polled in Lithuania, 46.5 percent gave the answer: Gorbachev. The daily LIETUVOS RYTAS continues publishing data on the public opinion polls carried out in Lithuania in mid-February by the Lithuanian branch of the Soviet Union's public opinion research center.

One thousand people were polled and their ethnic composition corresponds with that of the entire republic. Who else besides Gorbachev must take the blame for the events in Lithuania and Latvia? Several answers were allowed to this question. After the president is the vaguely defined center, chosen by 26.5 percent of the polled. Next comes the Lithuanian Communist Party (CPSU)—25.5 percent, the Army and the KGB—over 19 percent. The mystical national salvation committees—16.4 percent of the people polled. The percentage goes down when other political forces and organizations are mentioned. And 4.1 percent of those polled believe that the authorities of Lithuania and Latvia themselves must take blame for the tragic events in January.

Answering another question, one-third of those polled said that in their opinion the relations between different nationalities in Lithuania are better than in the Soviet Union, nine percent thought differently. Almost half of those polled think that the situation of other nationalites in independent Lithuania will improve.

Referendum Voting Figures Questioned

LD0703211991 Vilnius Radio Vilnius in Lithuanian 1700 GMT 7 Mar 91

[Text] The radio station Tarybu Lietuva [Soviet Lithuania] today invited not only local residents but also their guests to take part in the Soviet Union's referendum which is being organized in Lithuania by the pro-Moscow Communist Party in violation of the Soviet Union's Constitution and its law on referenda. Thus their votes, as well as the votes of the servicemen stationed in Lithuania, will be proclaimed as votes from the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic.

Apart from that, in view of the absence of lists of voters, the same person will be able to visit more than one constituency during the day. And where is the guarantee—since there are no lawfully formed election commissions or neutral observers, and bearing in mind the zealous efforts of the Yedinstvo activists—that any number of ballot papers will not be placed in the urns, or that any figures will not be entered in the protocols?

We have not yet forgotten how such statistics used to be compiled. For instance, the organisers of the meeting on 23 February devoted to Soviet Army and Navy day at the Vilnius sport palace reported that it was attended by 50,000 people, although the square in front of the palace accomodates at the most 7,000 persons, and the square was not full then.

And where did 250,000 participants in the demonstration on 7 November last year come from? A march by this number of people will require at least 3-4 hours, yet their procession lasted only 40-45 minutes.

But this circumstance did not present the Vremya program from announcing this fantastic figure. At present, the same forces are getting busy once again.

Lithuanian Leaders on 17 Mar Referendum

LD0803033491 Vilnius International Service in English 2300 GMT 7 Mar 91

[Text] [First announcer] The referendum to be held in the Soviet Union on 17 March will naturally have some or other repercussion in Lithuania, despite our long-afirmed stand. Frankly, because of the strivings of the forces hostile to Lithuania's independence to demonstrate at any cost that the referendum has taken place in Lithuania, notwithstanding (?the breaks) during the (?sessions), the Lithuanian MP's gathered today to discuss the referendum issue. That is, (?they were in) conference to consider the possible moves of parliament when anyone attempts in one way or other to hold the Soviet Union's referendum in Lithuania.

Parliament's vice Chairman Kazimieras Motieka, who was the first to speak, drew the MP's attention to the fact

that the Soviet Union was again resorting to the assistance of its military forces. Troops and military hardware are poured into Lithuania. Patrolling of the city by the military has been stepped up.

Juczas Jermalavicius, a secretary of the Lithuanian Communist Party, stating in a broadcast of the collaborationist radio station Soviet Lithuania, said unambiguously that the referendum would be held with the assistance of the military forces. He also warned that if obstacles were placed in the way of holding the referendum the territorial issue would again crop up.

Kazimieras Motieka pointed out that there had been more statements linking the referendum to some other issues. Firstly there were the words said by the head of the Soviet Union's delegation to hold negotiations with Lithuania, Vitaliy Doguzhiyev, to vice chairman of the Lithuanian parliament Ceslovas Stankevicious, to the effect that there was a third option to Lithuania's future, other than independence or staying within the Soviet Union. Although Vitaliy Doguzhiyev did not specify, Kazimieras Motieka pointed out that he might have been referring to a (?long lease) [words indistinct] union of Soviet republics.

Next the MP's were informed about yesterday's sitting of the Vilnius Dirstrict municipality. [Word indistinct] impression on the deputies and manipulating opinions. Chairman (?Anistasas Brazauskas) managed to get the Vilnius District municipality vote in favor of holding the Soviet Union's referendum. Although out of the 80 deputies present, only 41 voted in favor of this decision, the chairman let no other proposals to be voted. Besides, the Supreme Council today received the above resolution [?concerning] several other points which had not even been discussed. Officials of the district [words indistinct] and election commissioners are instructed to go by the resolution of the Soviet Union's Supreme Soviet on the referendum's organisation.

It was pointed out at the meeting of the MP's that the Vilnius District municipality had been discussing an issue it did not even have the right to consider by Lithuania's Supreme Council should adopt a resolution warning the municipality against exceeding its powers by taking such decisions, and emphasizing the need for municipalities and their officials to abide by the laws of the Republic of Lithuania. The fulfillment of such illegitimate decisions is to be considered as activity hostile to Lithuania's legislation and the state.

Chairman Kazimieras Motieka proposed that administrative rules should be introduced in those districts which do not abide by Lithuania's laws. The proposal was criticized, since it might have a negative effect upon the forming good relations with the ethnic Polish population and the Polish faction in parliament.

The chairman of the Vilnius district municipality could not be made to change his mind, even by the members of the Polish faction in parliament, to speak up against the decision to hold the referendum in the Vilnius District.

[Second announcer] Chairman of the Lithuanian parliament Vytautas Landsbergis, who next spoke on the referendum issue, reminded MP's that the Presidium and government had adopted a statement on providing the citizens of the Soviet Union the opportunity to take part in the referendum, if such a request were [word indistinct]. That was not the case, however, Vytautas Landsbergis pointed out, since there were only directions and instructions to make it look by all means that the referendum would be held. Even if 1,000 or so people take part in it, that would serve as a pretext for further interference into the affairs of Lithuania. Vytautas Landsbergis pointed out that it was no use speaking about any observation or control, since the turnout figures announced would depend only on the will of the organizers. The Soviet Union's urges to form referendum organizing commissions at enterprises or municipalities could be qualified as unscrupulous interference into Lithuania's affairs and ought to be given a (?reflective) legal assessment. Vytautas Landsbergis also pointed out that Lithuania's citizens aiding another state's interference [as heard] into the affairs of the republic and conduct subversive activities were to be made answerable for it. Vytautas Landsbergis held it that the Supreme Council ought to [word indistinct] the unlawful decision of the Vilnius District municipality. It had no legal force and did not commit anyone.

Meanwhile, the activity of the Soviet Union's Communist Party in Lithuania had always been criminal. Vytautas Landsbergis proposed that this organization should be viewed locally [word indistinct] in an international trial, since it continues its crimes started in January. As to the voting, it certainly has no legal power or consequences, since it should be given a legal assessment, Vytautas Landsbergis pointed out.

Chairmnan of the Supreme Council also drew attention to another possible interpretation of the referendum in the Soviet Union. Advocates of a unitarian state proclaimed that the referendum should be held only in a normal situation, and with the whole population taking part. Those acquainted with the Soviet terminology can easily decipher that the normal situation and all-around participation could be ensured by introducing martial law, dictatorship, presidential rule, and an atmosphere of terror. They urge President Gorbachev to ensure such conditions—that is, to introduce dictatorship even before the referendum. The referendum is aimed at provoking some internal conflict which had been long prayed for, but to no avail. When these conflicts did develop into an overt and bloody one, it turned out that it was just a continuation of the 1940 conflict, which again took the shape of intervention and military violence. Still, the Kremlin needs an internal clash, and the referendum is apparently meant to contribute to it, said Vytautas landsbergis at today's conference of MP's on the Soviet Union's referendum to be held on 17 March.

Foreign Minister Meets Polish Counterpart

LD0703121891 Vilnius International Service in Lithuanian 0100 GMT 7 Mar 91

[Text] Valdemaras Katkus, acting Lithuanian foreign minister, has met Polish Foreign Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski in Warsaw. Problems which are topical to both countries were discussed; the development of mutual relations has also been planned.

It has been agreed that the Foreign Ministry of Poland will analyze the draft documents presented by Lithuania which would legalize the relationship of the two states and permit the exchange of the bureaus of interest, and that the response will be given in two weeks time.

Senate Speaker Andrzej Stelmachowski spoke with satisfaction about the latest decisions adopted by the Lithuanian parliament with regard to national minorities.

Lithuania Aims For Cooperation Accord

LD0703151891 Warsaw PAP in English 1234 GMT 7 Mar 91

[Text] Warsaw, March 7—Lithuania would like to sign with Poland several documents aimed at closer political and economic cooperation between the two countries, Lithuanian Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Valdemaras Katkus said at a press conference here today.

Katkus said that Poland pledged it will not deport the Lithuanians who fled to Poland in order not to be drafted to the Soviet Army.

During his few-day visit [as received] Katkus met with Polish Foreign Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski, pleninpotentiary for refugees Zbigniew Skoczylas and Senate Speaker Andrzej Stelmachowski.

Lithuanian Delegation Departs for Warsaw 5 Mar

LD0503121891 Vilnius International Service in Lithuanian 0100 GMT 5 Mar 91

[Summary] A Lithuanian Foreign Ministry delegation headed by Acting Lithuanian Foreign Minister Valdemaras Katkus left for Warsaw today and will meet with Polish Foreign Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski.

No Military Movements Noticed in Lithuania

LD0703200691 Vilnius Radio Vilnius in Lithuanian 1550 GMT 7 Mar 91

[Text] It has been quiet in Lithuania the last few days. No intensive military movements have been noticed. A group of experts that arrived from Moscow is investigating the circumstances of an explosion at the building of the Oktyabrskiy and Sovetskiy rayon party committees of the Lithuanian Communist Party.

Representatives of the Republic of Lithuania are in consulation with their colleagues from Riga. It seems that the [word indistinct] of the criminals is identical to that observed in the capital of Latvia where 22 explosions have taken place. By the way, 18 of them took place at the buildings belonging to the party of military bodies.

Journalists were informed about it at a briefing at the Supreme Council by Audrius Azubalis, the press representative.

Radiation in Lithuanian TV Tower Confirmed

LD0603205891 Vilnius Radio Vilnius in Lithuanian 1700 GMT 6 Mar 91

[Text] Today the occupied radio and television building was visited by a group of experts from the Institute of Physics of the Lithuanian Academy of Sciences, and by Romualdas Naujalis, deputy director of the Radio Technical Center. Correspondent [name indistinct] had a talk with him:

[Begin recording] [Correspondent] First of all, I would like you to deny that there is no radiation in the occupied building, that everything is in order there. You have been there with experts: what conclusions have been reached by them?

[Naujalis] The experts not only saw everything, they went there with their instruments. They took measurements where our instruments used to be kept [passage indistinct]. The safe in that room had been broken into, [word indistinct] and (?radioactivity) is very high. [Word indistinct] they virtually sealed off the second floor, and it is very dangerous for people to go there. There were radiologists from our institute.

[Correspondent] I would like you to assess the situation, what you saw, as an economist.

[Maujalis] As an economist, I can say that I was horrified after having seen the premises which we used to cherish. All the doors are broken, everything has been plundered, everything that could be carried, including personal belongings. There is virtually nothing there. Our aim was to establish whether there were any broken measuring instruments (?rit-I) in other rooms—there were about 200 of them. We had to inspect virtually every room, starting with the television studios and finishing with the auxiliary premises. [passage indistinct]. It seems as if somebody was running, throwing around what they could not take; it was thrown on the floor and trodden on. There are virtually no people in our radio premises. [passage indistinct], one man is trying to put the equipment into operation, but the radio is not working there. All the doors are broken there, one acoustic door was shot at with automatic weapons, there are bullet holes in the walls. [end recording]

RSFSR

Yeltsin on Civil War Threat, Food Problem

LD0703145191 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1200 GMT 7 Mar 91

[Statement to citizens of Russia by Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin, chairman of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] Supreme Soviet, followed by an interview with him by Oleg Maksimovich Poptsov, president of the Russian Television and Radio Company; place and date not given—recorded]

[Text] [Yeltsin] Esteemed listeners, citizens of Russia: The vast amount of mail that I have recently been receiving confirms once again that there is a vast shortage of information about the work of the Russian parliament and government. Why is this? There is both the news blockade, which was not difficult to organize because the publishing houses have hitherto been monopolized by the central party bodies and the inadequacy of our own news media. Voters speak about this at literally every meeting and this is also the opinion of many deputies.

We have prepared a number of measures to resolve these problems, and they must be tackled promptly. But how? Much of what is planned today is torpedoed by central party and state bodies. I consider it all the more necessary at this difficult time to speak regularly on Russian radio. I am certain that this will help our mutual understanding.

Today I want to dwell on three topics. First, the problem of preserving civil peace in the republic and throughout the country. Anxiety about this is always expressed at numerous meetings during my trips around the republic, including those recently to Yaroslavl, Novogorod, and Kaliningrad oblasts, and the meetings in Moscow with representatives of various social strata and parties. I believe that everyone has a clear idea that if we do not maintain civil peace, the hopes for a better life will not prove justified. If we do manage to do it, then we will gradually overcome the low morale and dislocation; we will begin to emerge from crisis and to improve the lives of Russians.

The main source of tension and confrontation is not in contradictions between workers, peasants, and the intelligentsia, between people of different professions, including the military. The system is fighting for its very survival, in order to preserve everything that has been taken from the people over 73 years. It is hampering our work; it is retarding reforms and is trying to turn everything back. The tried and tested methods have been brought into play—harrassment, lies, and deception. Most dangerous for the country's future is the growing lack of understanding between the people and the highest Union leadership, between Russia and the other republics and the center. People no longer believe in the promises that are constantly made to them. In six years they have become convinced that talk of reforms, without the desire to implement them, results in chaos and ruin. The distrust of the country's citizens in the Union leadership's policies has recently reached a critical point.

The president has already begun intimidating people with the danger of a civil war. The military terminology of the battlefront is heard increasingly often from the highest platforms. Communists are being called on to come out of the trenches. The image of an enemy is being revived in people's minds and the stereotypes of encirclement by enemies and of class hatred are being revived.

I am convinced that the country is not threatened with a civil war and our duty is to do everything to ensure that this remains so. There are no splits in society by social characteristics: that is the main thing. If the military is used against the civilian population in some places, on the instruction of the country's leadership, I am completely certain that the Army will not proceed against the people. There is a desire to use the myth of a civil war to intimidate the population yet again, to distract attention from today's acute social problems, to justify the use of violence against the people and to put pressure in some places on what they have already begun openly calling the so-called democratic movement.

Yes, no one is surprised by rallies and the existence of many differing opinions, and such strong methods as strikes are being used. But all this is a peaceful means of displaying energy: I stress, peaceful and constitutional. I personally am convinced that there will be no civil war. Yes, the present rotton bureaucratic state structure has to die away, but without bloodshed.

Second, the most acute problem of food. A hard winter is past. I do not need to explain how hard it was. A voucher system is operating virtually throughout the republic. The range of goods in the shops is extremely meager. Now we are already asking how we are going to get through the second quarter of this year. Even we are not doing things completely, but just look at how the agreement signed between the union government and the republics for food in the first half of this year is being fulfilled. Grain: 15 million tonnes should have been delivered, but the actual amount delivered is 500,000. Meat: 1.4 million tonnes—delivered: 40,000. Oilseed meal for poultry farming: 2.5 million tonnes—delivered: 200,000. Vegetable oil: 550,000 tonnes—delivered: zero. Raw sugar: 1.2 million tonnes—delivered: 130.

Now, at the beginning of spring, on the eve of sowing, the issue of transformations in the agrarian sector is coming right to the fore. Republican laws on land and peasant farms have been adopted. All types of land ownership and all forms of management have been recognized as equal in Russia. The legal barriers which for decades prevented the farmer from working freely and effectively have been lifted. They got people accustomed to a chronic food shortage, but did not give land to those who wanted to work it. This spring people who want to work

the land should receive it from the authorities, and legally. This applies to rural residents and to town-dwellers who are prepared to work an independent or peasant farm or want to increase their household plot. It also applies to the millions of people who want to obtain a plot of land for a garden. The Government of Russia has made a decision on allocating up to 15/100 of a hectare of land to those who want to have a plot, garden or a strip of land for a dacha. It needs to be bluntly said that we have millions of hectares of unworked, abandoned land. If even a fraction of it is cultivated this spring, we shall receive an appreciable increase in food and reduce tension in this matter.

Of course, nobody is calling for the distribution of land to be carried out by dissolving the collective and state farms. On the contrary, their efforts to provide Russia with food must be reinforced by the accelerated development of other forms of management of the land. Collective farms alone cannot feed the people, and we are again seeing this at present.

Any day now the Presidiums of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet and Council of Ministers will adopt a joint decision which will set out in precise and specific terms the mechanisms for the transfer of land. But there is no need to wait. Many highly important issues can and must be tackled by local authorities themselves, acting on the basis of the primacy of the interests of people who want to obtain land in order to feed themselves and their fellow citizens. And there are quite a few examples of this: Volgograd, Novgorod, Sverdlovsk, Novosibirsk, and other oblasts. But I am receiving information from many regions of the republics that the land issue is being tackled with great difficulty. They go in for red tape, formalism, that is, the traditional bureacratic methods. But this should now be called sabotage. There exists a silent resistance to this most important task on the part of the party bodies. They are prepared to do anything, take any action, just to stop the process which has been started, to obstruct the decisions of the Russian parliament and government. This is how they demonstrate in practice their devotion to the interests of the people. Today it is not yet too late to take a more constructive position. The party committees must understand that it is a question of the reality of famine and they must urgently prove by deeds that they are for the people. How much more can you follow dogmas which have been overturned by life itself? Take China for instance. Their healthy stance made it possible to solve many problems in a very short time, and above all, for the first time enabled the billion-strong population to feed itself. And we ask anyone who does not want to tackle the problems at least not to hamper us.

The third issue: I cannot fail to dwell on another problem. In today's very complicated situation additional and, I would say, artificial obstacles to the normal functioning of the republic's legislative bodies are being created. The fresh extraordinary Congress of People's Deputies forced on us at the initiative of the Communists of Russia group has been one of these. It will take place at the least suitable time, at the end of March and into April. This is now the second extraordinary congress. What impatience!

There were already plans to convene the congress in May, once the spring fieldwork was completed, for the most part. All this has been discarded. The instigators of the congress find it much more important to distract attention, to divert us from tackling these urgent problems and to give our attention to preparing a fresh round of political struggle. It is a pity that all this is being organized by the leadership of the Russian Communist Party and the CPSU Central Committee at a time that is critical for the country. Whole groups have already been formed and are working energetically, seeking out or thinking up compromising material on undesirable leaders, instead of being on the spot to help tackle issues. It is time the voters made specific demands of deputies for them to get on with things. Various options for tactics at the congress are being drawn up. They are already selecting candidates for leading posts in the parliament and the Government of Russia. They are drawing up plans for further propaganda campaigns. Work which is totally unnecessary and which is harmful to the people is on the boil. Again, just as 73 years ago, they are preparing for another resolute struggle for power. This goes to show once again what the real aims of these so-called defenders of the people are.

For my part, I would like to observe that we in parliament have neither the time nor the resources to allow ourselves to get mixed up in this struggle. This was stated as early as the Second Congress of People's Deputies and I would like to repeat it now. The main thing is not to compete in the political games, not to engage in intrigues, but to tackle the problems which are most important for the voters. I believe that issues of who should be in Russia's leadership should not be decided in offices behind closed doors. Only the voters can best do this.

Now I would like to address the female listeners of Radio Rossii, all women of Russia.

Tomorrow is a holiday, 8 March. This year it will be more modest than usual. It is being affected by the crisis. Nonetheless I should like to express the wish to our dear women that they will not lose hope that the misfortunes which our republic is now going through will be overcome.

Russia does not have its own awards, but I consider that our women deserve the highest accolades. I should like, personally, on my own behalf, and on behalf of the Supreme Soviet, to thank all of you, dear women, for your great endurance, for your trust and support, and for your work, for the fact that you do not lose your optimism and remain feminine and beautiful. We receive the most telegrams and letters of support, about 2,000 per day, from women.

Unfortunately, as yet no real improvements have occurred in our lives. But certain measures have been

taken to improve the position of women in the republic. Additional benefits have been brought in for mothers of large families in the pensions legislation. Work has begun on implementing the program to produce children's foodstuffs. This will certainly improve the situation, even though not immediately. And this is just the start. In the near future we plan to increase the length of the minimum annual paid leave in the republic to 24 days. Everyone will gain from this, but women will gain first. The question of reducing the working week by one hour while preserving the present level of pay is now being worked on; it is proposed that this will be done from next January or perhaps earlier, depending on the situation.

Concluding my address, I should like to express warm thanks to those citizens who have sent, from various regions of Russia and from other republics and from abroad, their letters and telegrams, and resolutions from rallies and meetings, in support of my position after my address on 19 February. I sense the solidarity from many labor collectives, the working class, and the intelligentsia. It is particularly dear to me that the inhabitants of the heart of Russia, many villages and rural settlements of the republic, have expressed their approval.

I thank many of my colleagues, deputies at various levels of soviets of peoples deputies. Among the multitude of telegrams and messages, about 10 percent express disagreement with my position. Well, they have that right. The main thing is to believe in Russia and to get on with the job, jointly supporting each other. I wish all of you success in this, esteemed inhabitants of Russia. I thank you for your attention. Until our next meeting on the wavelengths of Russia's Radio and, I think, on television on 17 March on the question of the referendum and the union treaty.

[Poptsov] One question outside those problems which you have raised. We have a very large mailbag and an endless number of telephone calls, the Supreme Soviet is being overwhelmed, too. Everyone is asking how you are, about your state of health, and would like to hear this from you, personally.

[Yeltsin] Yes, unfortunately my whole family and I myself have been down with influenza, and because of that I had to put off the big trip that I had planned: after the Yaroslavl and Novgorod areas, to visit other regions of the Russian Federation. Well, I am recovering now and I think in two or three days I will be bearing my full work load.

[Poptsov] Well, that is good to hear. I should think all our listeners, above all, are glad to hear it. Let us hope so.

[Yeltsin] Thank you.

Polozkov Criticizes Yeltsin, 'Democratic Russia'

LD0703223391 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1400 GMT 7 Mar 91

[By TASS correspondents Igor Gvritishvili and Ruben Shiriyan]

[Text] Moscow, 7 Mar (TASS)— "There is no other serious political force in the republic which is capable of saving the Soviet Union from disintegration, to stabilize the economy, and to conduct perestroyka along the lines which were envisaged for it"—this is how Ivan Polozkov, the leader of the Russian Communist Party, outlined the party's tasks at a press conference in Moscow today. He stressed that the party has to promote the unification of all patriotic forces which are for the untiy and the entity of the Union, against any kind of expression of nationalism and chauvinism.

Ivan Polozkov expressed his opinion on the layout of the political forces in the republic. According to his assessment, "reactionary forces that call themselves 'democrats' or 'left radicals' are on the right flank." These people are closely linked to the shadow economy and the corrupted upper layers of the state and economic apparatus. They are, he thinks, supported by influential foreign circles. He includes the movement "Democratic Russia" among such forces. Forces that speak in favor of a socialist choice and a radical renewal of the country, with the Russian Communist Party as the core of such forces, are in the center, its leader stressed. Ivan Polozkov criticized the activities of Boris Yeltsin in his position as chairman of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet. Nevertheless, he noted, "if the leader of the republican parliament puts forward a constructive program to save Russia at the extraordinary Congress of People's Deputies of Russia—its beginning is envisaged for the end of March—then the communist deputies will back such a program."

Answering a question put to him by journalists on whether he is intending to come forward as a candidate for the post of the president of Russia, Ivan Polozkov said that in his opinion, there are enough worthy people among the communist parliamentarians who are capable of competing with Boris Yeltsin.

Speaking on the coming referendum on the future of the USSR on 17 March, Ivan Polozkov noted that he, personally, is "in favor of the Union". At the same time, it will be difficult for me to vote because the new-born democrats from the Moscow soviet have still not resolved the issue of my registration in the capital. I have no time to fly to Krasnodar and to vote there," Ivan Polozkov complained.

He lived and worked in this town in the south of Russia before election to the position of leader of the Russian communists.

Russian Foreign Ministry Issues Gulf Statement

LD0703135791 Moscow TASS in English 1322 GMT 7 Mar 91

[Text] Moscow March 7 TASS—"The Gulf crisis has shown the danger of an uncontrolled build-up of weapons in zones of tension," the Russian Federation Foreign Ministry said in a statement on the situation in the Persian Gulf, here today.

As is pointed out in the document, the war is "primarily a lesson to the countries of the region which saw for themselves that an arms race is a drain on economic resources and does not guarantee security".

All countries that supply arms to the world market should consider negative consequences. The position of the Russian Federation Foreign Ministry is that settling and limiting arms supplies must be put on the agenda of international talks. Transfer of technologies which can be used to create weapons of mass destruction, as well as means of their delivery, should be subjected to strict national and international control."

The statement emphasises that interests of the Russian Federation and a renewed Union also run within the channel of multi-sided cooperation in a civil rather than military sphere.

The first independent contacts of the Russian Federation with the Middle Eastern region show that there is a large scope for mutually beneficial deideologized peace ties and trade.

The statement also raises problems of the post-crisis period. "It is especially important today to restore Kuwait, to promote the establishment of a new peaceful Iraq, to gear all resources of this rich region, as well as international aid, to goals of construction."

"The United Nations has the right to pose the issue of responsibility for the threat of war never again to originate from Iraq and this region as a whole".

There is a wide range of means to settle the situation; an international conference and bilateral talks, consultations at the U.N. Security Council and various types of mediation.

RSFSR Citizens To Stage Pro-Yeltsin Rallies

LD0803141591 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1300 GMT 8 Mar 91

[Text] There will be rallies supporting the activities of Boris Yeltsin, chairman of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet, on 10 March today, in our editorial office, we have had quite a lot of phone calls, moreover from various towns throughout the country. The callers said that the posters had not been displayed in all towns, and they asked whether that meant that the rallies had been cancelled. No, the rallies have not been cancelled. They will take place. Live reports are planned for our Sunday program from various towns in Russia. We will be describing how Russians have reacted to the call to support the leader of the Russian parliament.

Pskov Says Yeltsin Indifferent to Baltic Claims

PM0503151891 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 28 Feb 91 First Edition p 3

[Unattributed report: "Unanswered Letters"]

[Text] Pskov—Repeated appeals by the leaders and people's deputies of Pskov Oblast to B.N. Yeltsin, chairman of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet, have remained unanswered. They have requested that the highest organ of power and the republic government participate in solving the problems arising in the Pskov region in connection with the exacerbation of the social and political situation in the Baltic republics.

The members of the Pskov Oblast RSFSR Communist Party Committee Bureau unanimously support this. At their regular session, they adopted a statement asserting, in particular, that the Russian leader is indifferent to the invalid territorial claims by Estonia and Latvia against the authorities and population of a number of the oblast's rayons.

Deputies' Statement on Yeltsin Condemned

91UN0981B Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian No 9, Mar 91 p 3

["Statement of members of the Presidium of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet"]

[Text] At the meeting of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet of 21 February 1991 a group of RSFSR people's deputies—S.P. Gorichev, B.M. Isayev, V.B. Isakov, R.G. Abdulatipov, A.A. Veshnyakov, and V.G. Syrovatko—being simultaneously officials of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet and its chambers, made a political statement. Its purpose was to discredit RSFSR Supreme Soviet Chairman B.N. Yeltsin. All the blame for the serious mistakes of the Union leadership, including political and economic ones, and for the shortcomings in the work of the new Russian parliament, which does not have sufficient experience, its Presidium, the RSFSR Council of Ministers, and for its own inactivity and failure to carry out the obligations placed on it was shifted to B.N. Yeltsin.

The groundlessness of such a statement is apparent to any honest person: A critical situation has developed throughout the country, in all Union republics, and in a number of them it is explosive; extreme social tension is typical of all regions and not just Russia; Russia, like other republics, is unable to break away from the dictatorship of the center, which is making one mistake after another. Attempts on the part of the republics to live differently are frustrated by the center, right down to the point of application of armed force.

But that is not all there is to it; it is also a matter of the aesthetic, moral, and work behavior of the aforementioned RSFSR deputies. They acted not only as people's deputies but also as officials, and four of them as members of the Presidium of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, thus misleading the broad public about the Presidium's position. Their statement as officials and members of the Presidium was not considered by the RSFSR Supreme Soviet or its chambers or Presidium.

Taking advantage of their official position, they organized a broadcast of the political statement on television and radio without the approval of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet or its Presidium. This act got the country worked up and aggravated the political situation even more.

We members of the Presidium who are leaders of commissions of the chambers and committees of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet condemn the confrontational activity of the aforementioned group of deputies and the political structures behind them which are deliberately directed toward splitting and blocking the work of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet and increasing social tension and confrontation in the society.

[Signed] Members of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium R. Khasbulatov, S. Shakhray, M. Zakharov, V. Yugin, F. Polenov, S. Krasavchenko, V. Lukin, A. Rutskoy, S. Kovalev, A. Zakopyrin, and V. Polosin.

Deputies Campaigning For, Against Referendum

LD0703174491 Moscow TASS in English 1701 GMT 7 Mar 91

[By TASS correspondent Lev Aksyonev]

[Text] Moscow March 7 TASS—Ninety eight thousand two hundred and forty seven commissions employing 961,000 people have been formed in the Russian Federation, the largest Union republic, for holding the nationwide and republican referendums. Their organisation is supposed to cost 113 million roubles.

During the republican referendum, which will be held simultaneously with the nationwide referendum, people will express their attitude to the idea of creating the post of president of the Russian Federation.

Vasiliy Kazakov, head of the central commission of the Russian Federation for organising the two referendums, denounced in a TASS interview the attempts to block any of them. He said that several Soviet and Russian legislators were touring the country and campaigning for or against one of the two referendums, depending on their political inclinations.

Oblast's Rejection of Referendum 'Illegal'

91UN0981A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian No 9, Mar 91 p 8

[Readers' letter and response by S. Shakhray, chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Legislation]

[Text] At its regular session on 22 February of this year the Smolensk Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies adopted a decision not to conduct an all-Russian referendum on the territory of the oblast. Is this legal?

[Signed] A group of readers.

The main argument in the decision of the oblast soviet was the accusation of **incorrect form** (my emphasis—S.Sh.) of the formulation of the issue brought up for nationwide voting. I recall this wording: "Do you support the introduction of the post of RSFSR president elected by a nationwide vote." It is suggested that in principle RSFSR citizens determine whether a Russian president is necessary or not and also whether to support the procedure for his election by the people themselves. Who the president will be and what authority he will have—these again will be decided by the citizens themselves in the elections.

Something else seems incorrect in this situation: The ignorance of the RSFSR Constitution or the deliberate deception of the deputies and residents of Smolensk Oblast by the oblast party and soviet leaders.

After the introduction of changes to the RSFSR Constitution the Supreme Soviet does not have the right to schedule a referendum by itself, by its own decision. It can schedule a referendum at the demand of one million citizens or one-third of the RSFSR deputies (that is, no less than 355 deputies who are backed by more than 34 million voters). In this case the wording of the questions is determined by the initiators of the referendum themselves. Under these conditions the Supreme Soviet set the date of voting for 17 March (which saved millions of rubles by combining it with the Union one) and determined measures for supporting the referendum.

Now a couple of words about the legality of the decision of the oblast soviet. The law is the law. If some group or even a state organ does not like it, they must use legal methods to express their disagreement. And the oblast soviet has such measures—the right to legislative initiative, that is, the right to propose their own draft law, the right to demand the convening of an extraordinary session or congress, and so forth. The oblast soviet does not have the right not to obey the law, and certainly not to register its unwillingness to obey the law. Its decision is not simply illegal, it is unconstitutional because it deprives some of the citizens of the RSFSR of their constitutional right to participate in the administration of their republic through direct expression of their will and violates the procedure established by the RSFSR Constitution for calling for a referendum.

What measures could be taken against the anticonstitutional decision of the oblast soviet?

First. The RSFSR procurator general, on the basis of Article 176 of the RSFSR Constitution, must protest an illegal decision of the oblast soviet of people's deputies.

Second. The RSFSR Supreme Soviet has the right to override a decision of the oblast soviet that contradicts the Constitution and laws of the RSFSR or, guided by its constitutional duty to provide for the observance of constitutional rights, freedoms, and duties of citizens, it can schedule new elections to the local soviet which, through its decisions, is encroaching on the aforementioned rights (Article 109 of the RSFSR Constitution).

Finally, in those regions where the kray or oblast soviets have made a decision about a direct Russian referendum, the arrangement of the voting can be entrusted to the rayon and city soviets. I assume that common sense and respect for the law will win out and all citizens will be able to participate freely in both the Russian and Union referendums.

Russian Supreme Soviet To Redraft Income Bill

LD0603121891 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1100 GMT 6 Mar 91

[Text] The Russian Supreme Soviet has resolved to instruct the Commission of the Soviet of the Republic for Social Policy jointly with the commissions and committees of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet and Council of Ministers and with the participation of the trade unions to redraft the RSFSR bill on indexation of monetary incomes of the population—taking into account the changes in prices of consumer goods and services—and table it for examination by the RSFSR Supreme Soviet in March of this year.

Silayev on Ankara Talks, Cooperation Deals

PM0703111791 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 2 Mar 91 Second Edition p 5

[Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Council of Ministers Information Department report: "Direct Links"]

[Text] The three-day visit to Turkey by I.S. Silayev, chairman of the Russian Soviet Federated Sovialist Republic [RSFSR], has ended. The Russian Federation is continuing to expand economic cooperation on the basis of direct business links, including links with a number of foreign countries. The Russian Federation Government's official talks in Ankara ended with the signing of qualitatively new documents, I.S. Silayev, chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers, stressed.

In particular, an agreement between the two republics' governments on trade and economic cooperation envisages not only the establishment of joint ventures and the construction of projects on the territory of the RSFSR and Turkey but also the streamlining of trade and economic links. To that end it is planned to accelerate the exchange of information and expand contacts between business people and participation in international exhibitions, fairs, and other events connected with international commercial collaboration. A Russo-Turkish business council to be set up in the very near future is also intended to contribute to closer cooperation.

Continuing the course toward the rebirth of the Russian countryside and the development of the republic's agro-industrial complex, the RSFSR Government delegation signed a protocol with the Turkish side on cooperation in the sphere of land reform and rural development. As a result, there are for instance plans to promote in 1991, with the participation of Turkish firms and organizations, an increase in the number of peasant family farms on Russian territory. In the same period it is planned to devise and agree other economic and scientific-technical cooperation programs.

"Following the meetings with Turkish President T. Ozal, Prime Minister Y. Akbulut, other officials, and representatives of business circles, visits to industrial enterprises, and the signing of the documents on the results of the talks, it appears that the scale and potential of our cooperation are going to increase in the future," Silayev noted on his return home.

The Turkish prime minister accepted an invitation from the Russian Federation Council of Ministers chairman to visit the RSFSR.

Supreme Soviet Resolution on Ruble-Sale Cited

PM0703113791 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 6 Mar 91 First Edition p 1

[Unattributed report: "Billion Dollar Echo in the Russian House—Discussion in the RSFSR Supreme Soviet"]

[Text] The question of the unprecedented deal between the Chelyabinsk branch of the "Ekho" eco-industrial firm, the "Revival of the Ural Countryside" association, and the South African firm "Dove Trading International" to sell 140 billion rubles for 7.756 billion dollars has been under discussion at closed and public sittings of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet. Even those able merely to observe the discussion's progress on the television screen got a pretty good idea of its acuteness and varying intensity. No doubt they lost count of the draft resolutions submitted. But this is not surprising as the problem concerned is of the utmost relevance and complexity and the opinions expressed were extremely varied. And not until last Friday did the Russian parliament manage to finally adopt a much-discussed version of the resolution. We hereby draw our readers' attention to a summary of that resolution.

Having listened to information from the RSFSR Supreme Soviet commission on the deputies' investigation of the circumstances surrounding the deal between the firm "Dove Trading International" and the "Revival of the Ural Countryside" association, the RSFSR

Supreme Soviet Session noted that the RSFSR Government had signed a number of documents pertaining to major deals for purchasing foodstuffs and goods with rubles and subsequently reinvesting them in the RSFSR economy, without establishing the proper economic bases or juridical protection and without doing an audit check on the foreign and Soviet partners. Such actions did not help to strengthen the Russian parliament's international authority, nor did they safeguard the RSFSR's economic interests to the necessary degree.

The information from the RSFSR Supreme Soviet commission on the deputies' investigation into the contract between the firm "Dove Trading International" and the "Revival of the Ural Countryside" association was taken into consideration.

Comrade G.I. Filshin was released from his duties as deputy chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers for displaying incompetence and exceeding his powers in becoming party to a contract between partners of dubious repute—the firm "Dove Trading International" and the "Revival of the Ural Countryside" association—and also for insincerity and for misleading the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Deputies' commission investigating the matter.

It was proposed that the RSFSR Council of Minister's 11 January 1991 letter, which was signed by G.I. Filshin, deputy chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers, and sent to K. Gibbins, president of the firm "Dove Trading International," offering assistance and support in fulfilling the contract between the aforementioned firm and the "Revival of the Ural Countryside" association, be declared null and void by the RSFSR Council of Ministers, along with other documents which may harm the RSFSR economy.

The RSFSR Central Bank (G.G. Matyukhin) must take the necessary measures to liquidate the obligations undertaken by the Moscow Interregional Commercial Bank (chairman of the board A.N. Shalashov) vis-a-vis the South African firm "Dove Trading International" and check the legality other commitments by this bank.

Due note was taken of the fact that the RSFSR Council of Ministers has moved RSFSR Deputy Minister for Trade V.A. Kozlov away from foreign economic activity and issued a warning to RSFSR Minister for Trade A.F. Khlystov for their unprofessional attitude toward selecting a foreign trading partner, and the tardy and imprecise manner in which they informed the RSFSR Council of Ministers Presidium on the nature, scale, and terms of the proposed contracts to purchase foodstuffs and consumer goods abroad.

Comrade V.N. Yaroshenko, RSFSR minister for foreign economic relations, deserves to be dismissed from his position as minister for inadequately protecting RSFSR foreign economic interests, which was reflected in lack of proper control over the realization of foreign economic activity by the RSFSR Ministry of Trade, and other RSFSR ministries, departments, concerns, unions, associations, organizations, and institutions, especially when preparing and fulfilling major foreign economic contracts. However, given his brief period of work, V.N. Yaroshenko was given a warning that his performance had been below standard.

It was brought to the attention of I.S. Silayev, chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers, that the RSFSR Ministry of Justice (Minister Comrade N.V. Fedorov), RSFSR Ministry of Finance (Minister Comrade I.N. Lazaryev), RSFSR Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations (Minister Comrade V.N. Yaroshenko), and the RSFSR Foreign Ministry (Minister Comrade A.V. Kozyrev) did not draw the necessary conclusion from the records of the talks about deliveries of consumer goods to the RSFSR by the foreign firm and the subsequent reinvestment of the rubles received by the foreign firms in sectors of the republic national economy, and thus had failed to defend the RSFSR's economic and political interests.

It was proposed that by 20 March 1991 the RSFSR Council of Ministers should:

—elaborate and approve the basic provisions of a procedure for the conclusion of agreements and contracts between RSFSR ministries, departments, and organizations and foreign firms;

—inform the chambers' standing commissions and the RSFSR Supreme Soviet of all government-level contracts and agreements as well as those being concluded by Russian ministries, departments, and organizations with foreign partners.

The RSFSR Supreme Soviet Commission for Deputies' Ethics was tasked with examining the the conduct and activities of RSFSR People's Deputy V.I. Ikonnikov.

The RSFSR Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations in conjunction with the RSFSR Supreme Soviet International Affairs and Foreign Economic Relations Committee must accelerate the drafting of legislative acts to regulate foreign economic activity and the elaboration of recommendations for controlling activity in the sphere of international economic links.

The session decided to pass materials from the RSFSR Supreme Soviet commission on the deputies' investigation into the circumstances surrounding the deal between the firm "Dove Trading International" and the "Revival of the Ural Countryside" association to the USSR Prosecutor's Office to be added to the criminal file.

The RSFSR Supreme Soviet considers it necessary to draw up legal norms to coordinate the activities of Russian and Union organs in the sphere of the foreign economic activity and to ensure that they defend jointly the foundations of RSFSR and USSR economic security.

As we can see, the RSFSR Supreme Soviet has defined a wide range of measures whose implementation will help

to normalize foreign economic activity and prevent adventurist deals. And so that the reader can getter a fuller picture of what is at stake, page three of today's edition of the paper contains the materials from the deputies' commission which served as a basis for the discussion and the resolution adopted by the session.

Ministry Rejects Silayev Remarks on Imports

PM0703121391 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 28 Feb 91 First Edition p 6

[Report by unidentified correspondent on Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations commentary: "Laying the Blame at Someone Else's Door...; Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations Commentary on Multibillion-Ruble Deals"]

[Text] The SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA Editorial Office has received numerous requests to explain some extracts—published in the press—from I.S. Silayev's speech to a session of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet on 22 February, mainly concerning food imports and his connection with the well-known 140-billion ruble [R] deal. I.V. Mordvinov, head of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations Press and Information Service, imparted the following to our correspondent:

Attempting to justify the government's involvement in dubious deals concerning the so-called "speculative" sale of R140 billion and R300 billion in return for freely convertible currency when addressing deputies at the RSFSR Supreme Soviet session in question, Russian Council of Ministers Chairman I.S. Silayev essentially placed the responsibility for this "at someone else's door," as they say, claiming that the USSR Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations had in fact pushed him and his comrades in the government to take this step by cutting purchases of grain, other foodstuffs, and also a valuable feed product—coarse soybean meal.

Essentially, this statement is nothing other than an attempt to distract the Supreme Soviet and public opinion from the real motives behind these two actions on the part of the Russian Council of Ministers in the foreign economic sphere.

I.S. Silayev is well aware that the USSR Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations is, to a certain extent, being forced to buy imported grain to augment state resources in 1991, as, despite the record harvest, a number of republics have failed to fulfill their obligations with regard to selling grain to the state. Russian economic units are among those which have failed to fulfill their obligations to supply grain to the state. There is a shortfall of 13 million tonnes. That is almost 28 percent of Russia's commitment and 43 percent of what the country now has to buy and import. Consequently, responsibility for the loss of livestock and poultry talked about by I.S. Silayev rests primarily with the republic's Council of Ministers.

Because of a shortage of funds, buying imported grain is a real problem this year. So far, however, we have found the money to buy some 15 million tonnes of grain, more than 8.5 million tonnes of which must be imported in the first quarter. It is planned to allocate almost 4 million tonnes of this (or 47 percent of the total) to Russia. Moreover, on the initiative of the All-Union Foreign Economic Association "Eksportkhleb," the USSR Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations has bought 3.5 million tonnes of grain from Canada on Canadian credit underwritten by the RSFSR Government. This purchase, mentioned by I.S. Silayev, has absolutely nothing to do with the R140-billion or R300-billion deals.

In accordance with instructions from Union bodies, associations belonging to the USSR Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations have concluded contracts for 1.075 million tonnes of groats, which are due to be delivered in the first quarter; this is more than one-third of the total amount supplied in the whole of 1990. The Union Government has designated almost 60 percent of this amount for Russia. More than 500,000 tonnes of the amount purchased will be sent to the Soviet Union before 1 March.

In accordance with their set targets, organizations under the USSR Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and its foreign economic associations are continuing to buy foodstuffs.

The following have been purchased so far: 78 percent of the annual imported sugar requirement (mainly supplied by Cuba); 628,000 tonnes of meat and meat products; 355,000 tonnes of animal oil; 39,000 tonnes of dried milk; and so forth.

These are the facts. In our view, there is nothing in the center's attitude that could have encouraged members of the Russian Government to attract hard currency in such a dubious manner.

These actions are based on a concept of foreign economic activity which is supported by the "500 Days" Program and, according to the republic's foreign economic leader, "has been approved by the Russian leadership." This concept names real estate as "a commodity that has been accumulating for 70 years." "It is not a traditional commodity, but it is expensive wherever you are in the world. We have a lot of this commodity in our country. On the basis of the value of land and unfinished industrial construction, it is worth something in the region of R600-800 billion. We need foreign assistance.... Foreign countries can contribute to the process of privatization." The above is the ideological premise for the deals we mentioned. It is a pity that their "authors" on the Soviet side—including those very recently involved in the infamous ANT cooperative affair—"forgot" that in the end they would be forcing us all to pay for their adventures with this "nontraditional but expensive commodity."

In the opinion of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations leadership, a strict procedure should be

established in the future in every republic and throughout the state as a whole, whereby the sale of real estate to foreign partners can only take place after careful study of the advisability and effectiveness of each specific transaction. There must definitely be a body of competent state experts to protect national property and all levels of authority—from local soviets to the Union parliament—against every eventuality and unauthorized actions taken under the guise of privatization or commercial initiative.

Communists Urge Protection of Lenin Museum

LD0603114891 Moscow TASS in English 1100 GMT 6 Mar 91

[Text] Moscow March 6 TASS—The plenary meeting of the Moscow City Communist Party Committee and the Control Commission of the city party organisation has denounced Moscow City Council's decision to transfer part of premises of the central Lenin museum to the USSR Union of Leaseholders and Entrepreneurs.

Moscow Communists believe that the decision by the Moscow executive committee is directly connected with "new" political parties.

They aim to discredit the historic road passed by the Soviet people, distort and falsify Vladimir Lenin's scientific heritage and the essence of the Soviet Communist Party's policy, reads a resolution by the plenary meeting.

The meeting demanded that chairman of the Union of Leaseholders and Entrepreneurs communist Pavel Bunich and chairman of the Moscow Executive Council Communist Yuriy Luzhkov return to the museum the premises legally belonging to it.

The plenary meeting appealed to the Soviet president, asking him to protect the premises of the central Lenin museum and find money to reconstruct it.

The SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA newspaper today carries the text of the resolution.

Leningrad Soviet Seeks Control of Television

PM0703110091 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 5 Mar 91 Second Edition p 6

[Correspondent N. Volynskiy report: "Fists Raised Against Glasnost"]

[Text] A stormy week has ended in the Mariinskiy Palace, where the Leningrad City Soviet session was meeting for the sixth time. An upsurge in the "democrats'" activeness set in when the discussion of the future of Leningrad Television began.

The deputies had long entertained the notion of taking control of Leningrad Television and removing it from the center's jurisdiction. The Leningrad City Soviet Glasnost Commission set about the task, and a document was drawn up, under which the Leningrad Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting becomes into the Leningrad television and radio broadcasting company.

In vain the Leningrad Television leaders and TV journalists appealed to the deputies' reason and sought to demonstrate the absurdity of this approach, and indeed its technical infeasibility. For instance, who will finance Leningrad Television, how will property disputes be resolved? There is a gaping hole in the city budget, and the Russian Council of Ministers does not even have the money for basic compensation for price increases. A. Sobchak, chairman of Leningrad City Soviet, also came out sharply against the expropriation.

Nothing was any use. Not only that, the deputies decided to set up a kind of television "oversight council." What for? It is basically a question of creating a new form of censorship, which, judging by the "democrats'" cast of mind, is likely to be even tougher and more implacable than in the recent past. Leningrad City Soviet adopted the decision all but automatically (one wonders, how many buttons did the deputies press at once?). This act by Leningrad City Soviet infuriated the Leningrad Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting collective. The committee's collegium delivered a sharp protest, stating that "in the heat of their polemical arrogance the deputies openly broke the law, both Union and Russian."

The journalists' anxiety is not for nothing. The love our "democrats" have for truth and freedom of information is demonstrated, for instance, by the outrageous scene in the Mariinskiy Palace on the session's last day. Aleksandr Nevzorov turned up unexpectedly to film. The "democrats" mobbed their enemy, insulted him, snatched the microphone from his hands. You should have seen their terrible faces, distorted by hatred... It looked as if the champions of freedom would start a fight, if Nevzorov's restraint had cracked. It did not happen. But who can guarantee that the methods of physical violence will not become the "democrats'" main technique in their holy war for "freedom" of the press—as they understand freedom?

Criticizes Media Censorship

LD0703215491 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 2040 GMT 7 Mar 91

[From the "Television News Service" program]

[Text] The permanent commission of the Leningrad City Soviet on glasnost and the media has criticized the leadership of the Leningrad Television and Radio Committee for restoring political censorship on Leningrad television and radio. The members of the commission think that such actions by the leaders of the Leningrad Television and Radio Committee contradict many of the articles of the USSR law on the press. This information comes from the INTERFAX agency.

Broadcast Media Decision Assailed

LD0703193591 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1730 GMT 7 Mar 91

[Declaration of the All-Union State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company]

[Text] On 1 March the Leningrad City Soviet of People's Deputies adopted a decision on the transformation of the Leningrad Committee on Television and Radio Broadcasting into an independent company and on the coverage of the activity of this soviet by Leningrad television and radio. In connection with this, the All-Union State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company considers it necessary to declare the following:

In accordance with Article 2 of the USSR president's decree of 14 July 1990, on the democratization and development of television and radio broadcasting in the USSR, the Leningrad Soviet has a right to information provision by the media of television and radio. However, the decision adopted on 1 March 1991 manifestly goes beyond the framework of the Leningrad Soviet's powers. The unilateral adoption by the Leningrad City Soviet of a decision on reorganizing the Leningrad Committee on Television and Radio Broadcasting, without the equal participation in this procedure of the oblast soviet and the State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting, is unauthorized.

Leningrad television and radio broadcasting, in accordance with decisions taken earlier by the USSR Government, has been created and developed within the system of the USSR State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting to deal with the following main tasks: information provision for the city and oblast and the appropriate local bodies, and the creation of programs for central television and radio broadcasting. For this purpose a material and technical basis for television and radio broadcasting has been set up in Leningrad, as well as a distribution network for a large portion of the country containing a population of 70 million, the like of which is not possessed by any other oblast center or city of republican subordination.

The text of the given decision of the Leningrad Soviet clearly implies a claim to property which constitutes unionwide state property. The All-Union State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company, invested with appropriate powers by the decree of the USSR president of 8 February 1991, will defend these property interests within the framework of the legislation provided by the USSR and the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic. And finally, in accordance with the USSR law on the press and other mass media, Leningrad television and radio journalists enjoy the right to creative and professional independence and may be the founders of media bodies. The acts of the Leningrad Soviet refer to the decision of the conference of representatives of the Leningrad television and radio committee. However, the All-Union State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company possesses documents bearing witness to the fact of the non-acceptance by the collectives of this committee and the Leningrad television center of the decision of the Leningrad Soviet, which was adopted without their agreement.

While respecting the rights of the Leningrad Soviet to the coverage of its activity by television and radio, the All-Union State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company is forced to express its categorical disagreement with its decision, which neglects the interests of the state and public at large.

Western Republics

Moldova Calls for Boycott of Union Referendum

LD0703174191 Moscow TASS in English 1729 GMT 7 Mar 91

[By MOLDOVA-PRES correspondents Oazu Nantoi and Aleksandr Tanas]

[Text] Kishinev March 7 TASS—The Moldovan president's consultative council held its first meeting today.

The meeting was attended by over 30 representatives of Moldovan social, political and cultural organisations, including the Popular Front, the Communist Party, the Social Democratic Party, the Democratic Christian Women's League and the Green Party.

Participants adopted a declaration calling for a boycott on all-Union referendum, scheduled for March 17.

Moldovan Communist Party Central Committee Secretary Yevgeniy Sobor told the meeting that the plenary meeting of the republican Communist Party Central Committee on Wednesday had decided that "the Communist Party does not bind itself to organise a referendum on Moldovan territory".

He said communists from the Dniester left bank area voted against the decision.

Moldova Adopts Law Expanding Presidential Power

LD0703214491

[Editorial Report] Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 1600 GMT on 7 March broadcasts a 2.5-minute report by correspondent Mikhay Sakirka on the current session of the Moldovan Supreme Soviet. Sakirka notes that a law reforming executive power was adopted at the session, which is not going very smoothly. Mircha Snegur, Moldovan president and chairman of the Moldovan Supreme Soviet Presidium, offered to resign, but his resignation was not accepted. Approximately 180 deputies boycotted the Moldovan Supreme Soviet session on 28 February, the correspondent notes, adding that this was linked to a demand for the resignation of Prime Minister Mircha Druk. A law on changes and additions to Moldova's constitution concerning executive power was adopted at the last plenary sitting of this session, Sakirka reports.

The new law envisages that the Moldovan president and prime minister work on a parallel basis, with the president submitting the prime minister's candidature and the composition of the government to the legislature to confirm it. The president has the right to set up and disband ministries and departments subordinated to the republic. The president carries out executive and legislative powers, chairs government meetings, and signs normative documents. He can cancel various documents issued by government structures if they contradict the Constitution of the Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic or presidential decrees.

For its part, the government is obliged to submit reports to the president and the Supreme Soviet every now and then. Moldova has become the first republic in the USSR where governmental activities are subordinated to the republican president, Sakirka points out. This law came into force as of 5 March 1991, the correspondent notes.

Law Seen as 'Compromise'

PM0803101991 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 7 Mar 91 Union Edition p 2q

["Direct Line" report by Eduard Kondratov: "Legislative Crisis Over"]

[Text] Kishinev—So the legislative crisis in Moldova has been resolved by the adoption of a law on the reform of executive power.

It had appeared that there was no way out. Prime Minister M. Druk refused point-blank to resign. The four legislative clubs' deputies who were trying to overthrow him refused point-blank to enter the chamber. Declarations were drawn up, they proposed that the session be adjourned, and they even talked of relinquishing their powers as deputies.

But a compromise was found. It was Tuesday afternoon before the session started work. The law on amendments to the republic's Constitution, which signified the transfer of supreme executive and administrative power from the prime minister to the president, was adopted with surprising ease. It was agreed that the president would now form the government, establish and abolish ministries and state committees, appoint and dismiss ministers. Although, on condition that the Supreme Soviet agreed to ratify the decision.

So, the government of Mircha Druk is now directly accountable to Mircha Snegur. But in all likelihood they will not work in tandem for long.

Ukraine's Kravchuk Interviewed on Union Treaty

PM0803105191 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 7 Mar 91 First Edition p 2

[Interview with L. Kravchuk, chairman of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet, by correspondent Colonel A. Polyakov under "Union Treaty: A View From the Republics" rubric; place, date not given: "'If Anyone Has Wasted Time, It Is the Center...'"]

[Text] [Polyakov] Leonid Makarovich, now the question of questions—is the USSR to be or not to be? There are forces in the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet which totally reject the very idea of the Ukraine's joining the new Union. What is your viewpoint?

[Kravchuk] I am unconditionally in favor of the republic's remaining in the renewed Union, in favor of the Union treaty being signed, and as quickly as possible. But I would like to elaborate on my position. I favor a new Union in which the republics will get real, not imaginary sovereignty.

A lot is now being said about the laws war. But, believe me, it is not only the republics that are to blame for this. The center is inexcusably dragging its feet and wasting time, while we must produce output, arrange ties, and ensure a normal life for people. We adopt decisions, but a week later, let us assume, a USSR presidential decree appears which does not "tally" with our resolutions. I agree with President N. Nazarbayev of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic: The Union treaty must be concluded as quickly as possible. It is necessary just to "show" people what kind of a treaty it is. Maybe the tension of confrontation will drop at once.

[Polyakov] You frequently emphasize that you advocate a Union of sovereign states. Does this not mean that the Ukraine will at once create its own armed forces, mark borders together with the customs service, and introduce its own monetary unit?

[Kravchuk] On no account. I will cite you the following example. France is called the French Republic. But we know that it is a strong independent state. The Ukraine is also called a republic. But how does it differ, for example, from neighboring Bryansk Oblast or another oblast?

I know from experience of working on the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee that our Central Committee enjoyed the same rights as Bryansk Oblast CPSU Committee. Yes, we have our own emblem and anthem and even a representative at the United Nations. But our economy was 95-percent seized by central ministries. We were suppliants to them. We must now clearly stipulate in the treaty what is ours and what is the Union's. Talk of leaving the Union is politically and economically naive. We import approximately 20 percent of various products, raw materials, and semimanufactures from other republics. If we break off ties, our own people will also "break off" ties with us.

Some people advise: Let us detach ourselves, compose ourselves, and then join. We will not undertake such an adventure. We have already broken all economic ties to such an extent that people in Switzerland, from where I recently returned, are amazed: A mighty country—and it is on its knees, with outstretched hand...

[Polyakov] What, then, is the political and socioeconomic situation in the Ukraine?

[Kravchuk] The situation is not simple. An opposition exists officially in the Supreme Soviet. But I would say that we have managed to avoid "leaps" and sharp turns in policy. It seems to me that the deputies here have nonetheless realized that they have millions of people behind them and they cannot permit what happened, for example, in Moldova and the Transcaucasus. The population in the Ukraine includes 18 million people who speak other languages, of whom 11.5 million are Russian-speakers. A great deal has to be done to prevent any distortions in the nationalities policy. You know, I am helped in this by experience of ideological work on the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee. Whatever the CPSU's opponents might shout now, the Communist Party has constantly kept the nationalities question in its field of vision. So the political situation is perfectly manageable. Things are more complex with the economy.

[Polyakov] You unconditionally supported the Crimea's autonomy within the Ukraine. Will it not happen that centrifugal forces will strengthen in the republic, and a republic of Galicia will soon appear, let us assume, in western regions?

[Kravchuk] No, I do not believe so. As for the Crimea, an autonomous entity has not been created there, but that which existed between 1922 and 1945 has been restored. The results of the plebiscite held in the Crimea were approved by our Supreme Soviet.

[Polyakov] So, a plebiscite was held in the Crimea, and the all-Union referendum is due 17 March...

[Kravchuk] I would think that it ought to be held separately in the republics by decision of our legislative organs. Its timing—after the proposed price hike—is also of concern to me. Yes, I am for the Union. But if people, displeased with the price hike, vote against the Union, then this means the country's total disintegration, with unpredictable consequences...

[Polyakov] Much criticism is now being leveled at USSR President M. Gorbachev. But it is easy to criticize. What would you, for example, do in his place?

[Kravchuk] I would like to formulate your question somehow a little more correctly. What, let us say, is my view of the actions which M. Gorbachev passed through me myself?

[Polyakov] Well, you yourself have helped me...

[Kravchuk] First, of course I do not aspire to Mikhail Sergeyevich's place. Second, I would like to be sure that he will not go back on his statements. "Union of sovereign states"—this is his formula. After that "came" the declarations of sovereignty. And suddenly—stop...

You get the feeling that Mikhail Sergeyevich is taking back his words and amending his intentions. His tardiness over granting powers to the republics is incomprehensible. I realize this is a delicate matter. But it has to be said: If you want the republics to answer for themselves—take on responsibility and answer. But he appears to be having doubts once again...

[Polyakov] Yet he, too, is human and finds it hard...

[Kravchuk] That is no argument. A statesman promoted by force of history to the crest of events in a great country at such a crucial time must answer for himself and for the country.

But sometimes we in the republics simply lose ourselves in conjecture. How are we to work? The draft Union Treaty is now being discussed in Moscow, and suddenly Prime Minister V. Pavlov proposes a draft law on the Cabinet of Ministers, in which one of the points states that all cabinet orders are binding throughout the territory of the Union. What sovereignty are we left with?

[Polyakov] This really is a crucial time for us. Things are difficult "down below," and not easy "up above." You too, Leonid Makarovich, leveled critical remarks at B. Yeltsin after his appearance on television. Will this not have some effect on the fulfillment of the mutual pledges of Russia and the Ukraine and on your personal relationship?

[Kravchuk] It is not for politicians to bear a grudge against each other. If Yeltsin transfers his grudge against me to the Ukrainians, and Kravchuk transfers his against Yeltsin to the Russians, then we are not statesmen but simply ordinary people. I do not believe in this. I reckon that some of Boris Nikolayevich's premises were false—I said so bluntly and honestly. He will tell me that I am mistaken. But we must never take offense, for we are not given that right. There are tens of millions of people behind us.

Now, regarding our cooperation plans. I recently returned from Alma-Ata. Everything I outlined with N. Nazarbayev is at once being implemented. With Russia, alas, everything is the other way around. Only, of course, it is not my criticism of Boris Nikolayevich that is to blame here. Our comrades arrive in an autonomous republic to obtain timber and are told: Give us meat and milk. Wait, our people reply, we have concluded a treaty with Russia and supplied everything. You supplied it to Russia, so get the timber from there too.

You would not believe it, but we have to negotiate separately with almost every oblast of Russia. The top representatives of our main administration for material and technical supply are now "dashing" about in all regions of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic. I hope people will understand that I am not interfering in Russia's internal affairs and am not opposed to the sovereignty of autonomous oblasts, but central power does not make itself felt in the provinces. How are we to work?

[Polyakov] Personal contacts among the republics' leaders will probably assume greater significance each day. Against this background, all kinds of rumors and fabrications cannot be ruled out. It became known quite recently that, after his stay in the Baltic region, B. Yeltsin wanted to come to the Ukraine, but you opposed this.

[Kravchuk] That really is a rumor. I, too, was informed unofficially that Boris Nikolayevich, after his well-known appeal to the United Nations, wanted to come to Kiev. I replied that, to that end, he must communicate with me and report the aims of his visit—and we would give him a cordial welcome. But there was neither a telephone call nor an agreement. I asked Boris Nikolayevich about that in Moscow. I had no such intention, he replied.

I think that someone is afraid that we will create a "parallel" center. But I have told our president: Mikhail Sergeyevich, if I am opposed to something, I will come and tell you to your face, but I will not allow any deals behind your back. The Ukraine is behind me, and I remember this.

[Polyakov] We have already said that the republic retains the right to have its own armed forces. At what stage could this thesis be realized?

[Kravchuk] Perhaps at no stage. Yes, we have retained such a right. Imagine: A neighboring republic or sovereign state creates its own borders, its own army, its own currency. What are we to do? Also ensure the preservation of statehood...

[Polyakov] Leonid Makarovich, it is no secret that certain Ukrainian Supreme Soviet decisions on service by Ukrainian citizens were adopted under pressure from the students' hunger strike and those who were directing and backing them. Do you not think that the republic's legislature might return to a discussion of these problems?

[Kravchuk] I do not think so. In terms of organizing the draft for service in the Soviet Army, the Ukraine gave a good showing in the Federation Council. Life itself will make the necessary corrections. Incidentally, I personally inquired how the draft was going. When it became apparent that it was lagging behind in certain regions, I demanded that the local authorities observe and fulfill constitutional requirements. At first things even reached the point where they did not even want to send men to Sevastopol to serve. But should they not defend the motherland in their own back garden? Or, maybe, sleep not in barracks but at home? In short, we have found a common language with the military. How could it be otherwise!

Combined units are now being withdrawn from the groups of forces. There are three military districts on Ukrainian territory. Tens of thousands of servicemen will "settle" here. A mass of problems is arising, but I telephone the oblasts and forewarn them to give the military constant attention. True, here, too, the center wanted to twist us round its finger. Almost one-third of the troops being withdrawn are remaining in the Ukraine. But, of the four house building combines which they intend to construct in the Union with FRG money, they do not want to site a single one here. I have already sent the prime minister a letter. We will not allow the Army to lose its trust in the republic's leadership.

[Polyakov] Leonid Makarovich, there is now a lot of politicized talk and rumors about joint patrolling. What would you say about this?

[Kravchuk] Of course, people are not afraid of patrols. Someone is simply speculating over the center's decision. But once again the center was late. First the order, then the decree. It should have been the other way around. But order is important to us, and we will maintain it for the time being in precisely this way. We will strengthen the militia, and then it will not need assistance.

But I would like to speak about something more important. Recently the Army has frequently not been used for its proper purpose. Look what they do then. In Tbilisi they brought the military in, and then brushed all aside, and the generals remained guilty. In the Baltic region already only the colonels are guilty.

If order is still left anywhere, it is in the military. I will not believe that they themselves burn with a desire to drive tanks through the cities' streets. It is unscrupulous to leave the military one on one with politicized ordinary people. I am against making the Army a "scapegoat," pardon me. The policy of those who would like to make the Army quarrel with the people is very shortsighted and self-seeking.

[Polyakov] The press and the people of the Ukraine now regard you increasingly strongly as a politician who thinks in a sober and considered manner and who knows how to make compromises and defend a correct position. How is such experience acquired?

[Kravchuk] It is hardly possible to speak of me as an accomplished politician or state leader. I was elected chairman of the Supreme Soviet 22 July 1990, and a week later the legislative "vacation" began. Then, with the start of the session's work on 1 October, demonstrations, the students' hunger strike, and endless rallies began. I might have lost my head. There was also the eight hours a day before the television camera. I could not watch television at home. At first I wanted to try to secure decisions through strong-arm pressure. But then I realized that, if people are arguing in the legislature, they are shouting in the street; if they are shouting in the sessions hall, outside its walls they are fighting...

We all need great patience. Real democracy is when the majority is restricted in its actions, while the minority is protected. The majority must not "pressurize" only through voting, for arguments are also needed. The minority must not abuse the excitement of the majority.

not "wind" it up. May we not at once mount a unified platform, but ways must be sought to bring us closer.

Kravchuk 'Prereferendum Tour' of Lvov Oblast

PM0803110591 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 7 Mar 91 Union Edition p 2

["Direct Line" report by Stepan Troyan: "Prereferendum Tour"]

[Text] Lvov—L. Kravchuk, chairman of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet, has made an official tour of Lvov Oblast.

He met with oblast, city, and rayon leaders in Lvov Oblast, visited the "Elektron" concern and a polytechnical institute, and made a live appearance on local television. I venture to suggest that Kravchuk's tour contributed to the consolidation of all forces on the eve of the all-Union referendum.

"One must learn," he said, "to correctly assess the actual situation and see the disposition of political structures and parties in order to be able to prevent confrontation in all circumstances. Real independence can be achieved far sooner in a state where peace and order reign than in a state that is torn asunder. I have been to various oblasts in the republic recently and I have not met a single person who does not want to see it a free republic. But the people want not just sovereignty but a union in which the Ukraine would be a state, with its corresponding rights and duties. Unity is the only true path to independence, although the road to it is complex and dramatic."

Ukraine Introduces Differentiated Retail Prices

PM0703152591 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 2 Mar 91 Union Edition p 3

[Report by correspondent Sergey Tsikora: "There Are Goods, but at Warehouses"]

[Text] Late news from correspondent Sergey Tsikora, reporting from Kiev:

The Ukrainian Supreme Soviet Presidium has allowed the republic government to start selling goods, the rise in prices of which the population will not receive compensation.

Four categories of prices are being introduced into trading. These are goods, primarily foodstuffs, whose price rises will be compensated by the government. The second group will consist of goods in whose trade nothing will change. The third group will encompass goods whose prices will "come down" from the top and be regulated by legislative means. The fourth "basket" will contain goods whose prices will be dictated by demand. This is the so-called group of goods with free contract prices.

Belorussia Adopts Land Reform Legislation

PM0803090791 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 7 Mar 91 Union Edition p 2

[Mikhail Shimanskiy report: "Last Days for Loss-Making Kolkhozes"]

[Text] Minsk—The Belorussian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] has adopted a resolution on the implementation of land reform in the republic.

During the implementation of this reform all questions of the regulation of land relations will be passed on to the soviets in accordance with their powers. This year an inventory is to be made of land belonging to kolkhozes, sovkhozes, enterprises, organizations, and institutions, irrespective of their departmental jurisdiction.

Local soviets are setting up a special land bank [fond zemelnogo zapasa] to allocate tracts of land to legal and physical persons. Local soviets are organizing registration of citizens wishing to set up peasant (private) farms, to expand personal subsidiary farms, to engage in individual stockraising, and to obtain the use of tracts of land for truck farming, haymaking, and livestock pasturing.

The resolution also contains a paragraph relating to inefficient kolkhozes and sovkhozes. Possible ways and means of transforming them into associations of peasant farms an cooperatives will be determined. Their land may also be given to leaseholders, peasant farms, and industrial and other enterprises.

Caucasus

Armenian Premier Affirms Wish To Leave Union

LD0803120391 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 0600 GMT 8 Mar 91

[Report by correspondent Jozsef Barath in Yerevan]

[Text] This enormous country, the Soviet Union, will continue to sink into an economic abyss for at least another decade. Only those parts, only those republics which will separate from it can escape further decline. This is what Armenian Prime Minister Vazgen Manukyan said to Hungarian radio, not making any secret of what he expects from the local referendum planned for the fall. Yerevan should announce its wish to quit the Soviet Federation.

The Armenian head of government called the Soviet referendum of 17 March on maintaining the federation, a political game, a temporary maneuver. In his view, the result of this can only be that Gorbachev will again get a few months of grace from the Supreme Soviet. The republics, however, will not be satisfied with the already obvious final outcome, which can be expected because of the way the question was formulated in the first place.

Manukyan harshly criticized the earlier leadership of Armenia, which missed the opportunities given by the unparalleled international solidarity following the earthquake. Two years after the catastrophe, not even 20 percent of the promised residential buildings are completed. In Spitak, which was devastated by the earthquake, people struggled through the hard winter in tents.

Armenian KGB Official on Tasks Facing Department

LD0503214491 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1330 GMT 5 Mar 91

[Text] At the first session of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Armenia, the chairman of the our new legislature, Levon Ter-Petrosyan, stated that with the adoption of a sovereignty declaration we already have, apart from anything else, our own republican militia, our own Ministry of Internal Affairs, and our own Committee for State Security, which will deal with law and order in the republic. At the time, this sounded—I confess, for me, at least—somewhat unexpected, although in principle it was clear even then that we, while being a part of the Union, like any republic have our own economic and political interests which have to be protected by someone. Now I am talking to one of the leaders of the republican KGB, the head of its sixth department, (Georgiy Aretikyan), (Georgiy Khristoforovich), your department bears the ordinal number six, I think that in the era of glasnost it would be nice to tell our radio listeners what you actually do.

[(Aretikyan)] In any republic there are enterprises that deal with defense matters. The question naturally arises of protecting secrets. One of the main jobs which the operational staff of our sub-department have is protecting secrets. So we also monitor these matters, so that scientists and specialists act within the framework provided for by special resolutions and special laws for protecting this subject matter. In the recent period we have also been faced with a new task: We are switching to market relations and an expansion in foreign economic activity, and the question of commercial secrecy now arises. In our country there are examples when various joint enterprises, while adhering to this concept of commercial secrecy, have inflicted great damage both on themselves and their partners, foreign partners, and some foreigners have even refused any further cooperation.

There has now been a very great expansion in foreign economic ties. We are trying to organize our work so that our republic and the country should not suffer economic damage. Of course, we think that many foreign enterprises, firms and so on, are trying to cooperate with us with goodwill, but there are enterprises which are trying to harm us by means of economic agreements and contacts.

In the course of our work, you will understand, we come up against a number of other tasks, take for instance, the most recent task imposed on us, the sixth department, the fight against economic sabotage. There was an appropriate presidential decree, and after that an explanation was given on what rights and what obligations are being imposed on the KGB in the fight against such things as economic sabotage.

Armenia Extends Deadline for Land Applications

NC0703122591 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian 1730 GMT 6 Mar 91

[Text] Granting the request of the executive committees of the local soviets of people's deputies, the Armenian Republic Council of Ministers has decided to permit the rayon and local commissions on land reform and privatization to extend the deadline for the submission of appeals and applications for the management of agricultural and rural collective enterprises. The new deadline for the regions in the Ararat plain expires on 10 March 1991, and on 20 March 1991 for the remaining regions.

Azerbaijan President Mutalibov on Referendum

PM0803100791 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 6 Mar 91 Union Edition p 3

[Interview with Azerbaijan President Ayaz Mutalibov by M. Berger; place, date of interview not given: "Republic-Center-Union Treaty"]

[Text] [Berger] Ayaz Niyazovich, the main question facing each republic today is the determination of its attitude toward the Union Treaty and the holding of the referendum. About two months ago you said in an interview that talk of Azerbaijan taking part in and signing the Union treaty was rather problematic. Has your position changed recently?

[Mutalibov] Sane people—and I regard myself as one of these—realize that not a single republic will manage without the Union today, however potentially wealthy it may be. I have in mind all founders of the Union without exception. After all, look how even today, when many economic ties have been destroyed, what has remained of them ensures an existence minimum for all people, and this is now keeping our society afloat.

If some republic decides to leave, these ties will be destroyed definitively, because to count on someone succeeding, when he leaves the Union, in retaining the full volume and terms of economic mutual relations with other regions or in switching them to the world market while concentrating in his hands the solution of all political and other issues is at the very least naive. We must look at things realistically and realize that an economic reaction to withdrawal from the Union will follow in one form or another and that will lead to very grave upheavals, which it will hardly be possible to contain.

[Berger] But the development of the political situation in the country shows that the question of participating in the Union is not unconditional for all republics. The

draft Union treaty has so far been signed by fully empowered representatives of only eight Union republics.

[Mutalibov] I believe that when the question of the possibility of leaving the Union arose in the past two or three years and the leaders of our state answered "yes" to it, in actual fact the practical impossibility of doing this was always implied. When the situation in the Baltic put the question point-blank, so to speak, a law was adopted, as you recall, which defined the mechanism and schedule for withdrawal. I personally formed the impression that with the adoption of this law there remained a hope that everything would somehow be sorted out of its own accord and would settle.

[Berger] In that light the forthcoming referendum and the discussion of the Union Treaty will clarify these complex questions.

[Mutalibov] Before speaking of the Union Treaty and my attitude toward it I should like to ask: Why actually have we come to the point today where we have to discuss a Union Treaty? What processes compelled the country to set about defining its attitude toward the Union? We need an analysis of everything which has happened in the five years of perestroyka, which would also help to determine our serious errors in the policy of perestroyka and to answer the question: Why have we come to such a life? We are now preparing intensively to hold a Union referendum which should determine whether or not the Union is to be. We suppose that the overwhelming majority will express themselves in favor. What will come after that? What will happen? Only the signing of the Union treaty will not of itself resolve urgent problems.

I would support our reconstructing our Constitution within the framework of the policy of perestroyka and following the Constitution until a new one has been elaborated and adopted. In that case I think the question of the Union's existence would not arise. At the same time I want to note that I am not against the actual idea of a referendum. This new instrument of our political life is indeed necessary.

[Berger] What mood prevails in Azerbaijan?

[Mutalibov] The people realize that they cannot survive without the Union. But at the same time people are saying that the Union has been unable to help us acquire calm and resolve problems which have a direct bearing on the republic's sovereignty and integrity. The question arises: If this has not been achieved within the framework of the present Union, where is the guarantee that this will be successfully achieved within the framework of a new Union?

The mood in the republic is too motile, therefore it is hard to say very definitely what the prevailing viewpoint is now and what it will be in two to three weeks. The only thing which is perfectly clear is that a very great deal here depends on the state of affairs in our hot spots. If it is suddenly aggravated, we could, in the form of a protest or challenge, obtain a referendum result which everyone might later regret. What to do then? What to do in general if in some republics the idea of the referendum fails, if the result is "no," under the influence of particular factors? That will give rise to insoluble problems. We have already generated many such problems in recent years.

[Berger] How do you see the Union, how to reconcile the consequences of the 70 years of integration and interdependence with the idea of sovereignty, which has now become a powerful political factor?

[Mutalibov] The main premise is the Union for the republics, not the republics for the Union. We must agree absolutely specifically on the optimum demarcation of functions and powers and the distribution of property and money.

A real, entirely materialized sense of ownership and statehood should be felt at the level of the republic and not only at the level of the economic structures situated on its territory. Surely it is not normal for a central department to suggest to us that we lease from it natural resources in the republic, as happened recently when discussing one large project?

Surely it is not normal when we cannot dispose of even that part of our currency funds which come to the republic through the centralized import purchases? Why is it believed that such a multilevel distribution system is better than if we made purchases directly for ourselves?

[Berger] For all the importance of the question you raised regarding the transfer of the import quota to the republic—that is a local problem. What can be said about Azerbaijan's economic strategy, if it has already been formulated and is being implemented?

[Mutalibov] Our economic strategy stems from the position in which we all continue to remain today. I have in mind the narrow specialization in the development of individual economic sectors and their profound mutual dependence on production facilities in other regions. We will not avoid that. Our economic potential has already been formed and is operating. We cannot destroy it and indeed we do not intend to do so for the time being. But we are thinking of creating new structures, new enterprises, those which are essential to enhance the efficiency of the use of everything in which Azerbaijan is rich. For instance, agricultural production. That is a sufficiently powerful sector of our economy. We do not view it as a new abstract agro-industrial complex. We put it like this: We have cotton growing, vegetable growing, viticulture, and fruit growing. Each of these structural compone should have its own program. The idea of the progra to enhance efficiency and reach the international le

Let's take cotton. The level of its processing, its quality, and the efficiency of the entire production form a single cycle. The task is to make greater use of it locally and to

process it into finished output so that it may enjoy a demand both in and outside the Union.

Or take viticulture. I am against the viticulture which for many years was geared toward ordinary fortified wines. We are improving the structure of wine making in favor of noble strains and the production of elite wine and wine products. Here the task is set of unfailingly moving into exports for freely convertible currency, which could be used to pay for the renewal of technology and the expansion of production. The government would receive its own currency deductions and consequently the republic as a whole would benefit.

Back when I was working in our State Planning Committee I said: What forms the national income of a banana republic? The export of bananas. In our Republic of Azerbaijan with its nine climatic zones there are as it were numerous such "republics" so let's pay special attention to that and develop what indeed develops best of all.

That is our strategy in the sphere of agricultural production. It is important that there should be the minimum state order and the maximum of our own prerogatives here. Here, if we are able to achieve success, it will in practice belong entirely to us.

In turn this development path acts like a two-rope, dragging behind it the production of packaging, glass containers, and much else, which, as they say, has been in a recumbent position throughout the soviet years. Our economic independence will be manifested and developed here and this content will fill the concept of "sovereignty."

[Berger] What about the sectors which come under a 100 percent state order?

[Mutalibov] Let's begin with the fact that the 100 percent state order for strategic output, especially raw material, puts the resource-exporting republics in a far more complex economic position than the one that takes shape where the production of finished output dominates. That is why we shall seek the repeal of the state order for the most important types of raw material and semifinished materials. Here a kind of demonopolization is also required.

But even in this abnormal situation we are trying to find so-called "windows": which ones? We have free hydrocarbon raw material which today is simply being discharged into the atmosphere, causing great ecological damage. Even people far removed from oil extraction and refining know of the flares which burn for years. We are suggesting to any foreign company that it invest capital in this business, and a very large amount of money is required here, we do not yet have it. Here we do not lay claim to a single gramme of the output which will be extracted from our flares. At the first stage we will be content with highly paid jobs for our people. Later, when expenditure has been recouped and the company has obtained a sufficient profit from the output produced, we will receive these capacities for ourselves. Not to mention the priceless capital of a skilled work force.

We are interested in increasing joint ventures. Their development is also part of our economic strategy. In general I believe that we simply cannot manage without joint ventures. For instance, take Apsheronskiy Rayon, with its stocks of oil. Here, after the excessively intensive extraction of oil in the forties and fifties, approximately 30 percent is left in the strata.

Understandably, during the war we were not concerned with conserving technologies. Understandably it would perhaps have been better to leave that oil as a legacy to future generations. But, forgive me, those future generations still have to be brought into the world, raised and educated in dignified conditions which so far we cannot ensure—there is a lack of funds. There is the Apsheronskiy Rayon oil but neither we nor the country has the money to develop it. So we are creating a joint venture. There was even the idea of a concession but so far the center is not embarking on that, it is afraid of something. But I think that with a 20-year concession we would transform Baku, we would move people from the pitiful "self-built houses" to normal apartment blocks, and we would recultivate the land.

The scrap metal situation is similar. There are 100,000 tonnes of it rotting at the bottom of the sea, not counting the old oil rigs on the platforms. The center is not giving us a license and cannot manage itself since there is no special dismantling equipment.

So we tour the Moscow offices, right up to the president's office, asking for licenses for each individual case.

[Berger] The implementation of strategy is a matter for the future, but the crisis must be combated now, today. Frankly, it is already a case not simply of a crisis but of saving the economy.

[Mutalibov] I see the way out in the speediest stabilization of the political situation in the country and the maximum enlistment of Western capital. Actually, the latter is a continuation of the former. Who will risk substantial capital by investing it in a politically unstable country? We have already felt for ourselves the drastic reduction in the influx of businessmen, even compared with last year.

So far, it is true, this interest, in our republic at least, has not been extinguished and we are trying to support all sensible proposals.

Of course, our partners are taking a risk; after all, we cannot back up the contract with real bank guarantees since we do not have our own currency reserves, and that is also an abnormal situation which should be changed. But for the time being, we are having to agree on the basis of a gentlemen's agreement and guarantees of the authority of presidential power.

The joint production, with the Italians, of food processors is a major and successful example of cooperation. On our side the domestic air conditioner plant is taking part in the project, begun some time ago. The Italian side has taken on the whole currency side of the project. The day is already near when the series production of output will begin.

[Berger] Ayaz Niyazovich, a purely political question. Recently the words "Soviet" and "socialist" were removed from the republic's official name. The republic's state symbols have changed. This has happened under a president who simultaneously heads the republic's Communist Party. Do you not fear accusations of ideological apostasy?

[Mutalibov] I am more afraid of accusations of ideological stagnation. But I do not think I have earned them.

The change of name cannot be viewed as a change of sociopolitical system. In our case it is primarily a reflection of the growth of national self-awareness.

Next, we cannot be distracted from the processes taking place not only in Azerbaijan. Once at the Federation Council someone who is now a former leader of the country said in a heartfelt way that during the discussion of the Union treaty doubt is being cast not only on the concept of "socialist" but also on the concept of "Soviet." I asked to speak then and said: Not so long ago we were taught that the political basis of our state consists of the soviets of all levels and the economic basis consists of public ownership of the means of production. There were no reasons to doubt that. But now we have all accepted privatization and a mixed economy. That means the economic basis is changing. A new figure has appeared—the entrepreneur, with whom the authorities must collaborate through the tax system which, naturally, leads to the municipalization of power. That is, to use well known terminology, it may be said that the superstructure is changing above the changing base.

Voicing this opinion at the Federation Council, I was not alone.

As for my membership in the Communist Party, I would not divide society into "red" and "white." I worked for 11 years as a plant director and I know what party diktat is like. I have been in the party for many years and I know it does not consist solely of orthodox members. There are reforming communists for whom everything new of benefit to society is not alien.

[Berger] In conclusion allow me to ask what is perhaps not an entirely serious question. If the Caspian were to bring you a golden fish, what wish would you ask it to grant?

[Mutalibov] Quite a serious question, actually. I would wish for the speediest civil consensus in our republic and in all parts of our country, for tolerance for each other, an understanding by the majority of society of the general problems of the state and sympathy for people's private problems and individual needs.

But what I would not wish is for some magic spell, some miracle to help us achieve all this. Only we ourselves can do it.

Azerbaijan Attitude 'Not Unanimous' on Referendum

LD0703031191 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1645 GMT 6 Mar 91

[By unidentified AZERINFORM-TASS correspondent]

[Text] Baku, 6 Mar (AZERINFORM-TASS)—The attitude toward the forthcoming referendum in the USSR is not unanimous in the republic. Although the question of Azerbaijan's participation in the referendum was considered beforehand in three permanent commissions of the Supreme Soviet, for a long time members of the Azerbaijan legislature could not come to a unanimous view.

Some of the deputies think that, under conditions of the Karabakh conflict, when "the center is not able to ensure the protection of the lawful rights, sovereignty, and territorial intergrity of the republic, there cannot be any question of holding a referendum on the republic's territory on 17 March." In the view of other legislators, in today's political and economic conditions, the destruction of ties between republics is leading to a weakening of not only the Union but also each of them. It is another matter that it is essential to have a renewed Soviet federation, a Union of sovereign republics, the rights and obligations of which should be clearly stipluated in a new Union treaty. There are also those who, while not objecting in principle to the republic's participation in a Union referendum, are insisting on the need to postpone the holding of it, taking into account objective reasons, among which are the situation in Narogno-Karabakh and in regions of Azerbaijan that border Armenia.

It has been decided to hold discussions during the session on 7 March. One of the reasons is the need to wait for the results of the seesion of the Soviet of the Federation.

Deputies have started forming a Cabinet of Ministers of the Azerbaijan Republic.

Azerbaijan Legislature Votes To Hold Referendum

LD0703192291 Moscow TASS in English 1911 GMT 7 Mar 91

[Text] Baku March 7 AZERINFORM-TASS—The Azerbaijani parliament today decided that an all-Union referendum on retaining the Soviet Union will be held on the republic's territory on March 17.

The decision followed heated debates between deputies supporting different points of view, and was taken by a roll-call vote.

'Pogram' in Ossetian Village; Gunfire in Tskhinvali

LD0703174391 Moscow Central Television Vostok Program and Orbita Networks in Russian 1530 GMT 7 Mar 91

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] Here's a report from a TASS correspondent: At the press center of the emergency committee under the chairman of the North Ossetian Soviet Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet, he was told that shots rang out again last night in Tskhinvali and its environs. In the village of Satkari fighters carried out a pogrom in Ossetian homes. There are wounded. Four Ossetians were taken hostage.

Update on Situation in South Ossetia

LD0703182691 Moscow Central Television Vostok Program and Orbita Network in Russian 1530 GMT 7 Mar 91

[Report by special corespondent Nana Gongadze; from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Excerpt] The events in Tskhinvali and its environs, the endless sorties by Ossetian fighters, tens of dead and wounded—all of this troubles both the Georgians and the Ossetians living in Borzhomi, Gori, Rustavi, Lagodekhi, and other cities in Georgia. Outside the oblast's boundaries there are more than 120,000 manual and office workers, collective farmers, and students. Representatives of mixed Georgian-Ossetian families gathered at a rally in Tbilisi. [passage omitted]

A rally of many thousands took place at the approaches to the city. Those taking part in the peace convoy met with local residents, and a dialogue took place between them. [passage omitted]

Yesterday, five hostages of Georgian nationality were freed, but at dawn today a group of Ossetian fighters bombarded the Georgian villages of (Zemo-Achabeti) and (Monasteri) with missiles and mortars. One resident was killed.

Abkhazia To Conduct 17 Mar Union Referendum

LD0503223791 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1630 GMT 5 Mar 91

[Text] As we have heard from Tbilisi, the session of the Abkhazian Supreme Soviet has decided to conduct the all-Union referendum, which the Supreme Soviet is planning to hold on 17 March, on the republic's territory. This was reported in the VESTNIK GRUZII [Georgian Herald]. The majority of the Abkhazian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic people's deputies voted in favor of this resolution.

Central Asia

Turkmenia's Niyazov Comments on Union Referendum

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[Interview with Saparmurad Atayevich Niyazov, president of the Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic, by program host V.V. Vishnevskiy in Ashkhabad; date not given; from the "Union Treaty: Road to Concord" program—recorded]

[Text] [Vishnevskiy] We are continuing our discussion of the all-Union referendum. Today we have come to Ashkhabad, the capital of Turkmenia. Saparmurad Atayevich, when I arrived here, I took a close look at the newspapers published in Turkmenia. Something that—to be frank—put me on my guard a bit was the unanimous approval of the referendum.

[Niyazov] In our republic as a whole there has been no pressure of diktat. Congresses have been held without any prompting. Decisions have been adopted independently. For example, the two-day writers' congress which ended the other day adopted an appeal to the entire creative intelligentsia, urging them to support the forthcoming referendum. Women's organizations, youth organizations, and veterans' councils have themselves, independently, adopted appeals to all their social forces, calling on them to take part in the referendum, without the diktat or prompting which we, the party, were thought to exercise in the past.

Therefore there is no need in the Republic for typecasting along the old lines. I believe that this is the view of the public as a whole—one which takes account of all sections of the population. Iitially, when we were first asked whether a referendum should be held or not, I personally, as president, was against the idea.

[Vishnevskiy] That is interesting to hear.

[Niyazov] When I said there was no need for haste, I felt that there were subjective factors militating against the holding of a referendum today. These included the food shortages, and the absence of clearly arranged two-way deliveries. The national economy is undermined by the arbitrary way in which people are behaving, the idea that they can get away with anything. So far we have not seen anything, in the legislative field, except general appeals and exhortations to work better. Leaders are saying that things will get even worse, that the difficulties will increase. The population reacts to this sort of thing. It affects their attitude to the referendum, too. This reaction is a subjective factor. If it were not for all these things, the referendum would of course take place in a more objective atmosphere, I believe. After all, every worker or office employee judges everything around him, including political processes, by how his own problems are tackled.

For this reason, if the referendum results in a majority for the strengthening of the Union, I believe that this may give some extra strength and confidence to those people in the leadership who at the moment lack confidence in the tackling of these economic questions, compliance with the laws and the Union Constitution. That will be the result. That is the hope. Maybe these comrades consider that, after this, they will have a mandate from the population.

At the same time, one is apprehensive over the fact that, for 70 years, these 15 fraternal republics, about which we have spoken, have developed different views. They have huge political—I mean, situations could arise in which a number of republics refuse to participate.

[Vishnevskiy] That was exactly what I was referring to, that this may exacerbate things.

[Niyazov] It seems to me, all the same, that there must now be intensive talks and negotiations with the leadership of these republics, without mutual recrimination. There must be roundtable discussions without a time limit, in the interests of the people. We must now...

[Vishnevskiy, interrupting] Cast aside all prejudice, and talk while the going is good, so to speak.

[Niyazov] Yes. In these conditions the ordinary worker or office employee has sensed that individual groups are waging a political struggle. Many of them do not really represent the people, although they claim to be speaking in the name of the people. People have begun to see through this. This makes people disenchanted with all political measures. Here in the republic we closely follow people's moods. We try not to conceal anything from them. The republic's leaders express their views on all problems raised by our population. We do not evade such issues. We try to hold meetings. We acknowledge to the people that even today we experience diktat from the center. We tell them that we favor a reinvigorated federation, but make it clear at the same time that we will not achieve all the powers of sovereignty and independence within a reinvigorated federation in one, or even three, years. This is because of many material, labor, moral, and psychological factors.

[Vishnevskiy] It is too complicated.

[Niyazov] Yes, it is too complicated. We do not think that this can all fall into place, with one abrupt movement, or that it will be possible to say: You are all independent and sovereign within a reinvigorated federation—make whatever decisions you want to. We have already encountered a number of problems, with every republic deciding things in different ways. This is already affecting us.

[Vishnevskiy] Saparmurad Atayevich, we have gotten around to the republic and its specific circumstances. The man in the street, so to speak, believes that the republic supports the referendum simply because the republic is rich in raw materials and nothing else. It simply cannot exist without the center and, say, ties with the Russian Republic, with Russia, to be more precise.

[Niyazov] Today we help other republics with natural gas, chemical feedstock and cotton fiber. We are also perfectly aware that per capita GNP in our republic is much higher than in some other republics. Our economic potential is such that per capita output of oil, gas, cotton, mineral fertilizer, and chemicals is higher than in more developed capitalist countries. My idea of a reinvigorated federation is that each republic should be self sufficient and seek out its potential reserves in order to raise the well-being of people, without relying on bread produced in a different republic. But in these conditions it would be dangerous if the republic were to take an initiative, or embark on actions, which are against the interests of other republics.

Therefore a center is needed to regulate these controversial questions. A Union treaty is needed. A reinvigorated Union is needed. Our understanding is that Turkmenia can exist independently, but only in the context of a reinvigorated Union. Every step we take will be weighed to make sure that it is in the interests of every inhabitant of the republic, irrespective of nationality or ethnic group, in the interests of all working people in the republic. The political, economic, and social actions which we will take and are taking will never be at the expense of the Union or any other republic. We are trying to ensure that in all spheres our cooperation is mutually beneficial and in the interests of all of us. These opportunities exist within a reinvigorated federation.